



Social Implication Of Forced Displacement: A Study On Displaced People Of Lake Chad, Region In Nigeria

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Abstract

The violent conflicts between nomadic pastoralist and sedentary farmer communities in the Lake Chad region and in Nigeria in general has caused thousands of lives and economic losses. The conflict has escalated in recent years as conflicting parties have easier access to arms and communication devices. The old, traditional negotiation mechanisms between the groups have mostly collapsed, therefore the ones who have better equipment try to get what they want without talking to other parties. The main reason of the conflict is basically the scarcity of resources; however, the scarcity did not appear suddenly in the region and it is also a result of several other factors which will be examined below such as inefficient state mechanisms, late effects of colonialism, climate change, increasing armament of non-state groups, leasing of farmlands etc.

Keywords; conflict, nomadic pastoralist, conflict, sedentary farmer, scio-economic.

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Conflicts between Fulani herdsmen and farmers in Nigeria have been a serious issue for both the local communities and the country as a whole. If appropriate steps are not taken, disputes appear to have a chance of becoming more widespread (cited in Olaniyan, 2015, p.331). Due to the local government's leasing of farms to cattle owners, the battle raged for decades. Traditionally, host communities in the West African subregion have welcomed migrants like nomadic herders and farmers without restriction for years. This is seen as a symbol of hospitality which seems to culminate in conflict in the region. (de Bruijn & van Dijk, 2003, pp. 290-291). In Nigeria, the locals maintain their sense of community by giving migrants, including those from the Chad Basin parcels of land. In other words, there were no conflicts between the natives and migrants of the three local government areas, namely Kukawa, Monguno, and Abadam. Additionally, for a considerable amount of time, both natives and migrants in the area raised cattle, and some of them were cattle owners. Therefore, the herdsmen who tender animals are natives who are wealthy and include some government officials. But the arrival of Fulani herdsmen and their livestock in the area changed the scenario. The leasing of land to them started to escalate friction, which resulted in violent conflict (the indigenous ranchers,

such as the Sukurti and Buduma, were in constant peace with their neighbor farmers). The interactions between the Fulani herdsmen and the locals have become contentious in this regard. As a result, there is social discontent and armed confrontation between the two factions. This chilly interaction motivates the researcher to develop interest in the study area. What causes the disagreement in the relationship? What impact does the conflict have on the socioeconomic progress of those living in the area?

Additionally, the research that is currently available on farmer-herder conflict identifies climate change, lush flora, and forage as the primary draws for herders to the Lake Chad Basin. (Folami & Folami, 2013, p.105; Stenning, 1959, p.4). Why did the herders relocate to this region? Why are they putting the indigenous people under pressure? With repeated assaults, the protracted struggle has been escalating for many years and is becoming unwinnable. Is there any local and national mitigation and preventive measures? How effective are these actions in resolving the conflict? Is there any alternative methods to this? This study aims to critically analyze the difficulties encountered by the farmer/herder in particular, it will look at specific conflicts generated, types, resource scarcity, and challenges to conflict resolution. A lot of attention will also be paid to the role of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (L.C.B.C.), which has the statutory mandate to examine the extent to which conflicts are generated in the use and management of the natural resources in the Lake Chad Basin by various interest groups located on the Nigerian side of the Lake.

Literature Review:

An Analysis of Lake Chad Basin Environmental Impediment: The Context of Farmers, Herders and Fishermen Resource Competition

Chad Basin sources of water across the stretch of eight countries radiating through the north, west and central Africa. The basin is principally bordered by four sovereign states of Nigeria (7%), Niger (28%), Chad (45%) and Cameroun (2%). The basin in addition extend further within the purview of four more countries among which are Sudan (4%), Algeria (4%), Libya (0.5%), and Central African Republic (9%) respectively (Galeazzi et al., 2017 in Wetering 2018 p26).

A simple inference derivable from the above statistics of the Lake Chad coverage, it is clear to understand that Chad Republic constitute almost half (45%) of the Basin then followed by Niger with 28% area coverage. Thus, cumulatively Chad and Niger constituted more than two-third of the total. While the six States including Nigeria constituted the remaining 27% put together. What this implies is that, Nigeria though constitutes smaller percentage of the Chad Basin, but shrinking of the area is more threatening to Nigeria, because the potential areas of expansion on account of the environmental impact and displacement due to desertification, drought, and the rising tide of insecurity in the hinterland of Nigeria has some form of interplay to the problem. The evidence of this impact is glaring with new dynamics and changing narratives of farmers and herders exodus in states like Benue, Kogi, Ekiti, Kwara, Plateau, Imo,

Anambra, Bayelsa, Oyo, Ogun, Nassarawa among others. The experts in this regard has expressed fear on the rising tide of insecurity that may facing the other parts of the country, then here we are, witnessing and paying for ravage of insecurity in the northeast region of Nigeria. By the time of writing this thesis about 10 years of its occurrence and there is no possibility of coming to an end in the near future.

However, in furtherance to the above, the correlation in the resource utilization and the upsurge in population indicated that, a spontaneous environmental conflict becomes inevitable over the scarce available resources in the Lake Chad Basin. This empirical evidence from 60 million populations in 1960 and in over six decades later in 2017 there has been a steady quantum growth which quadrupled to 243 million. The implication here is that, the capacity of the Basin to support the growing population is burdensome thereby opening up the vicious circle of competition particularly between the farmers and the herders which hitherto supported in abundance both groups with little or no acrimony.

As observed by Wetering (2018, p26); the Lake has enormously decreased in size, the population relaid on its resources is geometrically increasing in opposite direction to resource availability. He further stated that, the shrinking of the Lake Chad has negatively affected the economic viability in the region which manifested in migration and internal displacement. As argued by some scholars like Okpara (2015 in Wetering, 2018 p29) that there is a nexus between the environment and conflict in the Lake Chad Basin. In other words, the menace of Boko Haram insurgency can be equated with disappearing and receding of the Basin with regional insecurity implication has been a hydra headed and complex security challenge in the last decade (2009-2019). In addition, it also revealed how the receding Lake impacted on economic decline and displacement due to desertification which increase tensions and conflict in the region. This trend has also increase the tempo of Boko Haram insurgency from the poverty striking population who are vulnerable and uneducated.

Desiccation here implies the state of dryness or waterlessness which adversely affected socio-economic utilization. Thus raising bar of acute shortage of both surface and underground water resources for fishing, farming and grazing thereby threatening the livelihoods of millions who heavily depended on the lake.

It is on this background that this thesis problematic the nexus of environment and conflict between and amongst farmers who utilized the land for both rain fed and irrigation farming, fishing activities as well as the herders or pastoralist who are in motion looking for grazing space for their flocks. The intervening factors occasioned by the overuse of water and land, changing access and availability of resources, population growth and global and climate change as depicted in report of Adelphi in 2016 were all put together accounted for the intensity of competition amongst groups for livelihood in Lake Chad Basin. The ratio of utilization of the lake resources has over the decades been nose diving. Thus, some 56 years ago in 1963 the population according to UN population fund was

around 60 million and the capacity of the lake for sustenance was appreciable. By 2017 the population had spontaneously increased to about 243 million and at the same time the capacity of the lake has significantly decreased to about 10% in its volume (UNFPA, 2017 p16).

Conflict Parties and Actors

The ongoing violent conflict between herdsman and farmers in Nigeria has several parties and actors. Until last twenty years, the disagreements between herder and farming communities used to be solved by negotiations and usually the heads of villages and herder communities agreed on simple solutions such as a herder must compensate the damage in a farm if he couldn't control his animals and prevent them damaging the growing crops. The dialogue between two communities was not happening only after a bad incident. Instead, during the dry season if herders would like to use some laid fallow farms as grazing land they would ask for permission from the land owner before using it (Olaniyan & Yahaya, 2016).

More than 90% of nomadic herdsman in northern Nigeria are ethnic Fulanis and the majority of the Fulanis are Muslims. (International Crisis Group, 2017). This ethnic group is originally migrated from Arabic peninsula and today they are living in not just Nigeria but in several countries in West and Central Africa (Genyi, 2017). They are involved as a main conflict party in disagreements with farmers because of their high numbers in animal husbandry (Olaniyan & Yahaya, 2016). Some of the nomadic pastoralist migrated along with their animals and are the most dangerous because of their mobility. Their aim is to get greener pasture not spending much time in one location that makes them prone to involve in conflict activities

The migration of Muslim Fulanis to south is considered by some Christian groups as an attempt to "Islamize the south". There is also a huge risk that if an ethnic clash occurs between all Fulanis and other many ethnic groups in Nigeria, Fulanis could get support from other Fulani communities in neighboring states (Niger, Chad and Cameroon) by inviting them with an oath of allegiance to the tribe called Dongol Fullo and the ethnic problems might enhance incredibly in the West and Central Africa regions (International Crisis Group, 2017).

In the central parts of the country, Fulanis have settled and integrated with the Hausas, and today they are called Hausa-Fulanis. This group is also mostly Muslim, however, Hausa-Fulanis are more literate and politically active compared to nomadic Fulanis (Maiangwa, 2017). In the south, Christianity is the dominant religion among many ethnic groups such as Beroms. For instance, in Plateau state, the conflict between farmers and herders has ethnic and religious dimensions on top of the grazing disputes. Christian Beroms and Muslim Fulanis contravene about indigenesness and ownership of the land (Okeke, 2014).

Transformation and Problems in Agriculture and Pastoralism

Another driving reason for the conflict between herders and farmers is some pastoralist herders changing to sedentary lifestyle step by step. Therefore, in some regions the grazing and walking the animals is done by younger Fulani generations. The younger

herdsmen are usually not well experienced in negotiating with the farmers like their pioneers used to do and controlling the animals and preventing them from walking in the farms. Traditionally, herdsmen used to go to farmers in dry season right after the harvesting time and ask for allowance to use their land for grazing. This method used to work among two groups for long time. The younger generation is not able to solve the issues with farmers because they do not know how to negotiate and be political with them. This causes violent disputes among the groups (Shehu, 2018).

One of the triggering factors of the conflict is the altering farming practices. As an example, the Tiv ethnic group can be mentioned in here. Tivs are the most populous ethnicity in central Nigeria, living mostly in Benue state with around 4 million population (it was 800000 in 1953). Tiv people are settled farmers and their population is not concentrated but instead spread around the county. Because of the rapid population growth Tivs needed to produce more, began occupying more arable land and gradually decreased the amount of land they leave to fallow during dry season. This means less space for herdsmen in this region to graze their livestock (Genyi, 2017).

Also, some irrigation projects from Nigerian government (Agricultural Development Project in 1970s) allowed farmers to cultivate more land during dry season. While some farmers got more income and found employment in dry season, many herders lost the grazing paths they used to utilize before. Another project initiated by the government called National Fadama Development Project (since 1993) provided farmers different crops such as tomatoes, which was not leaving enough pulp and forage on the ground after harvesting so the grazing capacity of those lands decreased. These changes in usage of land started to create problems among groups as all fight for their incomes which depend on scarce resources (International Crisis Group, 2017).

Despite the rapid population growth and government's development projects in agriculture, Nigeria was not able to increase its agricultural production accordingly. The country had 33 million people in 1950 and the number increased to 200 million by 2020. This incredible increase brought many challenges to tackle (The Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the UNS, 2018).

Nigeria turned into a net importer country in staple food products by 1975. The inefficiency in agriculture can be explained with variety of factors such as lack of public facilities in countryside; schools, hospitals etc., which pushes people more into urbanized regions and therefore decreases farming population. Another reason why the agriculture still does not produce enough for Nigerians is the tools they use in the farm. Most of the farmers use old gadgetry like grubbers, instead of new technologies. This causes less yield than they could have got from certain land. It is also a result of the farmers' financial situations, since most of the time they cannot get supporting credits from banks or other government institutions to improve their businesses (Yakubu & Akanegbu, 2015). 4

On top of technical and financial difficulties, the climate change and environmental pollution effect agriculture excessively. Fast and unconsciously growing building sector

and industrialization pollutes the environment and degrades the productivity of soil (Yakubu & Akanegbu, 2015).

Internal Displacement and Poverty

People from both communities face internal displacement and poverty as some farmers lose their lands for good and some nomadic herders are forced to migrate other regions because of local hostilities in their own communities. Some displaced farmers live in temporary camps and some live with host farmer communities, which puts a strain on host communities' pockets. Farmers who seek refuge in other regions usually get very poor as they have no income to sustain themselves and their families (International Crisis Group, 2017).

There are no proper Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps for the people who had to leave their villages because of farmer-herder conflict. The so-called "camps" that some people could find shelter are usually some churches or school buildings, which also negatively effects the daily life and education opportunities of host communities (Genyi, 2017).

Loss of People and Hostilities

After several killings of farmers by nomadic herders in the beginning of 2000s, reprisal attacks and armament of farmer communities started in Nigeria. Also, sometimes pastoralists' cattle were killed as a response to herdsmen. The communities experience great hostility against each other, although in the beginning it was just a conflict about scarce resources and how to share them; constant attacks, killings, burning villages, rape etc. factors added more and more tension in between nomadic and sedentary groups (Ofuoku & Isife, 2010). In order to feel more secure and try to create defend mechanisms the collective identities of the groups got stronger. For example, religion and ethnicities started to play bigger role in the conflict because people need strong ties to get together and defend their communities against attackers (Genyi, 2017)

Methodology and objective of the study.

The present study is based on both the primary and secondary sources. As far as primary sources is concerned purposive sampling has used to collect relevant information with the help of interview schedule. The sample of the study was taken 150 in three affected region. Secondary sources has been collected through books, research articles, online resources, government reports. The main objective of the study was to examine the social implication of forced displacement on displaced families.

Finding and Discussion of the study

Social background of the respondents

Table.1. Social background of the respondents

Ethnic Group	Respondents
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Kanuri	13(8.7)
Hausa	12(8.0)
Buduma	67(44.7)
Sukurti	50(33.3)
Fulani	38(25.3)
Total	150(100)
Age	Respondents
20-29	70(46.7)
40-49	50(33.3)
50-59	20(13.3)
70-79	10(6.7)
Total	150(100)
Education	Respondents
Illiteate	130(86.7)
Primary level	7(4.7)
Junior level	10(6.7)
Senior level	2(1.3)
Tertiary level	1(0.7)
Total	150(100)
Marital Status	Respondents
Married	40(26.7)
Single	70(46.70)
Divorced	10(6.7)
Widow	30(20.0)
Total	150(100)
Family size	Respondents
6-8	60(40.0)
9-12	50(33.3)
13-16	40(26.7)
Total	150(100)
Religion	Respondents
Islam	147(98.0)
Christianity	3(2.0)
Traditional Belief	0(0.0)
Total	150(100)
Gender	Respondents
Male	110(73.3)
Female	40(26.7)
Total	150(100)

Caste	Respondents
Kanuri	20(13.3)
Hausa	5(3.3)
Fulani	50(40.0)
Sukurti	10(6.7)
Buduma	55(36.7)
Total	150(100)
Nationality	Respondents
Ghana	15(10.0)
Burkina Faso	20(.13.3)
Mali	10(6.7)
Niger	30(20.0)
Nigeria	50(33.3)
Chad	10(6.7)
Cameroon	15(10.0)
Total	150(100)
Duration of stay of farmer	Respondents
Less than a year	30(20.0)
1-5years	20(13.3)
6-10 years	20(13.3)
11and above	80(53.3)
Total	150(100)

According to the inference drawn from the table above, the majority of respondents are the Budumas which constitute 44.7% who according to their name in Kanuri language is "inhabitants of hay or grass" and are native of Lake Chad shore. The Budumas are the guardians and owners of the traditional islands on the shore of Lake Chad. Due to the potential inherent of natural resource in the region it attracts people across West Africa and beyond. The Buduma people believed that settlers are people who have migrated into Lake Chad. The reason according to their tradition is to protect their chieftaincy institution and land tenure arrangements against invasion. The incursion have encroached and glued almost all the islands at the fringe of Lake Chad. The non-Buduma groups most often are from the Northern part of Nigeria also practice their culture alongside the Sukurti people who are also second in number to Budumas which constitute 33.3%. The settlers and the aborigines had a mutual interaction as seen throughout the fieldwork. Therefore, everyone is fighting together against the Fulani herders (the invaders) and the alleged cattle owners except few anonymous middlemen. The Fulani are the largest non-centralized ethnic community in Baga district which constitute 25.3%. Kanuri people also practice pastoralism to some extent that they too cannot be singled out in the study area which constitute 8.7% and Hausa people who practice agriculture combined with herding farming constitute 8.0%.

Age distribution The study also took into account the respondents' age dispersion. Young, old, and adult viewpoints were all heard. The vast majority of comments portrayed a young demographic. Even though it is controversial, a functional definition of youth is necessary in this regard. The United Nations claims (2010.P.10) "Youth is a social construction coming out of the political, socio-cultural, institutional, and economic processes of a society that needs to be properly examined in order to comprehend the milieu within which it operates," claims Oluwaniyi (2010, p. 311). Accordingly, The Nigeria National Youth Policy defines youth as anyone between the ages of 15 and 35. For the study's goals to conceptualize age group, the definition offered by the Nigeria National Youth Policy was adopted. Therefore, most of the atrocities were been committed by the youth that have a greater percentage in th age distribution, which account for 46.7%. The age of 40years and above play greater role in mediation process while they do not engage in the clashes which constitute 33.3%. Those between 50 years and above constitute 13.3% and only 6.7% are said to be elderly people who are seldomly seen in the field for one reason or other because of their age who suppose to be resting in their tents but managing a small herd of cattle

The respondents' educational backgrounds are shown in the table above. This was important because a large percentage of respondents claimed they couldn't access jobs in the public sector. Therefore, ignorance may contribute to the eventual escalation of conflict in the area. Most of the respondents in the region which original considered as catchment area suffered from illiteracy because 86.7% are illiterates. The most educated ones acquired primary school certificates with 8.7%. Junior school leavers are 6.7%. Senior school certificate holders is only 1.3% while only 0.7% have attended tertiary education.

The above table indicates that most of the respondents are unmarried and irresponsible individuals which constitute 46.7% who are more prone to commit crime and run away with their cattle because they are the alien herdsmen and usually move helter- skelter in search of a greener pasture and duration of their stay is numbered. Police station reports indicates that most of the damages were done by unmarried and alien fulanis 26.7% are married. The divorced women are the ones who relieved their elder parents from herding that constitute 6.7% and the widows who constitute 20.0% are ones whose husbands were killed by insurgents. Meanwhjle the herding task is a tedious work that can only be manage by female folk.

From the above table most of the people in the study area have a large number of people living in the same compound particularly the ones with thre generational family popularly known as extended family constitute 40.0%. Followed by 33.3% and 26.6% which shows that there is no nuclear family in the region. They therefore live in a close knit community.

From the above table both the settlers and the aborigines are practicing Islam as their religion. 2.0% are practicing Christianity and there is non Traditional worshipers in the region which constitute 0.0%.

Both male and female respondents in the research area were asked for their opinions. This was required to determine the proportion of male and female respondents. The aforementioned Table displays this information. Male respondents constitute 73.3% and female constitute 26.7% that majority of respondents are male It is clear from the above table that there are more men than women because of risk involved in the herding farming activities in the region. This discrepancy is not at all related to gender stereotyping or discrimination but One reason for the disparity was that the women are few and more reluctant in in speaking to the researcher while most men were more willing to speak up on the issues. Another reason lies in the fact that, in the households (tents) traditionally and customarily men are the heads of the families and they cannot be bypassed to interview women when they are around. As such, most of the women were not willing to talk after their husbands. Also, most of the women were busy with household chores while some declined responding to the researcher by dubbing the interview as time wasting. Generally, in development and conflict studies, the issue of gender is very critical. According to research, males are more likely to involve in conflict-related issues than females(Urdal, 2006; Collier, 1999).

The table above indicates that Apart from the founders of the shore, as the name Chad Basin implies, a sizable portion of the Lake belongs to the Chad Republic, and the natives are the Budumas, who constitute 36.7% of the population and are considered superior than the other tribes. They are denied access to the bounty of nature to feed their animals because other people are considered settlers. Hence There is a chance of conflict. According to respondents, notably from the case records of the police stations as shown in the table below relegated fulani pastoralists constitute 40.0%, Sukurti herdsmen constitute 6.7%, hausa constitute 3.3% and Kanuri 13.3% respectively

Both male and female respondents in the research area were asked for their opinions. This was required to determine the proportion of male and female respondents. The aforementioned Table 3 displays this information. Due to the fact that men made up 93.3% of the respondents, who competed for the limited resources, and women made up 6.7%, the majority of respondents were men. It is clear from the above table that there were more men than women because of risk involved in the businesses. This discrepancy is not at all related to gender stereotypes or discrimination. One reason for the disparity was that the women were more reluctant in speaking to the researcher while most men were more willing to speak up on the issues. Another reason lies in the fact that, in the households (tents) traditionally and customarily men are the heads of the families and they cannot be bypassed to interview women when they are around. As such, most of the women were not willing to talk after their husbands. Also, most of the women were busy with household chores while some declined responding to the researcher by dubbing the interview as time wasting. Generally, in development and conflict studies, the issue of

gender is very critical. According to research, males are more likely to involve in conflict-related issues than females (Urdal, 2006; Collier, 1999). Therefore, As a result, only 6.7% of the respondents who contributed to the research were female, and most Muslim tradition discourage women from leaving their homes.

The investigation looked into the national backgrounds of the ranchers. This was important because the ethnicity of the herdsmen in the Lake Chad Basin are seen differently than they were. According to information gathered, the bulk of the herders are Nigerian citizens which constitute 33.3%. Indeed. 13.3% demonstrated that they are Burkinabe. 6.7% are Malians. Ghanaians constitute 10.0% and Niger 20.0%.

According to the information given, the respondents sampled for this study are locals who have lived there for a considerable period of time. Except for the plurality, more than half of the remaining respondents have resided in the Lake Chad Basin for more than 20 years which constitute 53.3%. 10.0% of the respondents domiciled since birth, 13.3% have lived near the basin for over 10 years. 53.3% of those surveyed remained for more than 11 years practicing the same job who believed to have stayed longer than necessary and might have stayed at home but Boko Haram has assassinated his son who is the custodian of the cattle and no any body else can take care of the herds that is why with his age still practicing pastoralism.

Social Impact of Displaced Families

Table 2: Education problems among displaced children

Education Problem	Respondents
Out-of-school children	20(13.3)
Girl education	60(40.0)
School drop out	40(26.7)
Infrastructure	10(6.7)
Personnel	20(13.3)
Total	150(100)

From the above table there are numerous problems facing the entire gamut of the educational system. In most cases roughly one half of all refugees are minors (UNHCR, 2018). Hence, any refugee inflow creates an immediate demand for schooling and often this represents a major challenge for the national education system. Yet, establishing universal schooling for refugee children is crucial for both the short-term and long-term effects of the refugee influx. 13.3% of the respondent opined that out-of-school children as a matter of fact increased because of the insurgency even before the insurgency there is less value attached to education. Without schooling opportunities, young refugees may engage in informal activities to contribute to family income. Hence the region was known for that as a catchment area in the state. 40.0% of the respondent believed that girls in the Lake Chad Basin did not attend school. 26.7% of the respondents ascertained that those enrolled into schools are drop out because of financial constraint. 6.7% of the respondents

are of the view that people failed to develop interest in school because of no enough infrastructural facilities like classroom and others. 13.3% of the respondents opined that even with the availability of schools there are not enough teachers.

Table 3: Sexual Violence Among Women

Sexual violence among women	Respondents
Women	55(30.7)
Girls	95(63.3)
Total	150(100)

From the above table, 30.7% of the respondents were reported to have witnessed sexual harassment and 63.3% of the young ladies encountered sexual vindicate either from the side of the insurgents or the armed forces.

Table 4 Water Sanitation

Water sanitation	Respondents
Roiled and polluted water	70(46.7)
Unapproved edge of the water body	80(53.3)
Total	150(100)

From the above table Pastoralists and their livestock constantly run the risk of ingesting contaminated lake water. 46.7% of the survey participants believed that they had no access to clean water just contaminated and salinised water of the lake. 53.3% of the respondents believed they are also at risk of using an unapproved water edge.

Table 5: Domestic Violence

Domestic violence	Respondents
Wife beating	55(36.7)
Verbal abuse	25(16.7)
Psychological or emotional abuse	40(26.7)
Threat of abandonment	30(20.0)
Total	150(100)

From the above table 36.7% of the respondents reported that after insurgency there were many cases of domestic violence like beating of wife as a result of hardship and lack of any economic motive. 16.7% of the respondents believed that exchange verbal abuse happen frequently between the couples. 26.7% are of the view that as the situation worsen by the day the tendency of emotional betrayal occurred. 20.0% of the respondents opined that wives are facing threat of abandonment and divorce.

Table 6: Blocking of Livestock Corridor and Waters

Blocking of livestock corridors and waters	Respondents
Farmers	60(40.0)
Government agencies	10(6.7)
Insurgents	70(46.7)
Bandits	10(6.7)
Total	150(100)

Pastoralists have traditionally taken care to haggle with the people in order to acquire access to the appropriate watering points (natural or improved). During each season, which lasts between 7 and 10 days and is generally a huge pond or reservoir, they stay close to a community with a water source for years, the available grazing space has been shrinking with an increase in population, there are more places where grazing is forbidden and croplands are growing (ENEC II 2004). Farmer communities are however constructed adjacent to the watering holes, and additional fields are created utilizing the original cow pathways. Previously, access to water and agricultural waste were exchanged for cattle; however, if livestock from both farmers and herders were to remain in the lower latitudes, they would suffer losses due to animal trypanosomiasis (Pollock 2004). The above table shows that the movement typically goes in the opposite direction, impeding herd movement and even denying them access to watering holes they had previously had unrestricted access to. Herders are noted for traveling upstream and downstream in pursuit of better grazing areas. Since insurgency is a recent phenomenon, it has restricted the free-will movement of herders who make up 46.7% of the respondents. According to 40.0% of respondents, farmers are the major barrier impeding to their progress. 6.7% said the government has barricaded passageways through certain policies to the herders' detriment 46.7% of the respondent opined that the cell of the insurgents around the shore of Lake Chad Basin deprived them of using the greener pasture in the region. 6.7% of the respondent believed that banditry activity near Lake Chad's shoreline is escalating daily.

Conclusion

The phenomenon of herder/farmer conflict in Lake Chad Basin typifies what is known as resource conflict in contemporary development literature. This thrives in an atmosphere of ecological scarcity and competition, as well as livelihood crisis. The problem has been accentuated by the global trend of climate change which has led to the shrinking of ecological space and resources, leading to intense pressure on, and competition for, the available resources.

The spiraling migration of pastoralists from other parts of Nigeria and West Africa in general has resulted in a sort of dialectical relations between the Fulani herdsmen and the settled native farmers. This situation has been complicated by the rising incidence of

livelihood insecurity among the farming and herding communities as a result of the dwindling ecological fortunes of the region. This scenario has led to desperate, violent struggles for access to and control of scarce ecological space and resources, a situation that has engendered dire humanitarian, social, socio-economic and economic consequences. The fierce and often virulent nature of this struggles have found expression in a vicious circle of violence and mutual vendetta.

The herder/farmer debacle along the region of Lake Chad has been essentially woeful in terms of its destructive impacts. So far, it has defied all measures at remedying it. In its apparent dynamics of deterioration and viciousness, the situation has given rise to a sort of pervasive Fulani militancy in the region. This has been the bane of sustainable peace and progress in most parts of Lake Chad.

The conflict along the region of Lake Chad is a farmer-herder conflict, resulting from the allocation of farmlands by the Bulamas, Lawans and the Ajas to some cattle owners. It is a fact that the nomadic activities of the Fulani herdsmen have cause a lot of damages, especially destruction of farms and crops. Hence, threatening the livelihoods of the farmers in the area. This, notwithstanding, both are to be blamed for the various crimes committed within the community. However, most of the atrocities have been committed by the Fulani herdsmen, especially the nomads (particularly the alien ones) from other countries who migrate to the area during the dry seasons.

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