



Declaration of emergency and response of political elites: a case study of General Pervez Musharraf

Siraj Ahmed Soomro, Assistant Professor, Department of Pakistan Studies, Shah Abdul Latif University, Khairpur, Pakistan, siraj.soomro@salu.edu.pk

Dr. Imdad Hussain Sahito, (R)Professor, Department of Pakistan Studies, Shah Abdul Latif University, Khairpur, Pakistan, drimdad60@yahoo.com

Professor Dr. Amir Ahmed Khuhro, Director, Institute of International Relations, Shah Abdul Latif University, Khairpur, Pakistan, amir.khuhro@salu.edu.pk

Abstract- In the name of Doctrine of Necessity, Maladministration, Islamization, Emergence of the economy government of Pakistan governed by the military for more than 32 years. Military dictators use the above terms to steal power from civilians. Political elites are the major actors in between military and civilian government. This case study analyses General Pervez Musharraf's declaration of emergency and how political elites responded. Moreover, this study investigates steps taken by General Pervez Musharraf during his tenure to secure his government and how he deals with political elites. It is also needed to examine how and why Musharraf took over the government and which political elites give him space to control the civilian government. To get the results of this study review references on General Pervez Musharraf era by different scholars and a questionnaire was adopted and analyzed on the statical package of social sciences (SPSS).

Keywords: General Pervez Musharraf, Political, Elite, Pakistan

I. INTRODUCTION

For several years, Pakistan's military has controlled the country directly. Except for a few years, it has served as a protector in the remaining civilian periods. After the birth of Pakistan, the rulers were forced to spend heavily in defense at the expense of other institutions because the country faced a danger. As a result, from the very beginning of its life, the military grew to be a powerful organization, with its commanders regarded as key players in Pakistan's governance structure. In 1954, the commander of the armed forces, General Ayub Khan, became a formal participant in the power corridor, and in 1958, he imposed Martial Law (Ahmad, 2013: 113-121). In 1969, 1977, and 1999, the tradition of the military takeover was revamped once more. Another explanation for military intervention in politics was the complicity of world powers, especially the United States of America (Dahl, 1973: 6). Despite their claims to be pro-democracy, they have consistently supported Pakistan's military rulers, from General Ayub to General Pervez Musharraf (Rahman, 2017). Civilian institutions were also harmed by the inept, inexperienced, and corrupt political leadership. It has been obvious for a long time (Khokhar, 2016: 230). Owing to low literacy rates and a lack of political knowledge, civil society and other elements of popular mobilization remained poor alongside state institutions. In Pakistan, the military has developed its corporate interests. As a result, the military's role in the political system has become important for the safety of civilians. Keeping in mind the reasons for the military's direct involvement, no one should expect full separation from the regime while giving it a civilian face once the military rule is established.

General Pervez Musharraf remained a very popular president during his whole tenure. Before coming into power, he was Chief of Army Staff and his popularity become very high during the Kargil conflict with India. During the Kargil conflict, he was well-liked among the peoples of Pakistan. When General Pervez Musharraf became the Chief Executive of Pakistan, he chose all technocrats to deal with all the political issues. Following were the names of Musharraf cabinet: Khurshed Mehmood Kasuri, Makhdoom Faisal Saleh Hayat, Shaikh Rashid Ahmed, Choudary Nouraz Shakoore, Ijazul Huq, Rao Sikandar Iqbal, Aftab Ahmen Sherpao, Babr Khan Ghouri, Zubaida Jalal, Dr. Abdul Hafiz Shaikh, Syed Sawanullah, Awais Ahmed Khan Laghari, Dr. Ghazi Gulab Jamal, Liaquat Ali Jatoi, Sardar Yar Muhammad Ajmal Khan, Maj. (Rtd) Habibullah Warriach, And Maj. (Rtd) Tahir Iqbal. (*Down, September 2, 2004*) Except for these name, General Pervez Musharraf include many retired generals from the army.

Research Questions of the study:

1. Do you know General Parveez Musharraf?

2. How satisfied were you with General Pervez Musharraf's leadership?
3. General Pervez Musharraf rule was legal?

Hypotheses:

1. The majority of Elite remained hand in hand with General Pervez Musharraf during the conflicting issues in his tenure.
2. The military regime affected the ongoing democratic process by sabotaging the constitutional sanctity.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

"In the Line of Fire" (A Memoir) is a well-known book written by General Pervez Musharraf himself, in which he shares his life experiences while serving in the Pakistan army. He also discusses Pakistan's internal and external affairs. Pervaiz Musharraf's memoir, *In the Line of Fire* (2006), details his personal and professional life. This book is a valuable source of information since it was written by Pakistan's then-President, who recognized his country's position as a front-line state in the War on Terrorism. Musharraf emphasizes the conditions of his ascension. He presents himself as a visionary leader who aspires to improve Pakistan. He stresses his seven-point agenda to solve Pakistan's domestic issues at the time he assumed office. "The events of 9/11 and their aftermath served to divert our attention away from these issues," he says. I didn't have a choice but to put security ahead of restructuring." During the East Pakistan crisis, he also emphasizes Pakistan's political difficulties. He says that "a brief political history of Pakistan shows how we have failed to develop true democracy." He correctly notes that our main political parties have devolved into family cults. He discusses the "War on Terror" and recounts his personal experiences with it. He recounts the events in Pakistan in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, recognizing the intense American pressure to comply with the US and abandon the Taliban. However, he believes that his decision was well-considered and in Pakistan's best interests. He claims that the "US was not the only victim of 9/11; the attacks struck Pakistan differently, but with similar ferocity." He describes militants' reaction to Pakistan's changed Afghan strategy, as well as the subsequent launch of a terrorist campaign against Pakistan in 2002. He looks at the geography of Pakistan's tribal areas, Pakistan's strategic compulsions concerning Afghanistan, and Pakistan's position in the WOT. He also goes into depth about early military operations in tribal areas, the difficulties the Pakistani army faced there, and how they overcame them, as well as the US and Pakistani forces' subsequent cooperation in the region. "Despite our best efforts, we were not granted timely access to modern technologies for intelligence collection, monitoring, and target acquisition," he says several times. Our army's activities are also reliant on technical information supplied by US forces." He also refutes the charge that Pakistan is not doing enough in the WOT by describing Pakistan's efforts in the WOT and the sacrifices made by its citizens and powers, thereby refuting the argument.

➤ S. Akbar Zaidi's *Military, Civil Society, and Democratization in Pakistan* (2011), Stephen P. Cohen and others' *The Future of Pakistan* (2012), Tasneem Ahmed Siddiqui's *Pakistan: Time for Change* (2011), Babar Ayaz's *What's Wrong with Pakistan* (2013), James P. Farwell's *THE PAKISTAN CAULDRON: Conspiracy, Assassination, and Instability* (2013), and James P. Farwell' (2012).

➤ Tariq Khosa's book "The Faltering State" (Pakistan's Internal Security Landscape). This book assesses Pakistan's recent internal security problems. It is an important contribution to the literature on governance and the rule of law. It is based on the author's nearly four decades of reliable public service (1973-2011) and offers unique insights into how Pakistan has been mismanaged at all levels.

III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This study has used positivist research philosophy containing the epistemological knowledge contribution. A deductive research approach is used based on conceptually and theoretical research paradigms. Moreover, research has made the choice of mono method, because study is indulged with explanatory research design (Saunders et al., 2011). Considering the concept of time horizon, this research includes cross-sectional time horizon. The questionnaire is used as research instrument, before collecting the data the face validity of adopted and modified questionnaire. The population frame of this study is unknown and difficult to identify the exact numbers of faculty members working in public sector universities of Pakistan. As the population frame was unknown, a non-probability sampling technique (convenience sampling) is used and set 500 respondents to participate in this study. A total of 500 online

questionnaires were sent and collected responses were to 328 (66% response rate). Respondents were graduate and post-graduate faculty members (National and International). The collected is being assessed by using SPSS v26 software.

IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION


Frequency table 1.1

Do you know General Parveez Musharraf?					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid		5	1.5	1.5	1.5
	No	4	1.2	1.2	2.7
	Yes	319	97.3	97.3	100.0
	Total	328	100.0	100.0	

Description table 1.1

Frequency 1.1 describes after passing through SPSS that total validation percent of “YES” 97.3% were agreed that they knew General Pervez Musharraf. Remaining 1.2% stay with “NO” which clearly show that respondent knew General Pervez Musharraf. This research study proves that most of the sample size population knew General Pervez Musharraf and his governance.

Figure table 1.1




Frequency table 1.2

How satisfied were you with General Pervez Musharraf's leadership?					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Not Satisfied	130	39.6	39.6	39.6
	Satisfied	198	60.4	60.4	100.0
	Total	328	100.0	100.0	

Description table 1.2

This question was based on an interval scale which is Satisfied and Not satisfied. Frequency table 1.1 asked for the satisfaction of (sample population) General Pervez Musharraf's leadership. Most respondents were satisfied with 60.4%. Apart from this 39.6% were not satisfied with General Pervez Musharraf's leadership. Here, it is clear received data that the margin of the sample population was satisfied with General Pervez Musharraf's leadership and rule.

Figure table 1.2



Frequency table 1.3

General Pervez Musharraf rule was legal?					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid		6	1.8	1.8	1.8
	Agree	71	21.6	21.6	23.5
	Disagree	64	19.5	19.5	43.0

Neither Agree nor Disagree	82	25.0	25.0	68.0
Strongly Agree	38	11.6	11.6	79.6
Strongly Disagree	67	20.4	20.4	100.0
Total	328	100.0	100.0	

Description table 1.3

This frequency table 1.3 was passed through the Likert scale and SPSS. This question was asked to know about the legality of General Pervez Musharraf's rule over Pakistan. Responses to this question were surprising because most of the respondents (sample population) were from Pakistan Public sector universities. The questionnaire was sent to 500 and received responses were 328. Out of the total received responses 21.6% were in a fever that General Pervez Musharraf's rule was legal, which means the sample population was in the opinion that General Pervez Musharraf rule was constitutionally legal. Furthermore, 25% of respondents were unaware of General Pervez Musharraf's legality. 20.4% of respondents were disagreeing with General Pervez Musharraf's rule was illegal. Based on responses, this research study can suggest constitution-makers frame any clear path for military intervene in the democratic process with safe passage.

V. CONCLUSION

This research study is purely based on General Pervez Musharraf's governing Pakistan as Chief Executive and as President. A study conducted an online survey and received responses/data. Based on respondents this study can conclude that most of the sample population were supporting Musharraf's government. The shocking result was this over 71% sample population were supporting this argument that General Pervez Musharraf's rule was legal. According to the constitution of Pakistan any military rule, the takeover of the constitution, national assemblies, and provincial assemblies is illegal. The 13th constitutional amendment in 1973 constitution stopped all kinds of military takeovers. Before the 13th amendment, General Zia ul Huq passed the 8th amendment which was empowered sitting Military General Zia to dissolve National and Provincial governments. But 13th amendment stopped all military aggression. General Pervez Musharraf's takeover of government and political elites' response was very perplexing. Mainstream political parties Pakistan peoples party PPP and Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz PML-N were through the back and General Pervez Musharraf introduces a new political party Pakistan Muslim League Quaid PML-Q. this political party was purely safeguarded by General Pervez Musharraf and his governing power. This political party protected General Pervez Musharraf in times of Lal Masque, Declaration of emergency, lawyer's movement, etc.

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

This study recommended upcoming scholars must work on General Pervez Musharraf's judicial trial and how he steps down from the government.

I provoke and invite further in-depth research and analyses to explore laypeople's perceptions towards military coups and what factors shape those perceptions. It is also equally significant to study what effects these coups have left at a laypeople's level.

I have studied Musharraf the President when he was the president of the country. Hence, further studies must also be carried out to study Musharraf the General, and Musharraf the violator of the constitution who has gone under several trials. In addition to my analytical entry point the Musharraf, the President these two other entry points are holding great value to comprehend how military personnel can use and misuse power and then prove themselves "error-free", especially after provoking the patriotism. In a low-income country like Pakistan, where millions of people live below the poverty line and millions also have no formal education, it is substantially convenient to provoke either religion or patriotism. These laypeople stay naïve to understand how political elites provoke them.

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