



## Discernment of Despotic leadership through the Interpersonal deviance: Mediation Moderation Model

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**Abstract-** This study inculcate the discernment of despotic leadership through interpersonal deviance by the application of social exchange fit theory. Current research work also narrated the mediation moderation model of state self-esteem and core self-evaluation in the relationship of despotic leadership and interpersonal deviance. This study unfolded the fact that state self-esteem and core self-evaluation tend to curtail the effect of despotic leadership on interpersonal deviance. Through dispensing questionnaire to the educational department employees of Pakistan, data have been acquired from 500 employees to elucidate the hypothesis of the current study. Current research work employed SPSS and Model 7 to run the data analysis. The analysis explored that personal disposition and characteristics alleviate the positive relationship of despotic leadership and interpersonal deviance. More specifically, when the core self-evaluation level is higher in the relationship between despotic leadership and state self-esteem, the magnitude of mediation of state self-esteem became weaker. Moreover, following the social cognitive and conservation of resource theory, mediation moderation model buffers the positive relationship of despotic leadership and interpersonal deviance. Organizations can succor their employees by relating and pertaining to personality development and ameliorating their personal characteristics.

**Keywords:** State self-esteem, core self-evaluation, despotic leadership, interpersonal deviance

### I. INTRODUCTION

Since 1998 till now, many biggest corporate scandals like Waste Management, Enron, Worldcom, Tyco, AIG and Lehman Brothers open a new area of research on darker aspect of leadership. Looking at the dark side of leadership and top executives is a serious matter for organizations (Hoobler & Hu, 2013) these days. Schilling (2009) had divided it into eight categories: exploitative leadership; insincere leadership; despotic leadership; failed leadership; restrictive leadership; laissez-faire leadership; avoiding leadership (active); avoiding leadership (passive). Despotic leader required unquestionable obedience and agreement from subordinates, imposed using a more explicit and active leadership style, such as being controlling and demanding, and behaving selfish and unsympathetic toward followers' interests and needs (Schilling, 2009). Such leadership focuses to increase power over its subordinates and creates high status distance relationships with followers. Such leaders have self-interested behavior, low ethical standards and are morally corrupt (De Hoogh & Den Hartog, 2008). Unlike abusive supervision, tyrannical leadership, destructive leadership, and supervisor undermining, where major concern is on humiliating, oppression, and aggressive behaviors having dishonest and immoral leader character, despotic leadership shows egoistic behavior in order to use, manipulate and exploit subordinates for his personal gains. Despotic leadership is supposed to destroy subordinates'

enthusiasm about the future. These subordinates are further expected to be afraid of their place in the organization. They may notice about themselves or other persons around them are actually exploited or treated unfairly by leader and they experience their organization has the work environment it provides is more hostile, a less optimistic and hopeful feeling about organization, hence voluntary turnover resultant.

As discuss earlier that such exchange relationship with despotic leader, subordinates may not respond to the leader behavior directly, may do so via indirect means, for instance by showing undesired behaviors like workplace deviance. Alternatively, when leaders representative of the organization, treat their subordinates poorly by displaying despotic or abusive, narcissist behaviors, subordinates may think that the organization is not giving value and respect to them and consequently to get even they involve in organizational deviance (Lian et al., 2012; Tepper, 2007; Thau et al., 2009). In Particular, research focus organizational deviance as the result of high despotic leadership being confronted (Naseer *et al.*, 2016), as it proves that subordinates respond to leader's low ethical behavior by exhibiting workplace deviance (Tepper, 2007). Since subordinates encountered with high despotic behavior every so often cannot show detriment directly towards the leader due to the authority difference, instead they inclined to react toward the organization (Tepper et al., 2009).

Previous research indicates that suffering of hostile relationship by employees from their managers, they may not respond due to immediate punishment fear directly, and participate in behaviors that harm the whole organization instead (Lyons & Scott, 2012). Due to the authority distinction, subordinates often confronted high despotic leader behavior incapable to respond towards their leader openly, so they persuaded to react towards organization instead (Tepper et al., 2009).

As by another fact leader's performance is a mirror of follower's achievements as leaders are representatives of an organization. By this fact leadership is the most powerful predictors of workplace deviance of employees (Tepper et al., 2009). According to social cognitive theory, environment has influential impact on individual behavior (Bandura, 1986), as people learn from their environment by observing how to engage in different behaviors. The main environmental cues include the presence of role models who demonstrate specific behavior, and the capacity to learn from such behavior is valuable because it prevents individuals from trouble of learning through trial and error. Such modeling processes often occur, consciously or unconsciously, through schemata (Bandura, 1986). Within an organization, supervisors are high ranked models, and thus employees tend to copy their behaviors (X.-Y. Liu & Wang, 2013). So, we find the relationship of despotic leader's behavior leads among subordinate same type of deviance behavior towards their co-workers.

## II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT

Ten Brummelhuis and Bakker (2012) model of Resources Work-Home (W-HR) state that in order to sustain mental or physical efforts all aspects of social context like emotional, physical, organizational and social need to be satisfied (Demerouti, Bakker, Nachreiner, & Schaufeli, 2001; Peeters, Montgomery, Bakker, & Schaufeli, 2005). Personal resources get damaged by all such contextual demands. In all these contextual demands, emotion will drain by emotional demand a type of contextual demands. A personal resource called state self-esteem that is own right of valued centrally to an entity (S. E. Hobfoll, 2002). Person about his value get negative aspect who experiencing from despotic leader contextual demand that effect his state self-esteem negatively. It also stated by model of in work domain behavioral negative consequences are also due to personal resource damage caused by contextual demand. Person keep in declining himself and thinking himself incapable to work are also due to such type of personal resource lacking (M. W. Baldwin & L. Sinclair, 1996). At times a person would not try his best or not even worse if he has believed that assigned work is beyond his capabilities this will lead to unrelated work done by him during working hours like he will behave badly about people, wastage of time on personal issues or on gossips. Counter workplace behavior underly all such behaviors. Prior research suggested that there exists a negative relationship of self-esteem with deviant behaviors (Donnellan et al., 2005; Fong et al., 2008; Lochman & Dodge, 1994; Papadakaki et al., 2009).

According Ten Brummelhuis and Bakker (2012) model of W-HR, deviant behavior of workplace from one side to other side also due to damage to personal resources on other sided work-home contextual demands

interface. Taking this perspective into account we can say that state self-esteem's personal resource depletion also due to contextual demand from family conflicts. So, counter workplace behavior's negative outcome would also such personal resource lacking (Bai, Lin, & Wang, 2016). Principles of self-resources using if Brown and Mitchell (2010) we could also clarify despotic leadership consequences. As per needs of Maslow's hierarchy (1970) self-esteem a sociometer of belongings in the interpersonal relationship. It is explained in that despotic and abusive leadership destroy self-resources of employees (e.g., esteem, attention, and will-power) needed to behave appropriately. From threatened or victimized by the despotic leader result in weakening of self-resources of employees (Brown & Mitchell, 2010). Again people, who lack personal resource like state self-esteem, himself declining in work and thought himself incapable of doing a work (M. W. Baldwin & L. Sinclair, 1996). From a despotic leader psychological unsafe experiences drains this resource and produces effect of work lives spill-over of employees to the extent to halt work attitudes positive and they involve in more workplace deviance i.e. organizational and interpersonal deviance (Meurs et al., 2013).

Prior studies suggested self-esteem has negative association with deviant behaviors (Donnellan et al., 2005; Fong et al., 2008; Lochman & Dodge, 1994; Papadakaki et al., 2009). But in current study, we would see that how state self-esteem mediates relationship between interpersonal deviance and despotic leadership. As state self-esteem is contextual base, in situation of despotic leader humiliating, oppressive, and unquestioned compliance causes self-resource that is state self-esteem depletion leading to increasing possibility of interpersonal deviance. Tone at the top gives' acceptable behavior stimuli to the subordinates.

### **H1: State self-esteem mediates the impact of despotic leadership on interpersonal deviance.**

As per conversation of resources theory given by S. E. Hobfoll (2001) person always do efforts to achieve and maintain those resources which help him in goals accomplishment. As per COR second principle to sustain resources losses, recover from losses and gain resources person must spent his own resource reservoir. Consequently, we can say that to respond stressor and for building future needed sustainable resources reservoir person employs his key resources. Furthermore, personal, material, and social resources reservoirs and attainment build a positive feeling to become capable of dealing stressful challenges among persons, families, groups, and organization. This theory states that person strives best to adopt coping mechanism to minimize resource loss, the loss which may make him feel discomfort. Measurement for checking the dispositional factors influence on job attitude is Core self-evaluation (CSE) (Chang et al., 2012). Whereas person thinking of that he is capable and have control of himself over his life in comparison to the person having less feeling of control and capabilities to solve problem has higher CSE than the person explained later. Persons which are always inclined to show positive work attitudes like job satisfaction & commitment and positive behaviors like citizenship & task performance possess higher CSE than person having lower CSE who exhibit the same. One study also stated that in workplace context has relational implication of CSE which previously overlooked due less directly manifestation of its effect. As an example, according to Zhao et al. (2018) suggested that persons having lower CSE possibility to exhibit relational ties of elicit helpfulness is less as social support is positively related to CSE (Kammeyer-Mueller et al., 2009). Kim et al. (2015) Also stated that for social reputation person possess lower CSE level are less protective. Consequently, in order to maintain positive impression on other this person would not put any efforts during his interactions. Friendship, loyalty, high-effort work outputs, professional respect and loyalty, between employees and their leaders are High-quality relationships by increasing employees perception and confidence about his work is to be meaningful and have impact, these make employees to be able to complete their work (Bin Saeed et al., 2019).

High core self-evaluating person focuses on his own optimistic thoughts and strives to continue on his performance his external focus (Li et al., 2014). Higher CSE lessens the influence of dispositional factor of despotic leadership to sustain self-resource of state self-esteem that helps him to deal stressor and maintain positive attitude and he may not involve in interpersonal behavior. We find that how despotic leadership will affect personal resource i.e. state self-esteem create mediating relationship with interpersonal deviance with core self-evaluation moderate this relationship.

**H2: State self-esteem mediates the interactive effect of despotic leadership and core self-evaluation on interpersonal deviance.**




Fig 1: Proposed Research Framework

III. DATA METHODOLOGY

The main aim of the current study is to examine the mediation moderation model to scrutinize the personal characteristics effect on the despotic leadership and interpersonal deviance relationship. The nature of the study is cross sectional with the deductive research approach. The data was collected from the employees of education department of Pakistan. Convenient sampling was used to collect the data from the 500 respondents through filling a structured questionnaire.

**3.1 Measurement of variables**

The research have characterized the personal disposition through state self-esteem and core self-evaluation. For analysis variables were measured on a five point likert scale. Despotic leadership was measured through 06 item scale (De Hoogh and Den Hartog 2008). A sample item is “Tends to be unwilling or unable to leave control of projects or tasks”, and the response ranged from strongly disagree to strongly agree. A 07 item unidimensional scale developed by (Bennett and Robinson 2000) was used to measure interpersonal deviance. A sample item is “Said something hurtful to someone at work”. State self-esteem was measured by a 10 item scale adapted from (Dehart and Pelham 2007), a sample item was “I feel that I have a number of good qualities”. To measure core self-evaluation scale developed by Bono and Judge (2003) was used. That scale measured the personal characteristics like emotional stability and self-esteem. 12 items were used in this scale, one of the item was “There are times when things look pretty bleak and hopeless to me”. To control the discombobulating effect of demographic variables data have been collected on age, education, gender and work experience (Fariselli, Freedman, Ghini, & Valentini, 2008).

IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Data collected from the final sample of 500 respondents of which 34% were male and 66% female with an average age of 26 years and more than 50% holds a master level degree. Data have been analyzed using SPSS Process macro (Model 4 and Model 7) (Hayes, 2012; Preacher, Rucker, & Hayes, 2007) to substantiate the moderation mediation model. Regression analysis maneuvering path analytic approach (Edwards & Lambert, 2007; Preacher et al., 2007) was used to elucidate the hypotheses. To check the internal consistency of measuring instruments reliability analysis is used (Basheer, Hameed, Rashid, & Nadim, 2019; Basheer & Hassan, 2019; W. Hameed & Naveed, 2019; W. U. Hameed, Basheer, Iqbal, Anwar, & Ahmad, 2018; W. U. Hameed, Waseem, Sabir, & Dahri, 2020; Ul-Hameed, Mohammad, & Shahar, 2018; Ul-Hameed, Mohammad, Shahar, Aljumah, & Azizan, 2019).

Cronbach alpha (Table 1) shows the internal consistency of measuring variables.

<b>Variable</b>	<b>No of Items</b>	<b>Cronbach Alpha</b>
Despotic leadership	6	.909
Interpersonal deviance	7	.880
State self-esteem	10	.754
Core self-evaluation	12	.782

*Table 1: Meta-Analysis of Related Literature*

Confirmatory factor analysis using AMOS was executed to impede the construct validity. Goodness of fit indices (Table 2) exhibit that values are in line with the recommended values by the researchers [Hair et al. \(2006\)](#). To have a better model fit RMSEA value should be less than .08 and TLI and CFI scores above .90. The results evinced acceptable levels for these values (RMSEA = 0.05, CFI = 0.95, TLI = 0.98, and CMIN/df = 1.759).

<b>Indices</b>	<b>Standard</b>	<b>Measured Values</b>
CMIN / DF	Less than 3.0	1.759
GFI	Not Less than .90	.970
AGFI	Not Less than .90	.929
NFI	Not Less than .90	.975
TLI	Not Less than .90	.982
RMSEA	Below .08	.050
PCLOS	Above .05 or insignificant	.002

*Table 2: Goodness of Fit Indices*




Fig 2: Measurement Model

To elucidate the relationship of despotic leadership and interpersonal deviance regression analysis Barron & Kenny (1986) was run. Result confirm the existence of significant relationship of despotic leadership and interpersonal deviance. The results (Table 3) indicate that despotic leadership has positive and significant relationship with interpersonal deviance ( $\beta = .283, R = .283, p < .05$ ).

	R	SUM OF SQUARES	BETA	Sig
DL → ID	0.283	12.992	.283	.000

Table 3: Regression Analysis



Process model 4 (Hayes, 2018) has substantiated the mediating effect of state self-esteem on despotic leadership and interpersonal deviance relationship. Results ( $R = .283$ ,  $p < .05$ ) displayed in (fig 3) supported the Hypothesis 1.

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***** TOTAL EFFECT MODEL *****
OUTCOME VARIABLE:
  DEVI_ID

Model Summary
      R          R-sq      MSE          F          df1          df2          p
      .2832      .0802      .8768      14.8177      1.0000      170.0000      .0002

Model
      coeff      se          t          p          LLCI          ULCI
constant  2.7747      .2386      11.6286      .0000      2.3037      3.2458
DEPO_L    .2575      .0669      3.8494      .0002      .1255      .3896

Standardized coefficients
      coeff
DEPO_L    .2832
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Fig 3: Process Model 4

To check interactive effect of despotic leadership and core self-evaluation on interpersonal deviance by running process model 7 (Hayes, 2018). The result gives significant level of moderation effect between despotic leadership and core self-evaluation on interpersonal deviance mediated by state self-esteem.

Conditional indirect effects of X on Y:

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INDIRECT EFFECT:
  DEPO_L  ->  STATE_SE  ->  DEVI_ID

      CORE_CE      Effect      BootSE      BootLLCI      BootULCI
      2.8978      .0476      .0280      .0014      .1094
      3.4612      .0549      .0314      .0062      .1282
      4.0247      .0622      .0427      .0022      .1656
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Figure 4: Process Model 7 for Moderation Mediation Effect

Multivariate statistical tool Confirmatory factor analysis was applied to assess how well the measured variables represent the number of constructs.




Figure 5: Structure Equation Model

	Estimate	S.E	C.R	PLabel
STATE_SE < - - - DEPO_L	.026	.170	.153	.878 par_1
STATE_SE < - - - dI_X_CE	.034	.049	.692	.489 par_3
STATE_SE < - - - CORE_CE	.325	.180	1.807	.071 par_4
DEVI_ID < - - - STATE_SE	.509	.120	4.238	*** par_2

Table 3: Regression weights Moderation Mediation Effect

## V. DISCUSSION

In current research work investigate the relationship between despotic leadership and interpersonal deviance. Moreover, research work investigates mediating effect of State self-esteem on direct relationship of DL (despotic leadership) of(ID) interpersonal deviance. Result of hypothesis significantly correlated with the results of previous research. Current study hypothesis 1 stated that despotic leadership has direct impact on interpersonal deviance. The said statement is confirmed through the results of study which supported the statement with  $\beta=.283$  and significance level of .000. Previous researches (Naseer et al., 2016; Tepper, 2007; Tepper et al., 2009) also supported the said statement. Hypothesis 2 of current study stated that State self-esteem mediates the impact of despotic leadership on interpersonal deviance. This said statement is confirmed through significance level of .0002 and supported by previous researcher (S. E. Hobfoll, 2002; Spector, 2011).

## VI. CONCLUSION

This research promulgate the individual disposition and characteristics effect on despotic leadership and interpersonal deviance relationship. This research has concentrated on the mediation moderation model of State self-esteem and core self-evaluation on despotic leadership and interpersonal deviance relationship. By pinpointing the dual effect of state self-esteem and cross self-evaluation as an important individual quality, this study has added a valuable contribution to despotic leadership literature and effect of leadership on the subordinates.

### Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

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