



New Great Game and China's Energy Interests in Central Asia

Fakhar Hussain, Lecturer in Civics at Government Imamia Associate College Sahiwal, Pakistan, diplomat786@gmail.com

Dr. Ramzan Shahid, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science and International Relations, University of Gujrat, Pakistan, ramzan.shahid@uog.edu.pk

Dr. Shumaila Rafiq, Lecturer, Department of Political Science and International Relations, University of Gujrat, Pakistan, shumaila.rafiq@uog.edu.pk

Saadat Nawaz, Visiting Lecturer, University of Sahiwal, Pakistan, raisaadat182@gmail.com

Abstract- The Great Game was initially a competition among the Russian and British, the two main imperial states of the 19th century for strategic control of the Central Eurasia. The New Great Game is distinguished by the ancient Great Game on the basis of a methodical observation of the theoretic models with respect to the number of key actors, as well as the scope and complexity of their relations. The traditional rivalries of power politics revealed in the beginning of the 21st century has permeated into the economic, military and political affairs of Central Asia on accounts of which it is ascribed as a "New Great Game". The existing understandings of the New Great Game model explains that China and the US are key players of the New Great Game in Central Asia and that it is associated with power politics centered round the energy resources of Central Asia. The regional actors like Russia and China are attempting to hold the US out of Central Asia, whilst the US aims for containment to the influencing power of Beijing and Moscow in the region. China has become one of the emergent market economy of the world on the basis of which energy needs of Beijing has been growing day by day to the extent that it has been ranked as 2nd in terms of global consumption of energy. The demand and availability of the supplies of energy is an essential part of China's priorities in the region of Central Asia. This research aims for analyzing China's energy interests in Central Asia in the perspective of New Great Game and opines that the involvement of China in Central Asia remains to be advantageous signifying that China's rise in the region of Central Asia is viewed as a win-win situation not only for China but also for the Central Asian Republics.

Keywords: Eurasia; Energy Resources; Rivalries; Raw Material; Caspian Region; Natural Gas.

I. INTRODUCTION

The alleged paradigm of New Great Game has frequently been used for expounding rivalries based on geopolitics of the region, hence the contemporary trends of relationships concerning different players of the world politics is found to be of complex nature rather than a customary tug-of-war among the ancient colonial empires (Torbakov, 2007). The region of Central Asia emerged for being a geopolitically novel autonomous area in the aftermath of the Cold War. Central Asia is a significant region on the basis of its geographic position and abundance of natural energy resources of gas and oil (Marketos, 2016). The Great Game was initially a competition among the Russian and British, the two main imperial states of the 19th century for strategic control of the Central Eurasia (Torbakov, 2007). The New Great Game is distinguished by the ancient Great Game on the basis of a methodical observation of the theoretic models with respect to the number of key actors, as well as the scope and complexity of their relations. Most of the academics dislike using the terms "Great Game" or "New Great Game" on the grounds that these have been considered for being echoes of the rivalries of the colonial times during the 19th and 20th centuries (Blank, 2012). The old version of Great Game has become a tale of the previous history, whereas the renewed form of New Great Game came into existence since collapse of the USSR (Ahrari, 1994).

The geopolitical and strategic ambitions of the Soviets and the British Empire had been clashed over establishing foothold in the region of Central Asia during the "New Great Game" of the 20th century, which to be mirrored in today's competition between members of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) to be regional players and the West to exploit Eurasia's oil deposits. Afghanistan has once again become the focal point of activity under the dynamics of the New Great Game in Central Asia (Khan, 2006). The traditional rivalries of power politics revealed in the beginning of the 21st century has permeated into the economic, military and political affairs of Central Asia on accounts of which it is ascribed as a "New Great Game" (Marketos, 2016). The contemporary emergent powers of the region attempt for pursuing the enhancement of strategic foothold in the region of Central Asia (Hussain, 2020). A closer analysis of the paradigm reveals that the concept of New Great Game seems to overlook a significant fact concerning

breakdown of the USSR in 1991 that the CARs emerged as autonomous players of the chess board of regional politics in Central Asia (Torbakov, 2007).

The region of Central Asia is termed as “Dingwei” of China; well-defined by Peter Hopkik as (Lebensraum) or the beginning of New Great Game; formulated by Zbigniew Brzezinski as emergence of a Grand Chessboard as well as described by Samuel Huntington as the start of the final clash of civilizations on the basis of its strategic position and evolving role in world affairs (Marketos, 2016). The existing understandings of the New Great Game model explains that China and the US are key players of the New Great Game in Central Asia and that it is associated with power politics centered round the energy resources of Central Asia (Torbakov, 2007). The relationship of China with the CARs is associated with the development of economy and security of energy supplies as well interior security against extremism, terrorism and separatism. Beijing developed joint associations with the CARs on the basis of nonviolent co-existence for getting strategic foothold in the region as a result of the collapse of the USSR and fall of the Russian supremacy in Central Asia (Hussain and Hussain, 2017). China presented substantial favors to the CARs in order to resolve the issues regarding borderline for creation of mutual trust, which became a major cause of the formation of SCO and for promotion of the “Grand Strategy” of China to distract attention of the West towards Central Asia. The interests of China in the CARs have been associated with the growth of economy and security of energy supplies. China desires for alleviating influence of the US in Central Asia in order to have strategic leverage in the regional domains (Afridi, Iqbal, and Hussain, 2017).

One of the most significant geopolitical objectives of the grand strategy of China remains to secure Central Asia for being an established region of Beijing’s strategic rear, since China’s priorities in the region is the containment of Beijing by the US and to evade the possibilities of the US patronage for independence of Taiwan, which being a major cause of the US-China antagonism (Marketos, 2016). According to the most recent conceptualization, the philosophy of New Great Game is mainly driven by Russia and China’s desire to drive out the US from the region of Central Asia and to obtain control of the area which is significant due to its resources of energy and geostrategic position (Torbakov, 2007). The post 9/11 events have projected the CARs at the international level and have enhanced strategic prominence of the region. The US has emerged as a main geopolitical actor of Central Asia along with China and Russia since after the 9/11 (Hussain and Hussain, 2017). The region’s changing strategic and geopolitical environment has affected not just the interests of the US, but also those of neighboring states such as China, Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, Ukraine and Afghanistan as well as India, the EU countries and Japan (Marketos, 2016).

According to some of the academics, one of the most significant components of the New Great Game is existence of external hegemonic powers in the region for security purpose whether in the forms of armed bases, exercising conjoint games of war, deliveries of weapons or taking control of the transit routes of the energy supplies. The presence for security reasons permits foreign powers for exercising control over policy-making and for promotion of the objectives of their national interests in the host state (Afridi, Iqbal, and Hussain, 2017). From the economic point of view, the external powers also play role for ensuring the export of the energy resources of the CARs to their desired directions, and also pursues for smooth and safe deliveries of energy supplies from the host countries and that other outside players may not redirect the regional flows of energy. From the strategic and military point of view, the outside dominant actors of the region project their power from host state to their rivals (Torbakov, 2007). The region of Central Asia has turned out to be a new platform of the old Great Game’s revised version, whereas the US and China are key players of today’s New Great Game (Khan, 2006), on the basis of which the CARs have thus, become a pivot to the emergent new world order in the context of obtainability of energy resources and the increasing needs of energy in the world (Marketos, 2016).

The region of Central Asia will be on the verge of intense geostrategic shifts in the coming decades to the extent that the present-day “New Great Game” has been intensifying in Central Asia and may help the CARs for preservation of their domestic security. China and Russia have been pursuing the policies of neo-imperialism and aggrandizement of the great power role in Central Asia, while the CARs have associated their interests to acquire means for intensification of their independence (Blank, 2012). The main actors in this novel version of “New Great Game” are the US, China, Russia, Pakistan, Turkey and Iran, which have been following policies in order to accomplish their objectives of national concerns. The regional actors like Russia and China are attempting to hold the US out of Central Asia, whilst the US aims for containment to the influencing power of Beijing and Moscow in the region. Another significant component of the contemporary “New Great Game” is the politics of energy pipelines. The concerned parties have been endeavoring for construction of the oil and gas pipelines for fulfillment of their ambitions with respect to control flows of regional energy resources (Fatima and Zafar, 2014). The control of massive hydrocarbon

and supplies of energy reserves of the CARs has become a core issue of the regional politics of the twenty-first century, like the early twentieth-century “Great Game” in which the geostrategic and political ambitions of the Soviets and the British conflicted in relation to Central Asia, hence in the similar way today’s competition concerning the regional actors of SCO member states and the Western powers has evolved into a “New Great Game” to dominate Eurasia’s oil deposits (Khan, 2006).

II. CHINA’S ENERGY INTERESTS IN CENTRAL ASIA

China initiated negotiations with the CARs regarding energy supplies and commerce, since liberation of the republics of Central Asia in the aftermath of the breakdown of the Soviet Union in 1991, for establishing strategic foothold on energy supplying market of the region (Afridi, Iqbal, and Hussain, 2017), because the Central Asian Republics (CARs) have accumulated the majority of the world’s renewable energy resources. The five coastal republics of the Caspian account for nearly 18.8% of total estimated reserves of the world’s oil and 45% of gas reservoirs (Marketos, 2016). The CARs have large natural oil and hydrocarbon deposits and have played significant strategic part in global political affairs (Hussain, 2020). The control of massive hydrocarbon and supplies of energy reserves of the hinterland of Eurasia has become a core issue of the regional politics of the twenty-first century (Khan, 2006), because Central Asia is abundant in natural resources, especially oil and gas reserves. On the basis of its ample energy savings and unusual geostrategic position, the CARs presence in the global geopolitical landscape of energy is rapidly expanding (Yujin, 2019).

The five Caspian littoral states possess estimated reserves exceeding 216.4 billion barrels of oil and 2819.2 trillion cubic feet of gas (Marketos, 2016). The Persian Gulf region is in possession of world’s 60 per cent of oil and 45 per cent gas reserves (Hussain, 2020). Central Asia had nearly 4 billion tons of oil deposits in 2016, accounting for 1.83 per cent of global reserves. Kazakhstan has the highest expanding potential of oil in Central Asia, with 3.9 billion tons of reserves accounting for 1.63 per cent global oil and ranked as 12th in the world. Natural gas reserves in Turkmenistan has 1.75 billion cubic meters reservoirs of the natural gas, which accounting for 9.4 per cent of the global reserves and placing third to the worldwide ranking with a storage/production ratio beyond a century (Yujin, 2019).

The rivalries between the world’s regional emergent powers over resources of the energy supplies and transit routes have become unusually severe, culminating in dramatic increase in price of energy as well as apprehensions regarding geostrategic and political considerations with respect to the security of energy supplies since start of the 21st century (Marketos, 2016). The great powers do compete in the CARs (Torbakov, 2007). The US, China and Russia have been competing for establishment of their dominance in the region and that energy supplies are merely a way to that end (Afridi, Iqbal, and Hussain, 2017). Central Asia is an oil rich zone, where global and regional players are interested in economic development, military aid and maintaining long-term influence in the region (Cheng and Hu, 2008) on accounts of which, the monopoly and control of the hydrocarbon reservoirs of the CARs is undesirable (Yujin, 2019).

China is one of the most populated state of the world and its economy is growing rapidly. The spectacular development of China’s economy has essentially been liable for its enhancing needs of energy and it has been assumed that the prompt growing of economy may endure (Cheng and Hu, 2008). The energy requirements for development of China are calculated by the balance and model of the commercial enhancement (Fazilov and Chen, 2013). China has been considered for being 2nd largest of the world’s buyer of energy while the CARs are in the possession of massive resources of raw materials and energy supplies, which are complementary to the commercial expansion of China. China’s interests are associated with the CARs resources of energy for the smooth and secure supplies of energy as well as to the big economic markets of end-user products (Afridi, Iqbal, and Hussain, 2017).

The energy-intensive industries such as steel, aluminum, Cars, electronics and chemicals are driving China’s ever-increasing energy demands, as a result of which Beijing has turned out to be the biggest energy user of the world during the period of the last 20 years, which accounts for nearly twenty-percent of overall global energy consumptions (Fazilov and Chen, 2013). China’s rapidly growing economy will fuel a 4-5 percent increase in the annual energy demand (Cheng and Hu, 2008), for which China became an importer of energy in 1993 (Stegen, 2015). Chinese appetite for power to fuel economic development remains insatiable with energy imports continuously increasing (Scobell, Ratner, and Beckley, 2014). The

increased trading with China, coupled with augmented exports of country's requirements of energy maybe a "mixed blessing" (Stegen, 2015).

Since China has become one of the emergent market economy of the world on the basis of which energy needs of Beijing has been growing day by day to the extent that it has been ranked as 2nd in terms of global consumption of energy (Afridi, Iqbal, and Hussan, 2017). Since the period of mid-1960 towards 1993, China had to be self-reliant in terms of energy demands. However by the year 2010, China emerged as the largest user of the world's energy, needing 57 percent of its oil imports in 2012. In 2014, China surpassed the US in terms of becoming the biggest buyer of world's net-oil, as well as it may be supplying about 66% of the overall needs of oil by 2020 (Stegen, 2015). China's requirement of energy supplies has been estimated to rise about 75% up to year of 2035. Beijing currently absorbs approximately 20% of worldwide consumption of energy and that its needs are rapidly enhancing, as a result of which it (China) has evolved into a major giant with respect to the total utilization of energy resources (Fazilov and Chen, 2013). China is the world's 2nd largest customer of energy supplies, as well as the 3rd biggest producer of energy resources (Afridi, Iqbal, and Hussan, 2017). China's energy requirements have emerged as a significant element of the present-day political strategy of the world and a prerequisite for maintaining the high ratio of China's ongoing commercial development. Consequently, the energy strategy of China has evolved for being strategic and political in nature instead of becoming a market-driven stratagem (Marketos, 2016).

China's hunger for energy supplies is insatiable. Uninterrupted energy supply is crucial for China's potential economic development in the future scenario. The demand and availability of the supplies of energy is an essential part of China's priorities in the region of Central Asia (Afridi, Iqbal, and Hussan, 2017). Chinese leadership is deeply concerned regarding energy security (Scobell, Ratner, and Beckley, 2014). The promptly increasing economy necessitates a nonstop supply of energy supplies, which can only be attained by Central Asian energy sources (Afridi, Iqbal, and Hussan, 2017). China relies heavily on Central Asia for energy raw materials (Cheng and Hu, 2008), and that China has risen as a significant player in the CARs energy market (Rumer, 2006) for which Beijing is keen to broaden its resources of energy and transit routes (Scobell, Ratner, and Beckley, 2014). In order to diversify its energy supplies, China is exploring Central Asian oil and gas deposits. It may have relatively safe supplies of energy with a low chance of blockade and threats to the ships going through the Malacca Strait. Central Asia provides supplies of energy to China and acts as a transit path to China as well (Afridi, Iqbal, and Hussan, 2017).

Despite the Great Wall of China, Central Asia can be seen as China's wild and unfenced backyard (Scobell, Ratner, and Beckley, 2014). China had been importing oil from the Middle East before the availability of the CARs supplies of energy. The transit route for the supplies of the Middle East oil towards China has to pass through the Strait of Malacca, which remains under the US control. As the US is thought to be of China's apparent rival in global affairs, so the US may be in a position to block the transit route and disrupt the energy supplies of China in case of a viable conflict between the US and China (Afridi, Iqbal, and Hussan, 2017). China is worried about the risks of disruptions in the safe transit of oil & gas tankers from the Gulf region and Africa to China through Malacca Strait due to pirate or terrorist attacks. As a result, China wishes to reduce its dependence on the Malacca Strait and plans to develop alternate transport routes (Hussain, 2020). This situation worried China's strategic planners, who devised a holistic plan for Central Asia's energy supplies. China's main concern in Central Asia is energy and the security of its Xinjiang province, which shares boundaries with many Central Asian Republics (Afridi, Iqbal, and Hussan, 2017).

The energy cooperation between the CARs and China is strategically complementary, with substantial prospects in the fields of energy trading, the discovery and development of gas & oil sources, as well as technology for processing raw oil and gas products (Yujin, 2019). China considers this region critical to its energy needs (Afridi, Iqbal, and Hussan, 2017). China has been importing around 10 to 20 million tons of crude oil from Kazakhstan per year, accounting for total 10% of Beijing's imports of oil. The volume of imported energy from the CARs did not yet achieve the ranks of strategic significance, whereas expectations for the next few years look bright, as Kazakhstan's oil production has been steadily increasing, on accounts of which China and Kazakhstan have signed a ground-breaking deal regarding direct transportation of oil across boundary of China through the Alataw pass for the first time in Xinjiang province (Marketos, 2016).

China's energy policy is to diversify the imports of energy supplies rendering it least reliant on Middle Eastern and republics of Africa and to have a firm grasp over transit routes of energy from the CARs,

connecting Central Asia to Beijing via province of Xinjiang (Afridi, Iqbal, and Hussan, 2017). After the launch of its first regasification LNG terminal since 2006, the imports of gas by China have increased steadily, which have been projected at a pace of 5% per year. China's natural gas was 169 billion cubic meters (bcm/y) annually in the year 2013, which was equal to 5.9% of China's primary needs of energy. According to China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), potential gas demand of China will "grow by about 8% annually" with usage hitting 350 bcm/y and 550 bcm/y in 2020 and 2030 respectively, accounting for 10-12% of China's primary energy consumption (Stegen, 2015). China's dependence on imported oil augmented as a result of the country's industrial development. China wishes for construction of a pipeline of gas from Kazakhstan towards China, in relation to which China desires to use the massive market economies of the region of Central Asian as a catalyst for creating a novel growth zone for foreign direct investment in the Xinjiang province of China as well for revitalizing the ancient Silk Route, expanding commercial ambitions of China from the CARs towards countries of the Persian Gulf region and also to the Western energy markets (Afridi, Iqbal, and Hussan, 2017). Central Asian Countries have provided China with a solid and consistent supply of energy and in return the CARs gained heavy investments, new technology, and a secure and colossal oil and gas exporting sector by China. Energy cooperation with China is crucial for Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and of other countries' economic development (Yujin, 2019). It is estimated that the volume of gas and oil industry of the Caspian region will increase in the coming years, with Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan responsible for the vast majority of this increase (Marketos, 2016).

China sees itself as an Asian energy hub, relying on supplies of energy from Eurasia, including Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan (Stegen, 2015). The collaboration of China and the CARs with respect to energy resources enhanced since depletion of Beijing's self-reliance in energy during 1990s (Afridi, Iqbal, and Hussan, 2017) and in the mid-1990s, China worried with respect to security of its energy supplies on the basis of which a profound strategy regarding energy was designed by the leadership of China for the furtherance of its global ambitions (Stegen, 2015). The CARs and China have established collaboration in the various fields of energy like refining, engineering and exploration of gas and oil (Yujin, 2019). China and Turkmenistan have also signed an agreement regarding construction of pipeline of gas towards Xinjiang, as well as also Kazakh-China pipeline of oil (Stegen, 2015). China and Kazakhstan also signed an agreement for pipeline of oil from Kazakhstan towards Xinjiang through mainland China (Afridi, Iqbal, and Hussan, 2017). The hydrocarbon resources of the CARs may bring both short as well as long term benefits, of which to be accrued as a result of the long lasting strategies by the local leadership for their countries (Stegen, 2015). The domestic sources of China's energy supplies have been concentrated the North and North Western areas of Xinjiang on accounts of which security of this region is prime concern of China (Afridi, Iqbal, and Hussan, 2017). China has established strategic relation with its neighboring Central Asian States regarding flows of energy towards China for being the central hub of economic market between eastwards & westwards (Stegen, 2015).

China's efforts to dominate the area seem to be a novel version of the Great Game, which is centered around the energy resources of Central Asia and raw material markets. The main players of present-day New Great Game are the US and China since after the US intervention in Afghanistan (Marketos, 2016). China has been playing a role of dominant power in terms of the CARs energy resources, while the US role is relegated to be of second tier on the basis of which the US Exxon Mobil does not have match against oil giant CNPC of China (Fazilov and Chen, 2013). With the initiation of the "Silk Road" vision presented in 2013 by Xi Jinping, Beijing has reached a new step in its quest for energy security, merging Asian economic markets with China being pivot of the transit of energy (Stegen, 2015) for which China enhances its engagement through regional initiatives as 'Economic Silk Road' (Cheng and Hu, 2008). The CARs may be helpful to China for expansion of the supplies of energy resources and for the development of nuclear energy by means of approximately 30 nuclear power plants to be constructed by China, and that uranium reservoir of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan accounting $\frac{1}{4}$ of world's total resources may be enough to meet the needs of China (Fazilov and Chen, 2013). China has successfully established collaboration with Eurasia's energy giants like Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan in order to secure its energy supplies for "Silk Route" plan (Stegen, 2015). The involvement of China in Central Asia remains to be advantageous (Swanström, 2015) signifying that collaboration between China and the CARs in terms of energy security is based on mutually beneficial and win-win principle (Yujin, 2019).

III. CONCLUSION

It is imperative to conclude that the Great Game was initially a competition among the Russian and British, the two main imperial states of the 19th century for strategic control of the Central Eurasia. The old version of Great Game has become a tale of the previous history, whereas the renewed form of New Great Game came into existence since collapse of the USSR. Most of the academics dislike using the terms "Great Game" or "New Great Game" on the grounds that these have been considered for being echoes of the rivalries of the colonial times during the 19th and 20th centuries. The traditional rivalries of power politics revealed in the beginning of the 21st century has permeated into the economic, military and political affairs of Central Asia on accounts of which it is ascribed as a "New Great Game".

According to the most recent conceptualization, the philosophy of New Great Game is mainly driven by Russia and China's desire to drive out the US from the region of Central Asia and to obtain control of the area which is significant due to its resources of energy and geostrategic position. The region of Central Asia has turned out to be a new platform of the old Great Game's revised version, whereas the US and China are key players of today's New Great Game. The main actors in this novel version of "New Great Game" are the US, China, Russia, Pakistan, Turkey and Iran, which have been following policies in order to accomplish their objectives of national concerns.

The control of massive hydrocarbon and supplies of energy reserves of the CARs has become a core issue of the regional politics of the twenty-first century. The US, China and Russia have been competing for establishment of their dominance in the region and that energy supplies are merely a way to that end. China has been considered for being 2nd largest of the world's buyer of energy while the CARs are in the possession of massive resources of raw materials and energy supplies, which are complementary to the commercial expansion of China. Central Asia can be seen as China's wild and unfenced backyard. China sees itself as an Asian energy hub, relying on supplies of energy from Eurasia, including Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan. The involvement of China in Central Asia remains to be advantageous signifying that collaboration between China and the CARs in terms of energy security is based on mutually beneficial and win-win principle.

REFERENCES

1. Afridi, Manzoor Khan, Iqbal, Musharraf, and Hussan, Sumbal. (2017). "New Great Game in Central Asia: An Analysis of China's Interests." *Global Social Sciences Review (GSSR)*, Vol. II, No. I (Spring 2017), 1-17.
2. Ahrari, Mohammed Ehsari. (1994). "The dynamics of the new great game Muslim Central Asia." *Central asian Survey*, 13 (4), 525-539.
3. Blank, Stephan. (2008). "The Strategic Importance of Central Asia: An American View." *The US Army War College Quartely Parameters Vol.38, No. 1*, 73-85.
4. Blank, Stephan. (2012). "Whither the new great game in Central Asia?" *Journal of Eurasian Studies*, Volume 3, 147-160.
5. Cheng, Ter-Shing, and Hu, Liyan. (2008). "China's Energy Security and Geo-Economic Interests in Central Asia." *Central European Journal of International & Security Studies*, Vol. 2, No. 2, 42-55.
6. Fatima, Qamar, and Zafar, Sumera. (2014). "New Great Game: Players, Interests, Strategies and Central Asia." *South Asian Studies*, 29(2), 627-655.
7. Fazilov, Fakhmiddin, and Chen, Xiangming. (2013). "China and Central Asia: A Significant New Energy Nexus." *The European Financial Review*, Accessed at: <http://www.europeanfinancialreview.com>
8. Guo, Xuetang. (2006). "The Energy Security in Central Eurasia: the Geopolitical Implications to China's Energy Strategy." *China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly*, Vol. 4, No. 4, 122-144.
9. Hussain, Fakhar. (2020). "Geostrategic Imperatives of Gwadar Port for China." *The Korean Journal of International Studies* Vol.18, No.2 (August 2020), 145-167.

10. Hussain, Fakhar, and Hussain, Mezhar. (2017). "China-Pak Economic Corridor (CPEC) and its Geopolitical Paradigms." *International Journal of Social Sciences, Humanities and Education (IJSSHE) Vol. 1, No. 2, 79-95.*
11. Hussain, Fakhar, Ahmad, Dr. Mian Saeed, Nawaz, Saadat, Haider, Syed Aqeel, and Atif, Muhammad. (2021). "Challenges to China-Pak Economic Corridor (CPEC): The Indian Perspective." *Elementary Education Online, Vol. 20 (Issue 5), 3764-3770.*
12. Hussain, Fakhar., Khan, Muhammad Ikramullah, Hussain, Sarfraz, Nawaz, Saadat, and Ahmad, Nisar. (2021). "Dynamics of Regional Geopolitics and Challenges to CPEC: The Afghan and Iranian Perspectives." *Elementary Education Online, Vol. 20 (Issue 5), 3235-3243.*
13. Hussain, Sarfraz, Hassan, Asan Ali Golam, Rafiq, Muhammad, and Quddus, Abdul. (2019). "The Impact of Exchange Rate exposure and Working Capital on return on equity." *International Journal of Disaster Recovery and Business Continuity Vol. 10, December (2019), 64-74.*
14. Hussain, Sarfraz, Rafiq, Muhammad, Ahmad, Nisar, Quddus, Abdul, and Tien, Pham Phat (2021). "Pak Rupee As A Currency And Currency War." *Journal of Contemporary Issues in Business and Government Vol. 27, No. 1, 88-95.*
15. Hussain, Sarfraz, Rafiq, Muhammad, Qudus, Abdul, Ahmad, Nisar, and Tien, Phat Pham. (2021). "China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: Cooperate Investment Development And Economic Modernization Encouragement." *Journal of Contemporary Issues in Business and Government Vol. 27, No. 1, 96-108.*
16. Khan, Abdul Hafeez. (2006). "Central Asia: Centre of New Great Game." *The Dialogue, Volume I, Number 4, 57-82.*
17. Liao, Xuanli. (2006). "Central Asia and China's Energy Security." *The China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 4, 42-62.*
18. Marketos, Thrassy. (2016). "China's Energy Geopolitics The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Central Asia." *New York: Routledge.*
19. Rumer, Eugene. (2006). "China, Russia and the Balance of Power in Central Asia." Strategic Forum National Defense University, November. Accessed at: <http://www.ndu.edu/inss>.(October 11, 2020).
20. Scobell, Andrew, Ratner, Ely, and Beckley, Michael. (2014). "China's Strategy Toward South and Central Asia An Empty Fortress." RAND Corporation. Accessed at: <http://www.rand.org/giving/contribute>.(October, 2020).
21. Stegen, Karen Smith. (2015). "Understanding China's Global Energy Strategy." *International Journal of Emerging Markets, 10 (3), 18-22.*
22. Swanström, Niklas. (2015). "The Security Dimension of the China-Central Asia Relationship: China's Military Engagement with Central Asian Countries." Institute for Security & Development Policy, March, 18. Accessed at: <http://www.isdp.eu>.(October, 11, 2020).
23. Torbakov, Igor. (2007). "The West, Russia, and China in Central Asia: What Kind of Game Is Being Played in the Region?" *Transition Studies Review, Vol. 14, No. 1, 152-162.*
24. Yujin, Feng. (2019). "China's strategy toward Central Asia: interests, principles and policy tools." *International Relations, Vol. 12, Issue 1, 23-39.*
25. Zimmerman, Thomas. (2015). "The New Silk Roads: China, the U.S., and the Future of Central Asia." Center on International Cooperation, October. Accessed at: <http://www.cic.nyu.edu>.(October 11, 2020).