



Outstanding Attributes Of Expression In Dualism In Mind

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ABSTRACT

As everyone is aware, the 'Mind-Body' relationship is a contentious topic in the study of the mind. Several pro-dualist arguments, despite their superficial allure, fail to demonstrate that our minds are distinct from our bodies in the Cartesian sense. The Identity Theory is an alternative philosophical theory of mind to reductive materialism that may be brought up in conversation. According to this idea, there is a one-to-one relationship between the physical states and processes of the brain and central nervous system and all mental states and activities. Although the traditional criticisms of Cartesian dualism remain formidable, this has not led to its complete rejection. There is still a clear separation between the mental and physical realms.

Keywords: Mind, Dualism, Consciousness, Relationship, Property.

INTRODUCTION

To hold either the belief that mental events are not physical or the belief that the mind and body are separate and unrelated are both examples of mind-body dualism in the philosophy of mind. Thus, it contrasts with other stances, such as physicalism and inactivism, in the mind-body dilemma, and comprises a variety of beliefs concerning the connection between mind and matter and between subject and object.

Aristotle agreed with Plato that there are multiple souls, and he elaborated on this idea by classifying them according to their respective functions: the nutritive soul, responsible for growth and metabolism, is shared by all three; the perceptive soul, responsible for feeling pain, pleasure, and desire, is shared only by humans and other animals; and the faculty of reason is unique to humans. Each successive level of a hierarchical structure officially supervenes onto the substance of the one below it; a soul, in this perspective, is the hylomorphic form of a functional organism. According to Aristotle, the first two souls, which are tied to the physical form, die off when the body does, but the third, which is based on the thinking, lives on forever. Plato, on the other hand, thought that the soul may go to a different body (a concept he called "metamorphosis"). Some philosophers have seen this

way of thinking as a sort of reductionism since it allows for the inclination to neglect extremely large groups of variables because of their imagined relationship with the mind or the body rather than for their actual worth when trying to explain or forecast a researched phenomenon.

philosophy, known as dualism, posits that the mind is an immaterial, non-spatial entity. Descartes differentiated the mind from the brain as the source of intelligence by linking it instead to concepts like consciousness and self-awareness. As so, he was the first Western philosopher on record to articulate the issue of the mind's relationship to the body. Different types of monism are set against dualism. While emergent materialism and non-reductive physicalism are often contrasted with substance dualism, property dualism might be seen as a sort of emerging materialism.

In the philosophy of mind, dualists stress the profound dissimilarity between the mental and the physical. None of them believe that the mind is just the result of the brain, and some even dispute that the brain plays any role at all in mental processes. This article delves into the numerous theories put up by dualists to account for this striking disjuncture between the mental and the material realms. Numerous pro and anti-dualistic arguments are presented and addressed.

Substance dualists often claim that the mind and the body are made up of distinct substances and that the mind is a thinking entity that lacks the conventional qualities of physical things such size, form, location, solidity, motion, according to the laws of physics, and so on. Substance dualists may be categorized in several ways based on their views on the connection between the brain and the rest of the body. Minds and bodies, according to interactionists, are causally linked. Occasionalists and parallelists dispute this, eventually attributing all visible interaction to God; they are often motivated by a desire to protect the credibility of physical science. The epiphenomenalist view is a middle ground that allows for the possibility that physical events might have mental events as outcomes while rejecting the converse. This protects the scientific rule of conservation of energy at the price of the intuitive idea that we act for reasons.

LITERATURE REVIEW

O'shiel, daniel. (2019). This study argues that a comprehensive examination of human emotion is necessary for a correct understanding of the epistemological and philosophical dilemma of dualism. No wonder therefore that Descartes, Spinoza, and Sartre—three of the most influential philosophers on dualism—all dedicated significant intellectual energy to the study of human emotion. Understanding emotion demonstrates that the issue of dualism is irrelevant to our immediate, pre-reflective experiences; dualism is a theoretical interest that demonstrates how we must posit two essential realms, one of nature and one of

consciousness, which are nevertheless always already entwined in experiences like emotion. In this way, it is clear that dualism is not a problem on the level of daily life, but it is on the level of knowledge and philosophy. To avoid confusing first-person and third-person perspectives and immediate and reflective experiences, dualism is an important tool that must be understood and used properly if one is to give a comprehensive theoretical account of human nature. Here, one must be cognizant not only of the dual nature of matter and thought, but also of the dual approaches to theoretical issues, namely, the scientific and the phenomenological. To sum up, it is possible to provide an accurate, dynamic explanation of human emotion while still acknowledging the value of dual (but not "dualistic") modes of thought.

Callie joubert (2014). Neeta Mehta has lately put up the idea that modern medicine is in a crisis. Descartes's theory is blamed for the problem, and the author of "Mind-Body Dualism: A Critique from a Health Perspective" aimed to discover why this dualism persists despite being rejected by philosophers, medical professionals, and the general public. My response to her criticism has three goals. I start by highlighting a more basic issue and demonstrating why dualism is inexorable from both a scientific and a commonsense perspective. I next argue that the self is not the same as a brain by analyzing the self-aware feelings of shame, guilt, and regret. The third part emphasizes the psychiatric problem and provides some of the primary causes behind it. Biological and physical reductionism, according to Mehta's argument, have created a crisis in the medical field.

Mathew h. Gendle. (2016). The separation of medicine from religious control was a major historical development made possible by the theory of dualism. Both the reductionist methods of contemporary Western medicine and the dualist perspectives offered by complementary and alternative medicine contribute to a cold and mechanical attitude to patient care. Multiple factors, including the patient's surroundings and their past experiences, combine to produce behavioral problems, which appear seemingly at random. Dualist approaches to understanding behavioral illnesses obscure the role that an individual's biology plays in the development of disease and divert attention from treatments with the greatest potential for success. Care for patients in the field of behavioral health should be holistic, but this approach has to be grounded on radical emergence rather than the artificial separation of the "physical" and "mental." In this way, doctors may treat patients with compassion while increasing their chances of a successful outcome.

Paul d. Gaschen (2018) The structure and nature of people may be analyzed from several perspectives. Even in the field of philosophy, this holds true. There are two main lenses through which philosophers examine the human: materialism and dualism. The dualist stance, which holds that there are certain aspects of the human that cannot be reduced to the physical, stands in stark contrast to

materialism, the view that all things causally important to the human are physical. In this thesis, I shall define and analyze the concept of Cartesian dualism. The question of how physical and non-physical substances interact is a special difficulty for this version of substance dualism. After elaborating on Cartesian dualism, I'll introduce this interaction issue and evaluate whether or not it offers a serious challenge.

Maung, h.h. (2019). Some works in the field of psychiatry argue that studies into the neurobiological roots of mental illness disprove the dualism of the mind-body problem. This research demonstrates that this assertion does not hold true for all dualistic perspectives. Referring specifically to Kenneth Kendler's treatment of the mind-body dilemma within biological psychiatry, I contend that criticism of dualism often confuses the psychological and phenomenal ideas of the mental. It also ignores the significant philosophical findings of modern dualist philosophers since it fails to recognize that there are multiple forms of dualism. In this paper, I suggest that the neuroscientific data supporting biological psychiatry poses problems for the classical dualism of René Descartes but not for the contemporary dualism of David Chalmers. This latter sort of dualism is consistent with a careful consideration of the scientific claims of biological psychiatry. This has significance for how psychiatry frames the mind-body issue. The goals of biological psychiatry are important to the "easy" issue of understanding psychological processes, but psychiatrists need not be concerned with the "hard" problem of consciousness.

DESCARTES' CONCEPTION OF MIND

We all know that the 'Mind-Body' connection is a hotly debated topic in the philosophy of mind. Because of the confusion around the connection between the mind and the brain, we find ourselves in this predicament. While the "Mind-Body" dualism or connection remains the core topic in the discipline of philosophy, the two primary schools of thought on the subject are now divided: (i) A Dualist Perspective, and (ii) A Monist Perspective. The dualistic perspective continues to assume the conventional view that the mind is immaterial, internal, and private. All thought, according to the monistic or physicalist view, consists of nothing more than the brain's (or the body's) physical operations. We are, however, not likely to insist on a strict either/or approach. We need to explain (i) the mind, (ii) the brain (body), and (iii) the relationship between the two if we take the concept of "mind" to be "thought" as an immaterial entity.

Everything, according to scholasticism, may be broken down into "substances" and "accidents," or, in more contemporary parlance, "individual things" and "accidental properties," respectively. Substances, on the other hand, exist without the need for anything else, whereas incidental qualities are reliant. The traditional view holds that all material substances are made up of a combination of matter and essence, with the important caveat that the essence is inherent to the

substance while the accidental properties are added later. That is to say, the interior structure of a material is determined by its essence, and not by its incidental features. Further, "a human being consists of a body and a soul," according to the conventional wisdom. The soul is said to be the very nature of the physical body. In other words, the connection between a person and his or her mind or spirit is analogous to the bond between a physical object and its essence.

The mental substance hypothesis, put forward by the "father of modern philosophy" René Descartes, holds that all humans, even "morons" and "infants imbeciles," possess both "mind" and "body." Both the "mind" and the "body," in his view, are distinct things. Each and every one of us embodies both intellect and body. The mind, he argues, resides in the body, but this duality is only coincidental. Because the mind survives even after the physical body dies. That being the case, 'mind' and 'body' are not coequal. He believes that "mind" is an active, self-aware material whose defining characteristic is "extension." Consciousness and physical extension are two characteristics that can only be found in the "mind" and the "body," respectively. Descartes turns the concept of 'essence' from the conventional viewpoint into that of a substance with its own unique essence. Descartes argues that

By body I understand all that can be terminated by certain figure, that can be comprised in a certain place; and so fill a certain space as therefore, to exclude every other body that can be perceived either by touch, sight, hearing, taste, or smell; or that can be moved in different ways, not indeed of itself but by something foreign to it by which it is touched I am therefore, precisely speaking, only a thinking thing, that is, a mind, understanding, or reason, - terms whose significance was before unknown to me. I am however, a real thing and really existent, but what thing? The answer was a thinking thing. It is a thing that doubts, understands, denies, wills, refuses, that imagines also and perceives".

Descartes argues that living organisms and inanimate objects are both of the same sort but vary by degrees. The animated body is intricate, with increased consistency between its many corpuscles. Leibnitz agreed with Descartes, saying, "All that take place in body of a man or any animal is as mechanical as the clock which makes place in a watch," implying that a human body is nothing more than a statue or machine composed of earth. Applies to any living, breathing body with enough motion to be animated may also be destroyed. A human body is alive because it can move across space, but a stone or other inanimate object cannot.

Furthermore, Descartes defines substance in two ways: (i) anything that is completely existentially independent from any other thing is a primary substance, and (ii) anything that is completely existentially independent from anything other than the Absolute substance is a secondary substance. Secondary substances like

"Mind" and "Body" have characteristics that are incompatible with one another, such as "consciousness" and "extension," for example. Once again, he distinguishes three types of dualism: (i) Real, (ii) Modal, and (iii) Rational, between the mind and the body.

(i) Real: Because mind (a substance) may be imagined without the logical requirement of conceiving from any other substance, e.g. body, there is a genuine separation between mind and body. Because of this, it is founded on the notion of logical conceivability.

(ii) Modal: The difference between the earth's revolutionary motion (mode) and its matter (substance) is one example of the two types of modal differences. The variation between two manifestations of the same property in the same material (b). As an illustration, consider the dissimilarity between the revolutionary motion and the spherical form of the earth.

(iii) Rational: Firstly, there is the separation between substance and its qualities, and secondly, there is the contrast between the difference between two defining features of the same thing (b). The difference between the length of time something exists and how long it lasts, for instance. Descartes argues that the only way to tell two ideas apart in one's mind (but not in one's reality) is via the exercise of reason.

DESCARTES VERSUS GILBERT RYLE

The dualist seems to have some problems. The issues arise from wondering how we can be sure that we are right in attributing mental states to other persons if they are in essence unobservable. How can I know that your mental states and the connections you make to behavior and brain condition are the same as mine? How can we put words to the connection between mental and physical states? How does the causal process work if they do? As I pointed out in the last chapter, many seemingly compelling pro-dualist arguments fail to prove that our brains are separate from our bodies in a Cartesian sense. The soul, self, or mind, in the dualist's view, is an immaterial entity apart from the body. Even newborn newborns have both a body and a mind. The human brain and the rest of the human body are two entirely separate entities.

The mind's "consciousness" is the essence, whereas the body is comprehended or described in terms of "extension." Since the dualist idea is that there are entities of a kind that are not recognized by physics (the science of matter), we cannot say, at least for the time being, that this conception is nonsensical; after all, it would be outrageous to dismiss as nonsense the thought that there might be more things in heaven and earth than are dreamed of in the physicist's philosophy. Therefore, I will not dismiss dualism as useless here because it deals with creatures not

recognized by physics, but rather will focus first on the far more fundamental presupposition of dualism, namely, that minds are legitimate beings in their own right.

When asked "how many minds?" dualists often reply that a healthy human being has a single mind. However, the legitimacy of the dualist's position remains in issue. Strawson claimed, while expanding on a Kantian theme:

"Suppose I was in debate with a Cartesian philosopher, say Professor X. If I were to suggest that when the man, Professor X, speaks, there are a thousand souls simultaneously thinking the thoughts his words express, having qualitatively indistinguishable experiences such as he, the man, would currently claim, how would he persuade me that there was only such soul? (How would each indignant soul, once the doubt has entered, persuade itself of its uniqueness?)

The dualist is running into problems, and they appear both fundamentally difficult and quite intractable. The dualist perspective asserts that there is a clear divide between (i) just existing as a physical being and (ii) being a compound of a physical body and an immaterial mind. We humans belong in the second group, whereas in the first group would be rocks, trees, etc. Though non-human animals may see the world around them and have wants for food and sex, it is worth noting that in part five of the Discourse, Descartes simply supposes that animals are the first category of mind-less, merely physical entities. Many of the creatures we see have surprisingly complex minds. Descartes' thoughts on animals:

" They have no intelligence at all, and ... it is nature which acts in them according to the disposition of their organs. (Writings 1:141)."

Descartes specifically claims that animals can't be differentiated from robots. Descartes' efforts to create a bright line between humans and brutes by referencing the existence and absence of minds are completely incorrect in this context, since there does not appear to be such a stark contrast between human beings and other animals. In his defense, Leibnitz argued:

".... the opinion of those who transform or degrade beasts into pure machines . . . goes beyond appearances, and is even contrary to the order of things. (Papers: 454)."

THE IDENTITY THEORY AND FUNCTIONALISM

According to the Identity Theory, mental and neural processes are the same and cannot be distinguished from one another. It's presented as a scientific breakthrough that proves the unity of the mind and the body. There are various variations on this idea, but they all share the belief that the mind does not exist as

a distinct entity, and instead all mental processes, events, etc. are precisely identical to brain activities, events, etc.

Before I go any further, I'd want to briefly restate that, according to Descartes, the mental and physical are incompatible since they are two different things. However, identity theorists argue that there is only one set of substances, physical substance, and that some members of this set can be referred to by both physical and mental expressions, even though we cannot know a priori that the mental and the physical are identical. This assertion of identity is general, not specific to any one mind-state or brainstate. It is argued that mental states (mind-states) are equivalent to physical states (brain-states) and that mental states may be seen in the same way as the states of a physical item.

According to Feigl, "raw feels" and "brain states" are synonymous, under the Identity Theory. This is a specialized term for both exterior sense perceptions and pictures and internal physical expressions and emotions. There is no logical need that "raw feels" and "brain states" must be synonymous. Although their connections to our mental states are little understood, the "raw feels" are realities in and of themselves. One may also argue that by saying this, Feigl is attempting to bolster an epiphenomenalist perspective.

"But I admit that for the ordinary purpose of psychology, psychophysiology and psychiatry an epiphenomenalist position is entirely adequate, if only the traditional, picturesque but highly misleading locutions (eg 'substantial material reality and its shadowy mental accompaniments') are carefully avoided"

Feigl, (who bases his thesis on Frege's separation of sense and referent), believes that the identity of "raw feels" and "brain states" is illogically predicated. His words are:

"The identification of the objects of this twofold reference is of course logically contingent, although it constitutes a very fundamental feature of our world and we have come to conceive it in the modern scientific outlook".

The issue that emerges from this is whether or whether 'rawfeels', consciousness, or even just awareness, is a brain activity. U T Place has responded to your inquiry with a resounding yes. According to U T Place's article "Is Consciousness a Brain Process?";

" 'Consciousness is a process in the brain' in my view is neither self-contradictory nor self-evident it IS a reasonable scientific hypothesis, in the way that the statement 'lightning is a notion of electric charges' is a reasonable scientific hypothesis".

The question of whether or not consciousness can be reduced to or analyzed in terms of assertions about brain processes is irrelevant to whether or not the mind is an activity in the brain. Dreams, fantasies, and other sensational brain activities are distinct from what we call "consciousness." Even though Place provides three examples to back up his argument that "Consciousness is a process in the brain," this statement may be either accurate or untrue. The explanations are:

"(a) by the fact that you can describe your sensations and mental imagery without knowing anything about your brain processes or even that such things exist., (b) by the fact that the statements about one's consciousness and statements about one's brain processes are verified in entirely different ways, and (c) by the fact that there is nothing self-contradictory about the statement 'X has a pain but there is nothing going on in his brain'

It does not entail dualism and at the same time cannot be dismissed on logical grounds that 'Consciousness is a process in the brain,' but it does admit that there remain a number of our mental concepts, of consciousness, of sensation, and mental imagery where a dispositional analysis fails and an acceptance of inner processes become unavoidable.

THE CONCEPT OF PERSON

In the previous chapter, I argued that, despite the prevalence of typical arguments against Cartesian dualism, adherents of the theory have not abandoned it altogether. The split between the mental and physical realms persists. In my thesis, I want to determine whether, in attempting to make sense of the human experience, a certain degree of dualism is required. If that's the case, then, why is it inevitable? Is this a function of our overall conceptual framework or of the mind itself? The challenge of conceptualizing a person is central to the mind-body conundrum. The terms "mental" and "physical" are used to describe two distinct categories of being. A physicalist or materialist is someone who holds the view that all things, including humans, are composed entirely of matter. A "person" is a physical body to materialists, whereas a "person" is a "mind" to rationalists. According to these thinkers, the human being is indivisible, consisting of both the physical and the mental.

Strawson views the no-ownership theory as illogical because it fails to acknowledge the foundations upon which our thoughts and feelings are based. But in reality, we can only speak about an individual's or group's experiences or states of consciousness. According to Strawson,

"It is not coherent, in that one who holds it is forced to use of that sense of possession of which he denies the existence, in presenting this case for the denial. When he tries to state the contingent fact, which he thinks gives rise

to the illusion of the 'ego', he has to state it in some such form as 'All my experiences are had, by (i.e. uniquely dependent on the state of) body B'. For any attempt to eliminate the 'my' or any expression with a similar possessive force, would yield something that was not a contingent fact at all. The proposition that all experiences are causally dependent on the state of a single body B, for example, it is just false. The theorist means to speak of all the experiences had by a certain person being contingently so dependent. And the theorist cannot consistently argue that 'all the experiences of person P' means the same thing as 'all experiences contingently dependent on a certain body B', for then his proposition would not be contingent as his theory requires, but analytic. He must mean to be speaking of some fact contingently true that they are all dependent on body B. The defining characteristics of this class is in fact that they are 'my experiences' or 'the experiences of some person', where the idea of possession expressed by 'my' and 'of', is the one he calls into question".

Although Strawson acknowledges that mental and physical processes are distinct from one another, he maintains that the two types of predicates are, in reality, qualities of the same thing. Strawson argues that, contrary to the no-ownership theory's position, "I" does relate to something, and that, in reality, I am a person. He claims that since the idea of a person is so basic, it is only to a person that we may attribute altered states of consciousness. And that 'pure ego' or one's own awareness is a derivative of the more fundamental idea of person. The idea of a person precludes any analysis that would show this to be false. The idea of a person may be used to explain or analyze "pure ego" or individual consciousness.

Strawson argues that a person is not a disembodied ego or individual consciousness, but rather that a person is an embodied ego or individual consciousness. No one is just their brain or their body; they are both. To put it simply, a person is a combination of two different sorts of subjects: an experiential subject, like a pure ego, and a physical subject, like a body. Strawson argues that we should rather state that a person is composed of a "subject" and a "non-subject" in order to prevent any more confusion. We may avoid the complications of both the Cartesian and the no-ownership theories thanks to this basic idea of a person. Further, Strawson distinguishes between what he calls "M-properties" and what he calls "P-properties," both of which he considers to be equally relevant to an individual. It reads, as he puts it,

"There would be no question of ascribing one's own states of consciousness, or experiences, to anything, unless one also ascribed, or were ready and able to ascribe, states of consciousness, or experiences, other individual entities of the same logical type as that thing to which one ascribes one's own states of consciousness. The condition of reckoning oneself as a subject of such predicates is that one should also reckon others

as subjects of such predicates. The condition in turn, of this being possible, is that one should be able to distinguish from one another, to pick out or identify, different subjects of such predicates, i.e. different individuals of the type concerned. The condition in turn, of this being possible is that the individual concerned, including oneself, should be of a certain unique type: of a type, namely, such that to each individual of that type there must be ascribed, or ascribable, both states of consciousness and corporeal characteristics. But this characterization of the type is still very opaque and does not at all clearly bring out what is involved. To bring this out, I must make a rough division, into two, of the kind of predicates properly applied to individuals of this type. The first kind of predicate consists of those which are also properly applied to material bodies to which we would not dream of applying predicates ascribing states of consciousness. I will call the first kind M-predicates: and they include things like 'weighs 10 stone', '*is in the drawing-room' and so on. The second kind consists of all the other predicates. P-predicates, of course, will be very various. They will include things like 'is smiling', 'is going for a walk', as well as things like 'is in pain', 'is thinking hard', 'believes in God' and so on.'

Like every other philosopher, Strawson is now attempting to address the following issues: (i) Why do we label people's mental states with names? & (ii) why are they attributed to the same thing as specific physical traits? He was really interested in responding to both of them. But without a doubt, his 'thought experiment' demonstrates that M-properties and P-properties may be attributed to a person exclusively, and that a person is a unitary idea or unitary entity with two distinct sets of qualities. Strawson's idea supports the view that a person is a combination, or that they are made up of two types of characteristics. One may also claim that this idea of a person lacks logical coherence. I'll go back to this idea in a while.

CONCLUSION

Even though psychologists have claimed to have solved the puzzle of the mind-body connection, much more research is needed. All the so-called theories of mind, as I have demonstrated in the preceding chapters, are fundamentally flawed. The fundamental aspect of consciousness has been disregarded by the likes of Behaviourism, Identity Theory, and Functionalism. The addition of the suffix -ness to the term consciousness appears to imply the quality *of being aware. To restate, there is no equivalence between mental and physical notions in our language. However, this does not suggest that there are two types of beings, one mental and one physical. Their ontological position is therefore still up in the air. My attempt at a conclusion is that Descartes's notion of the connection between the mind and the body as two entirely separate things is untenable, but it has not been adequately challenged. The idea of mind-body dualism persists in many guises.

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