



To Study The Effect Of Group Decision Making And Team Performance In Private Sector Industries

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Introduction

It is generally accepted that collective decision-making is always preferable than individual decision-making. However, this is not always the case! The phrase "group thought" was originally used in a (1952) article in Fortune magazine by William. H. Whyte, Jr. It is among the several aberrations and is a significant phenomenon that defies the concept of positive synergy. Whyte emphasised "rationalised uniformity," which he considered as a danger to uniqueness and creativity, in governmental structures and decision-making bodies. Victims of Groupthink, written by psychologist Irving L. Janis, is regarded as the foundational text on the notion of groupthink. It was released in 1972 This important study analysed how groupthink affected historical government policy choices. It also looked at judgments that leaders made in an effort to avoid groupthink, decisions that were the opposite of that. According to Janis, the in-group typically endorses a directive leader's predefined goal while stifling its members' own reservations, disputes, or suggestions for alternate courses of action. Groups who practise groupthink discredit outside perspectives, Groupthink is a tendency to seek consensus that can obstruct group decision-making processes and result in bad conclusions that, in turn, cause disasters Janis, 1972,1982. Group think is "a form of thinking people participate in when they are fully engaged in a cohesive in-group, when the members' yearning for unanimity overcome their urge to rationally assess alternative courses of action," according to Janis (1972). (p. 8). Janis also provided a thorough slope of the causes of groupthink, its signs, and the signs of poor decision-making that results in adverse consequences. sHowever, groupthink's detrimental effects in organisational contexts are not well supported by empirical research. Manz and Sims' research is the only source of empirical information on groupthink that has been drawn from work teams in professional environments (1982). Three anecdotal cases—two from production teams and one from a quality-management team—were quickly depicted to show the potential for groupthink in organisational contexts. They came to the conclusion that groupthink might reduce the efficiency of autonomous work groups and urged future study "based on a more rigorous quantitative background through the use of the groupthink symptoms as behavioural categories" (Manz & Sims, 1982, p. 782). The

groupthink paradigm in companies still needs to be quantitatively validated. In the current study, we used quantitative data gathered from task-performing teams across corporate organisations to investigate the validity of the groupthink idea (hereinafter referred to as organisational teams). Researchers have really opposed groupthink for a number of reasons. Janis' (1972, 1982) categorically negative assessment of groupthink is one of the main criticisms of his examination of the topic (Longley & Pruitt, 1980). Longley and Pruitt stated in their critique that performance is only negatively impacted by a premature concurrence-seeking propensity that occurs before evaluation of important choices. Additionally, concurrence seeking may occasionally enhance group performance. Snizek (1992), for instance, claimed that group conversations that centre on shared knowledge increase participants' trust in and dedication to the group's choices and activities. Furthermore, where a minor issue is at risk, even early concurrence seeking may be advised. The overestimation of the relationship between the decision-making process and its outcome by Janis (1972, 1982) is a related criticism (McCauley, 1989; Tetlock, Peterson, McGuire, Chang, & Feld, 1992). Tetlock et al. (1992) maintained in their systematic reanalysis of historical cases using Q-sort that "policy-makers displayed much more symptoms of vigilance than of groupthink in both the Mayaguez and Iran rescue decisions... Nevertheless, the outcomes in both cases were disappointing and embarrassing" (p. 419). Undoubtedly, there is a common propensity to credit undesirable results to a competent decision-making process while attributing bad judgments, like groupthink, to a good decision-making process (Graham, 1991). The relationship between the decision-making process and its result, however, is merely probabilistic since it is mediated by a number of factors, such as luck, as Tetlock et al. (1992) highlighted. According to survey research (Moorhead & Montanari, 1986), none of the indications of groupthink and poor decision-making had a discernible impact on the effectiveness of the group. The association between groupthink-induced choice flaws and outcomes, according to the scientists, "was not as robust as Janis indicates" (Moorhead & Montanari, 1986, p. 399). The notion that groupthink primarily addresses the first half of a generic problem-solving process has been criticised more recently (Aldag & Fuller, 1993). The stages of a generic issue-solving process include problem identification, alternative generation, alternative evaluation and selection, decision implementation, and decision control (Bass, 1983; Elbing, 1978). Groupthink only speaks to the first three stages of decision-making and ignores the control and implementation phases (Aldag & Fuller, 1993, pp. 541-542). Organizational teams both make and implement choices, despite the groupthink model's focus on group dynamics during deliberation. As a result, the groupthink model might not be able to adequately account for how well an organisational team performs. In addition to these issues with the groupthink model, there is also the question of whether groupthink truly has a negative impact on performance and, if so, how it may do so given the lack of conclusive empirical data to support this claim. Given this dearth of actual studies, the generally accepted notion that groupthink is harmful should be questioned. Given the shaky relationship between groupthink and performance and the fact that it only covers the first half of the problem-solving process, groupthink may actually prove to be just a marginally useful predictor of

team performance. In this study, we compared the cognitive (i.e., groupthink) and behavioural functions of organisational teams in order to better understand team performance. Cognitive functions represent decision making, while behavioural functions represent choice implementation, according to the basic problem-solving paradigm (Bass, 1983; Elbing, 1978). Evidently, due to their temporal proximity to outcomes compared to cognitive processes, behavioural functions may have more immediate and noticeable influence on results. In extreme situations, if execution fails, the result is a disaster regardless of how well the decision-making process was done (for example, the attempt to free the hostages in Iran; see Tetlock et al., 1992); but, if it succeeds, the result is a significant success (e.g., the decision by the Israeli government to raid Entebbe; see Maoz, 1981). In these circumstances, behavioural rather than cognitive capabilities appear to be more directly linked to the outcome. In this study, internal and external team activities were used to construct behavioural functions. Internal activities, such as team development, member communication, and other group maintenance activities, are directed at the group as a whole and represent intragroup interactions. Teams' external activities are focused on their surroundings to control how they connect with outside groups (cf. Ancona & Caldwell, 1992). Because it offers a thorough and impartial view on the range of potential team activities, the difference between internal and external activities looks advantageous in the context of organisational teams. Teams' external activities are focused on their surroundings to control how they connect with outside groups (cf. Ancona & Caldwell, 1992). Because it offers a thorough and impartial view on the range of potential team activities, the difference between internal and external activities looks advantageous in the context of organisational teams. Briefly stated, this study has two objectives. First, we made an effort to quantify the signs of groupthink and poor decision-making in organisational contexts. Beyond the techniques of lab experiments and political case studies, this set of data permitted an analysis of the ecological validity of groupthink. Second, we looked at groups' actions as well as their thoughts. We evaluated the relative effects of cognitive (groupthink) and behavioural (team activities) functions on the effectiveness of organisational teams. Since almost all studies of groupthink, starting with Janis, have focused on an external danger or crisis as the situational component causing groupthink, we employed a crisis as the research setting (Janis, 1972, 1982, 1989; Moorhead et al., 1991; Smith, 1984).

Literature review

Groupthink has been extensively researched in books, journal articles, and lab reports from the scientific, medical, academic, business, and governmental areas. Although many of these sources concentrate on political choices, government missteps, first responders, and the intelligence community, few directly discuss homeland security while providing hypotheses and case studies. As a result, to determine the influence of the phenomenon, the study in this thesis is based on qualitative data that was gathered and examined. In order to conduct the research and analysis for this thesis project, literature from the scientific, medical, academic, commercial sector, and governmental communities was used. In order to examine how groupthink impacts organisational structures across

society, with an emphasis on governmental institutions, four categories were selected. These topics include the history and uses of groupthink, its role in politics, its treatments and mitigating variables, as well as its relationship to social identity theory. 1. The History and Uses of Groupthink Victims of Groupthink, a landmark study on the groupthink hypothesis published in 1972 by social psychologist Irving L. Janis, documented the phenomena in foreign policy choices and "fiascos" including Pearl Harbor, the Bay of Pigs, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War. 7 The issue occurred when insiders in foreign policymaking swallowed concerns or disputes rather than upsetting the cosy atmosphere of accepted knowledge. These insiders valued their membership in this exclusive group more than the outcome of any specific decision. Perhaps since groupthink persisted throughout the years, Janis continued to write on the dangers of being nice. According to Janis, the judgments made by a group would be of worse quality the more often they exhibit groupthink's symptoms. 8 Groupthink has endured the test of time, in fact. James K. Esser provides a summary of groupthink theory research over the last 25 years in his article "Alive and Well After 25 Years: A Review of Groupthink Research." This study analyses groupthink case studies, such as Janis's original historical case studies of disasters caused by groupthink, like Pearl Harbor and the Cuban Missile Crisis, as well as more recent case studies, like Esser and J. L. Lindoerfer's investigation into how groupthink contributed to the Challenger space shuttle accident. 9 In his discussion of groupthink research's future, the author claims that it has "great heuristic value" since it still motivates new studies, theories, and hypotheses. 10 An alternative and critical assessment of these incidents is provided by this article's study of historical case studies of groupthink. The results of the laboratory experiments confirmed Janis's original hypotheses while also updating them to make them applicable to the homeland security theme of this thesis study. Ahlfinger and Esser evaluated two hypotheses derived from the groupthink theory in a lab environment for their study, "Testing the Groupthink Model: Effects of Promotional Leadership and Conformity Predisposition." The complete spectrum of groupthink symptoms was covered in these examinations. It questioned why organisations with leaders who actively advocated their own predetermined agendas would be more prone to succumb to groupthink than groups with leaders who actively refrained from doing so. The study concluded that groups with leaders who promoted their own agendas "generated more symptoms of groupthink, addressed fewer facts, and made a conclusion more rapidly" than groups with leaders who did not participate in this behaviour. Similar to this, the leadership in many homeland security departments has adopted authoritarian management styles. Senior leaders promote their own agendas and are stern with those who disagree with them or have different viewpoints. The study found that measurement issues hinder groupthink research, which in turn implies why groupthink studies are frequently qualitative rather than quantitative and case studies are utilised to pinpoint groupthink's symptoms. 11 A qualitative paradigm of case studies is also used in this thesis to evaluate if groupthink exists in the homeland security industry in light of the quantitative measurement challenges described in this article. Many social scientists disagree with Janis' work, and many have presented compelling arguments in opposition. These objections to the groupthink idea include theories that

groupthink does not significantly impair decision-making quality and that, in some situations, it can enhance rather than detract from teamwork and performance. Although the groupthink hypothesis was introduced more than 25 years ago, the author of the essay "A Comprehensive Empirical Investigation of the Relationships Among Variables of the Groupthink Model" claims that there is still no consensus over the theory's viability. All the elements of the original research are included in this inquiry of Janis's groupthink theory. "64 four-person ad hoc groups" were used in the study to gather data, which were then recorded and evaluated. Only two out of the 23 situations when Janis' predictions were verified were found in the analysis of the experiments. 12 The Organizational Application of Groupthink and its Limitations in Organizations by Jin Nam Choi and Myung Un Kim describes a research that looks at the impact of groupthink on 30 organisational teams facing approaching crises. According to the study, there are two components to groupthink symptoms. The first is that groupthink has little bearing on team performance and is unrelated to group performance. This study also reveals that team activities have a bigger effect on performance than groupthink, and that the signs of poor decision-making are not indicators of team performance. These findings are significant because they show how groupthink may have favourable effects on organisational groups in the future and because they cast doubt on the groupthink theory's validity. 13 In the corporate sector, groupthink is frequently researched, and a lot of this work may be used to improve homeland security. Groupthink: Collective Delusions in Organizations and Markets, a paper by Roland Bénabou for the National Bureau of Economic Research, investigates how collective beliefs and delusions develop and last in "organisations." According to the author, a concept known as "mutually assured delusion" frequently results in erroneous impressions of reality. This phrase also describes groups where the boss's reality or denial of reality trickles down to his employees, who unquestionably adopt his viewpoints. This circumstance accurately captures the current status of the homeland security industry and how each successive leadership in-group enters the scene with a "mutually assured illusion" to achieve its own political objectives.

Hypothesis

H0: There is no significant relation between groupthink and team performance.


HA: There is significant relation between groupthink and team performance

Analysis

1. Members criticized others who raised questions concerning the selected solution

N	Valid	40
	Missing	0
	Mean	2.5500
	Std. Deviation	1.60048

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Strongly Disagree	18	45.0	45.0	45.0
Disagree	4	10.0	10.0	55.0
Neither Agree nor Disagree	1	2.5	2.5	57.5
Agree	12	30.0	30.0	87.5
Strongly Agree	5	12.5	12.5	100.0
Total	40	100.0	100.0	



Interpretation:


45% of the respondents strongly disagree with the statement, 10% disagree, 2.5% neither agree nor disagree, 30% agree and remaining 12.5% strongly agree with the same.

- When new information was contradictory to our decision, we tried to rationalize our decision

N	Valid	40
	Missing	0
	Mean	2.8000
	Std. Deviation	1.62038

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
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Valid	Strongly Disagree	12	30.0	30.0	30.0
	Disagree	10	25.0	25.0	55.0
	Neither Agree nor Disagree	2	5.0	5.0	60.0
	Agree	6	15.0	15.0	75.0
	Strongly Agree	10	25.0	25.0	100.0
	Total	40	100.0	100.0	




Interpretation:

30% of the respondents strongly disagree with the statement , 25% disagree, 5% neither agree nor disagree, 15% agree and remaining 25% strongly agree with the same.

3 Most members did not raise objections in order to maintain unity of my team.

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Strongly Disagree	14	35.0	35.0	35.0
Disagree	10	25.0	25.0	60.0
Neither Agree nor Disagree	1	2.5	2.5	62.5
Agree	5	12.5	12.5	75.0

Strongly Agree	10	25.0	25.0	100.0
Total	40	100.0	100.0	




Interpretation:

35% of the respondents strongly disagree with the statement , 25% disagree, 2.5% neither agree nor disagree, 12.5% agree and remaining 25% strongly agree with the same.

3. We believed that our solution was right in the face of ethical consideration.

N	Valid	40
	Missing	0
	Mean	3.0250
	Std. Deviation	1.57688

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly Disagree	8	20.0	20.0
	Disagree	12	30.0	50.0
	Neither Agree nor Disagree	3	7.5	57.5
	Agree	5	12.5	70.0
	Strongly Agree	12	30.0	100.0
	Total	40	100.0	




Interpretation:

20% of the respondents strongly disagree with the statement , 30% disagree, 7.5% neither agree nor disagree, 12.5% agree and remaining 30% strongly agree with the same.

4. All members completely agreed to the selected solution

N	Valid	40
	Missing	0
	Mean	2.6500
	Std. Deviation	1.38767

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly Disagree	12	30.0	30.0
	Disagree	8	20.0	50.0
	Neither Agree nor Disagree	5	12.5	62.5
	Disagree	5	12.5	62.5
	Agree	12	30.0	92.5
	Strongly Agree	3	7.5	7.5
	Total	40	100.0	100.0




Interpretation:

30% of the respondents strongly disagree with the statement , 20% disagree, 12.5% neither agree nor disagree, 30% agree and remaining 7.5% strongly agree with the same.

1. We were confident that we could produce high-quality solutions.

N	Valid	40
	Missing	0
	Mean	2.8500
	Std. Deviation	1.56156

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Strongly Disagree	10	25.0	25.0	25.0
Disagree	11	27.5	27.5	52.5
Neither Agree nor Disagree	4	10.0	10.0	62.5
Agree	5	12.5	12.5	75.0
Strongly Agree	10	25.0	25.0	100.0
Total	40	100.0	100.0	




Interpretation:

25% of the respondents strongly disagree with the statement , 27.5% disagree, 10% neither agree nor disagree, 12.5% agree and remaining 25% strongly agree with the same.

2. My team surveyed as many alternatives as possible to solve the problem

N	Valid	40
	Missing	0
	Mean	2.7750
	Std. Deviation	1.54401

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Strongly Disagree	12	30.0	30.0	30.0
Disagree	8	20.0	20.0	50.0
Neither Agree nor Disagree	5	12.5	12.5	62.5
Agree	7	17.5	17.5	80.0
Strongly Agree	8	20.0	20.0	100.0
Total	40	100.0	100.0	



Interpretation:

30% of the respondents strongly disagree with the statement , 20% disagree, 12.5% neither agree nor disagree, 17.5% agree and remaining 20% strongly agree with the same.

8.


N	Valid	40
	Missing	0
	Mean	2.8000
	Std. Deviation	1.50555

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly Disagree	10	25.0	25.0
	Disagree	11	27.5	52.5
	Neither Agree nor Disagree	4	10.0	62.5
	Agree	7	17.5	80.0
	Strongly Agree	8	20.0	100.0
	Total	40	100.0	100.0

1. My team surveyed as many objectives as possible to solve the problem.

N	Valid	40
	Missing	0
	Mean	2.7250
	Std. Deviation	1.41399

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly Disagree	10	25.0	25.0
	Disagree	11	27.5	52.5
	Neither Agree nor Disagree	4	10.0	62.5
	Agree	10	25.0	87.5
	Strongly Agree	5	12.5	100.0
	Total	40	100.0	100.0




Interpretation:

45% of the respondents strongly disagree with the statement , 10% disagree, 2.5% neither agree nor disagree, 30% agree and remaining 12.5% strongly agree with the same.

1. My team put effort to obtain expert advice or qualified information from outside the team.


N	Valid	40
	Missing	0
	Mean	2.8000
	Std. Deviation	1.62038

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly Disagree	12	30.0	30.0
	Disagree	10	25.0	55.0
	Neither Agree nor Disagree	2	5.0	60.0
	Agree	6	15.0	75.0
	Strongly Agree	10	25.0	100.0
	Total	40	100.0	100.0



Interpretation:

30% of the respondents strongly disagree with the statement that they are satisfied with the academics of Organization of Dehradun, 25% disagree, 5% neither agree nor disagree, 15% agree and remaining 25% strongly agree with the same.



1. We could resolve the crisis with efficiency in terms of cost.

N	Valid	40
	Missing	0
	Mean	2.6750
	Std. Deviation	1.65464

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly Disagree	14	35.0	35.0
	Disagree	10	25.0	60.0
	Neither Agree nor Disagree	1	2.5	62.5
	Agree	5	12.5	75.0
	Strongly Agree	10	25.0	100.0
	Total	40	100.0	100.0


Interpretation:

35% of the respondents strongly disagree with the statement, 25% disagree, 2.5% neither agree nor disagree, 12.5% agree and remaining 25% strongly agree with the same.

1. The crisis was resolved in a way that moved us toward our goal.

2.	Valid	40
	Missing	0
	Mean	3.0250
	Std. Deviation	1.57688

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Strongly Disagree	8	20.0	20.0	20.0
Disagree	12	30.0	30.0	50.0
Neither Agree nor Disagree	3	7.5	7.5	57.5
Agree	5	12.5	12.5	70.0
Strongly Agree	12	30.0	30.0	100.0
Total	40	100.0	100.0	



Interpretation:

20% of the respondents strongly disagree with the statement , 30% disagree, 7.5% neither agree nor disagree, 12.5% agree and remaining 30% strongly agree with the same.


13. We are satisfied with the results of the crisis resolution. i.e. Overall, we coped with the crisis effectively

N	Valid	40
	Missing	0
	Mean	2.6500
	Std. Deviation	1.38767

	Frequenc y	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Strongly Disagree	12	30.0	30.0	30.0
Disagree	8	20.0	20.0	50.0
Neither Agree nor Disagree	5	12.5	12.5	62.5
Agree	12	30.0	30.0	92.5
Strongly Agree	3	7.5	7.5	100.0
Total	40	100.0	100.0	

Interpretation:

30% of the respondents strongly disagree with the statement , 20% disagree, 12.5% neither agree nor disagree, 30% agree and remaining 7.5% strongly agree with the same.



Subsequently an attempt was made to study whether group thinking has any influence on the team performance. "Pearson's correlation coefficient was computed to assess the relationship between group thinking and the team performance. There was a positive correlation between the two variables, $r = .717$, $n = 111$, $p = 0.000$ for some teams.

Conclusion

In 30 organisational teams facing approaching crises, this study looked at teamwork and groupthink. The findings demonstrate that there were two components to the symptoms of groupthink. Surprisingly, one aspect of groupthink strongly and favourably correlated with team performance, whereas the other revealed a negligible negative association. Additionally, there was no significant correlation between team performance and the signs of poor decision-making. Groupthink did not significantly outperform teamwork in terms of performance. The findings show that groupthink may indirectly affect performance through team activities. Creativity Suppression - Groupthink stifles individual thought, and innovation frequently suffers as a result. As a result, businesses frequently miss emerging market trends or technological advancements or fail to act upon them. Companies that are coping with challenging inner or exterior circumstances or have experienced failure in the past, particularly as a result of straying from conventional practise, are more susceptible to groupthink. Companies that value multiculturalism, a balance between men and women, and a variety of age groups are less likely to have groupthink than those that do. Analysis that is insufficient Significant aspects of a situation are typically left unchecked due to groupthink, sometimes with disastrous results, since dissenters are sometimes forced to toe the line and support the popular opinion. Janis lists the botched Bay of Pigs invasion, the cover-up surrounding the Watergate break-in, and the inability to recognise design flaws in the space shuttle that led to the Challenger catastrophe as examples of the detrimental effects of unbridled groupthink. Each time, a small, isolated group engaged in a critical decision-making process ignored obvious indicators that the suggested course of action was unwise. Positive effects- By finding and maintaining a common ground, groupthink may impose a measure of harmony in circumstances when there are severe levels of disagreement. By emphasising the familiar and concentrating a team's efforts on one goal, groupthink may also improve the performance of a new company or organisation. Groupthink may also help to foster the crucial "buy in" by promoting a united front after decision-making is complete and implementation begins. The self-assurance of leaders in their ability to lead effectively usually causes groupthink.

- a) The leader should designate each member as a critical assessor.
- b) The leader need to refrain from expressing preferences and expectations right away.
- c) Each member of the group ought to regularly discuss the group's choices with a trustworthy associate and then report back to the group on the associate's comments.

- d) Every conference has to invite experts. in turns, one or more at a time. It is important to invite outside specialists to disagree with the members' opinions
- e) The position of devil's advocate should go to at least one intelligent and knowledgeable participant (to question assumptions and plans)
- f) The group's leader should make sure that enough time is allotted for studying rivals' warning signs. The group should then develop alternative theories about the rivals' motivations.