



## UNITED STATES TREND OF DEVIATING FROM ARMS CONTROL TREATIES AND ITS IMPACT ON GLOBAL SECURITY SYSTEM

**Dr. Tauqeer Hussain Sargana**, Assistant Professor, Department of Politics and International Relations, International Islamic University Islamabad (IIUI), Pakistan, [tauqeer\\_taki@yahoo.com](mailto:tauqeer_taki@yahoo.com)

**Latafat Aziz**, Senior Lecturer, Department of Humanities & Social Sciences, Bahria University Islamabad, Pakistan.

**Dr. Mujahid Hussain Sargana**, Assistant Professor, Department of Humanities & Social Sciences, Bahria University Islamabad, Pakistan.

**Fawad Aslam**, PHD Scholar, School of International Relations, Nanjing University, China.

**Dr. Muhammad Umer Hayat**, Senior Assistant Professor, Department of Humanities & Social Sciences, Bahria University Islamabad, Pakistan.

**Asim Muneeb Khan**, Senior Lecturer, Department of Humanities & Social Sciences, Bahria University Islamabad, Pakistan.

### Abstract

**Purpose of the study:** The purpose of the study is to underscore the changing discourse of Washington's approach towards global arms control and disarmament regime. United States in October 2018 announced its willingness to come out of 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Treaty (INF). This not only invoked a new debate on the future of arms control treaties but also sent waves of insecurity in the global order that had been observing a positive discourse of disarmament between the two Cold War arch rivals. With ups and downs in the subsequent ultimatums at-last the fate of the treaty faced termination from the US in February 2019 just like the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) that was ended in 2002 by the then US President George W. Bush. The key question confronted in the study is about, why subsequent U.S. administrations are deviating from international commitments that the Washington made to ensure international peace and security?

**Methodology:** The study is descriptive in nature and follows deductive method with that of mixed method approach to highlight the challenges surrounding regime failure of global security system.

**Main Findings:** This study makes the point that the result of US withdrawals from her international arms control commitments would accelerate development and deployment elements of its Global ABM system in South Korea, Japan and number of European countries. That is why Washington's decision to abandon INF treaty can be openly considered as a multistep strategy for denial of global security system. At the same time the final goal of this strategy is clearly visible, which is to weaken the reciprocal abilities of presumed rogue and revisionist enemy-countries. Additionally, the White House is interested in strengthening ties with allies such as India to contain Chinese rise.

**Applications of the study:** In this study an attempt has been made to underscore the US security anxiety which revolves around the pretext of Russian and Chinese evolving missile modernization. Washington believes that to ensure her national security it has to neutralize both the Chinese and Russian factor in an adequate manner. This aspires and requires US missile deployments in Asia Pacific Region with that of additional air and sea delivery means in allies territories. In fact, the INF treaty was putting bar on the US options to mitigate the evolving security theatre. Somehow, Washington's viewpoint to walk away from the INF treaty is the same as of ABM treaty.

**Novelty/ Originality of this study:** The study has looked into the new but rapidly increasing securitization of strategic stability with that of confronting the very notion of global security order. The study has generated the information about the impact of United States trend of deviating from arms control treaties and its impact on global security system.

**Key Words:** arms control, SALT, START, INF, AMB, New START, Russia, United States, global security system, India, China, international security, instability

### I. INTRODUCTION:

Recent trends of United States slipping away from its bilateral commitments with Russia on global security system create vulnerability for global peace and security. The world at large is going through

enormous security challenges, which are different than the so-called security construct of the Cold War. Most of the literature written in the post Cold War period had given credit to United States for showing restraint towards Soviet military maneuvers. As a result maturity between the two leaderships prevailed that preferred to end up into bilateral nuclear arms control measures rather indulging into direct mode of confrontation. The spirit on good grounds even continued in the post-Cold War period and gave impetus to strategic stability. The pace of positivity somehow got deteriorated in the aftermath of 9/11 episode which highlighted security anxiety in the American strategic posturing and invoked trends of turning back to Cold War arms control measures. This became visible when former US President George W. Bush in 2002 withdraw from Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which allowed the country to massively deploy anti-ballistic systems in Asia Pacific and Eastern Europe (Boese, 2002).

Continuing with the pace of slipping away from global security system, US President in October 2018 indicated to walk away from the INF treaty (Borger, Julian & Pangelly, 2018). With political upheavals along with tit-for-tat ultimatums, finally the US withdrew from the treaty in February 2019 (Borger, 2019). US decision to step back for its obligations vested in the INF treaty which has been considered a fundamental arrangement for global peace, the world will witness decreasing consensus over arms control along with hype in the issues of insecurity leading toward global disorder. One of the biggest positive trends that emerged out of such treaties was the stability of arms control between United States and former Soviet Union. Though, in 1988 Russia succeeded the former Soviet Union but the consensus required for international peace prevailed. Today, the 'Trump Trend' is adamantly reflecting Washington's hasty withdrawing strategy from bilateral strategic agreements that it had signed with Russia. This tendency is not good for international security. It is important to mention that the US in 2001 has already abandoned Anti-Ballistic Treaty (ABM) of 1972, which was the byproduct of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), the first ever consultative arrangement of 1969 between the two Cold War rivals. US decision to withdraw from the ABM treaty was referred as "mistake" by the then Russian leadership (Jeffery, 2001). So, this recent development of declaring withdrawal from INF treaty is not an isolated attempt. In fact, it is continuation of a greater US strategy.

Looking deep into the Trump's trend towards arms control, one could predict the so-called 'serial killer' kind of tendency in White House, which will not settle-down until it finds her next target. So the next agreement that falls prey to Trump's trend of arms control is New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) of 2010. New START benefited both the competitors in limiting the deployment of nuclear warheads to 1,550 along with deployment of over 700 delivery systems (Gould, 2018). The consensus will remain alive until February 2021 but the future prospects of the treaty and its extension seems dark. Regrettable is the fact that these three treaties are the 'pillars' of nuclear stability, which prevented the possibility of nuclear war between the two countries. It took so many years with exceptional efforts to create this legal base to guaranty safety and peace. Trump's trend of deviating from US commitments towards international peace is about to vanish every single aspiration towards global security.

Why Trump administration is deviating from international commitments that the US made to ensure international peace and security? The answer seems quite interesting as Cold War politics of nuclear deployment is under surge with tit for tat tendency. Recent developments surrounding militarization of regions along with nuclear testing and deployment of sophisticated warheads which the US believes Russia and China had been indulged in are the violation of the earlier commitments (Borger, 2018). Though, China is not party to INF treaty but still US looks at Beijing's nuclear posturing as a threat for her national security particularly of its allies in the Asia Pacific region (Zhao, 2018). To underscore the security dynamics erupting out of arms control deviations, it is necessary is to understand the global security system. This would help us to decode the overall scenario of arms control regime with that of emergence of security politics that made the consensus futile while putting it at the mercy of global politics.

## II. GLOBAL SECURITY SYSTEM:

The Cold War politics of containment not only advanced the ideological confrontation between two rivals but also prepared their militaries with enhanced abilities to confront each other's objectives on an extended geography. This made them capable to engage on almost every territory of the world. In

return technological sophistication along with modernized armaments had defined the destructive capabilities of the two. This created a point where dooms day mantra of insecurity got birth and both the rivals had to come together to address the strategic vulnerabilities hampering international peace and security. This in fact originated bilateral consultations during the Cold War, which helped the two to end up into mutual agreements on nuclear arms control mechanism. Thereafter, visualizing need for stability and international peace both Washington and Moscow have adopted measures to curtail and minimize bilateral issues of vertical proliferation including decrease in nuclear warheads, missiles and delivery means. This in fact gave birth to global security system with that of arms control agreements between the two rivals.

Most of the Cold War arrangements around nuclear arms control were strategic in nature, which included SALT-I and SALT-II of 1969 and 1972, respectively (Jensen, 1984). Though, START-I was initiated in 1980s but was materialized in 1991 (Forrow, et.al., 1998). Therefore, “START-I, START-II, START-III, SORT, and New START” were the arrangements which came into existence in the post-Cold War period. It is significant to mention that the 1987 arrangement of “Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty” was a non-strategic nuclear arms control agreement, which continued even in the post-Cold War period (Frederking, 2018). The US claimed controversy over the development and deployment of Russian missiles that come under the preview of the treaty brought it into the limelight and finally pushed Washington to walk away from the 1987 arrangement with Russia just like the ABM treaty (of SALT-I arrangement) which it abandoned in 2002 (Dodge, 2017). The other non-strategic nuclear arms control measure was the Presidential Nuclear Initiative (PNI) of 1991, which was also reciprocated by the then Russian leadership. Therefore, when it comes to identify nuclear restraint or arms control arrangements between the United States and Soviet/Russian leadership, there are two different measures that define the overall consultations and global security system. These are:

- i. Strategic measures
- ii. Non-Strategic measures

The details of both types of arms control measures are briefly explained below to understand the basic outlet of contemporary trend of slipping away from the global security system by the United States.

### III. STRATEGIC MEASURES:

As mentioned earlier that both United States and Russia had two separate arrangements of arms control bargain which includes strategic and non-strategic measures. The Cold War strategic arms control measures included SALT-I, SALT-II; whereas, the post-Cold War measures included START-I, START-II, START-III, SORT and NEW START agreements. Details of these arrangements are given in the subsequent paragraphs.

#### a. SALT I

The ‘Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty’ came into existence in the aftermath of an extensive arms race between former Soviet Union and United States in November 1969. The treaty was initially decided for five years time period, which included confidence building on three priority areas between the two rivals (US State Department, 2021a).

- The first was the defense arrangement through Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) that allowed both the parties to retain about 100 ABMs installed on the two strategic sites. The two strategic sites included the capital city and nuclear missile sites of each party. Allowance to deploy 100 AMBs on the respective sites in fact came as an agreement to protect strategic assets and targets of utmost importance. It disallowed the parties to develop national ABM system, which was even reduced to installation of only one system at Moscow and North Dakota, respectively in Russia and United States. The AMB treaty lasted until 2002 when the then Bush administration unilaterally withdrawal from the agreement.
- The second defense arrangement under SALT-I included the subject of limiting the Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs). In-fact,

this arrangement was called 'The Interim Treaty'. Under this short term agreement, the Soviet Union was allowed to have 1618 ICBMs as compared to 1054 ICBMs of United States. On the fronts of SLBMs, Soviet Union and United States agreed to have 740 missiles. Keeping in view the US advancement in strategic bombers, the USSR was allowed to maintain bigger inventory of ICBMs. Contrary to address ICMBs and SLBMs, the issue of Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV) was not deliberated in the interim treaty. As we know that MIRV's are capable of carrying many weapons on a single missile. Moreover, at the time of interim agreement and SALT-I negotiation in particular both Soviet and US were developing MIRV and Cruise missiles, respectively.

- The third agreement between the two parties on lines of SALT-I was 'the Basic Principles Agreement'. This arrangement was to seek political promises for each other on the fronts of nuclear warfare. In fact, the agreement charted out some important rules and guiding principles to avoid nuclear confrontation and to exercise political restraint in global politics.

Due to five years time period of SALT-I, the overall arrangement became futile and from November 1972 both parties initiated talks on SALT-II.

## **b. SALT II**

Since the earlier arrangement of SALT was of interim nature therefore after expiry of its five years time bar, another initiative under SALT-II was deemed necessary. Contrary to SALT-I, this second phase of strategic arms limitation faced more difficulties. With all its problems and difficulties, on the auspices of 1974 Vladivostok Summit, the Soviet and American leadership proposed the sketch of prospective outlook of SALT-II agreement. President Leonid Brezhnev represented the Soviet side, whereas President Gerald Ford represented the US. Just like the earlier SALT-I, this agreement also skipped the discussions on Cruise missiles rather focused on missile launchers along with ICBMs and SLBMs. A reciprocal with equal limits were proposed on each party. One of the biggest concerns particularly the right wing senators of US Senate were apprehensive of was related to the Soviet tendency of coping up with American technology while using the time bar of the agreements. Therefore, Soviet tendency of coping up with America mostly heated the domestic debate and stalled amicable negotiations.

Continuing with the spirit of strategic arms limitations, Jimmy Carter in 1977 being the new US President in office speeded up the negotiations with an objective to put restraint on expanding Soviet missiles. He finally was able to fix the limit of weapons on agreed figures by 1979 and signed SALT-II agreement on June 18, 1979. President Leonid Brezhnev and President Jimmy Carter inked the agreement in Vienna.

Under the signed agreement, both parties agreed to limit the delivery vehicles related to ICBM, SLBM and strategic bomber. The limit was agreed on 2,250 delivery vehicles for each side, which specifically considered ICMB silo, SLBM launch tube and heavy bombers. Other restrictions were imposed on the deployed forces with strategic nuclear assets. The proposed limit specifically the MIRV was of 270, which the Americans were already below the agreed threshold. In fact, they can increase the number of delivery vehicles on MIRV front. As mentioned earlier, just like SALT-I, Cruise missiles were also not considered in SALT-II agreement.

The next stage after signing the agreement was to get the endorsement from the US Senate, which failed to achieve the required consensus. Along with US Senate apprehensions about Soviet violations regarding the spirit of previous agreements, when in December 1979 Soviet invaded Afghanistan; the fate of the treaty became victim to Cold War politics. Though, both United States and Soviet Union voluntarily abided the treaty understanding despite absence of any legal compulsion. When in the middle of Afghan war political flames were perceived to catch up global confrontation, the US President Ronald Reagan on May 26, 1986 declared SALT-II as "flawed treaty" and signaled that the future decision of United States regarding deployment of strategic forces will be dependent on Soviet threat (US State Department, 2021). This ended the so-called voluntarily abidance of the both parties and the SALT-II significance lost its *de facto* relevance.

## **c. START I**

The third arrangement that took its shape in the domain of nuclear arms control was the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. The idea was in fact floated by the former US President Ronald Reagan in 1985, when

he met Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev during the auspices of Geneva Summit. During the same time United States have been aggressively pursuing the idea of Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). In fact, the concept was floated by the former US President Ronald Reagan in 1983, who based on the science fiction movies wanted to create a space based 'strategic defense' remembered as 'Star Wars'.

The SDI objective was to create a curtain of x-ray lasers equipped with so-called nuclear devices to generate a defense response from space against the most expected Soviet led ballistic attack on United States. The idea was basically evolved around the concept of 'strategic defense' rather 'strategic offense' which was previously associated to the nuclear doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). The proposed concept did receive enough funding but the scientists never came closer to fully implement the idea. Though, the research and development initiated to materialize the idea had deeply impacted on the 21<sup>st</sup> century missile technology of the United States.

Due to November 1983 NATO deployment of strategic forces particularly the deployment of intermediate range missiles in Eastern Europe and Ronald Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative put halt in materializing the arrangement on START for several years. Though, issues related to non-strategic weapons with that of intermediate range missiles ranging between 500 to 5500 kilometers and missile defense were amicably resolved through December 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF). Today this treaty is under enormous pressure, detail of which is given in the later part of this study. Parallel to INF agreement, the delay in the START negotiations was taking time. The agreement on START was finally concluded and signed by the then US President George H. W. Bush on July 31, 1991.

The disintegration of Soviet Union of early 1990's and as a consequence emergence of new states such as Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan; who being the possessors of Soviet nuclear weapons further created a challenge to arms reduction dialogue between US and newly emerged Russian Federation. As a result the treaty's entry into force got halted. Under the spirit of the treaty agreement the Soviet weapons possessed by these states had to be returned to Russian Federation. This also included their inclusion into NPT and the proposed START agreement. Therefore, Lisbon Protocol was signed on May 23, 1992 to address these challenges, which brought the three states into agreement with Russia and United States along with their inclusion into NPT. Issues were fixed amicably in due process of time and finally on December 5, 1994 treaty entered into force. The treaty was initially given 15 years of life with clause of unlimited five years extension in condition to mutual agreement.

Under the treaty agreement, both the parties consented reduction in the delivery vehicles and warheads of the deployed strategic arsenals. About 6000 warheads with that of 1600 delivery vehicles were proposed to be the limit of deployed strategic arsenals of both the countries. Under the agreement the excessive numbers of delivery vehicles were to be destroyed, which was ensured through a verification regime. Until December 2001 objectives of the START agreement were achieved. Intermittently both parties remained associated with the treaty but showed unwillingness to extend START negotiations beyond its 15 years lifetime. Therefore, the treaty got expired on December 5, 2009 (Federation of American Scientists, 2021).

It is important to mention that during the negotiations particularly in the 15 years of START treaty several other attempts were made to reduce the number of deployed forces. These attempts are known as START-II of 1993 and SART-III Framework of 1997. Though, remained unsuccessful but brief details on the two parallel efforts are given below.

#### **d. START II**

Due to new realities of the post-Cold War period along with dissolution of Soviet Union into Russian Federation demanded some new ideas to deal with the ongoing discussions on reduction in strategic forces and their deployment. Since, the START-I agreement entered into limbo situation with that of newly emerged nuclear states with Soviet weapons, the Russian and American presidents in June 1992 consented to pursue parallel plan to START negotiations. Therefore, in January 1993 an agreement was inked under START-II proposing reductions in the deployed strategic weapons. The reduction limit was proposed between 3000 and 3500 weapons with that of land based MIRV deployments. Just like the earlier arrangement, START-II also continued the spirit of reduction and destruction of MIRVs but not

weapons (US State Department, 2021b). Under the agreement the treaty was given 10 years of lifetime with expiry in January 2003. Though, the deadline was extended until December 2007 through a 1997 protocol, which mainly addressed the earlier delays in ratification of the START-II agreement. During this time, START-I had also achieved its due weightage and amicably resolved the hurdles. Meanwhile, on December 04, 1994 START-I entered into force.

Dialogue and negotiations on the front of START-II invoked fears and mistrust as most of the time US and Russian thinking on arms control regime created halt in the process. Due to which the US Senate refused to sign the 1997 protocol along with few treaty amendments of ABM proposed by Russia. In fact, Russia made compulsory to bring changes into ABM as a condition to entry into force to START-II agreement. The limbo continued without concrete confidence building measures and finally as a result of US withdrawal from the ABM treaty in 2002, START-II agreement lost its effectiveness. The agreement never entered into force and remained victim of mistrust and fears.

#### **e. START III Framework**

The START-III was again an effort to reduce the number of strategic weapons deployed along with destruction of delivery vehicles. The agreement was inked in March 1997 and put bar on deployed weapons which proposed limit to 2000-2500 weapons. The framework was agreed by the US President Bill Clinton and Soviet President Boris Yeltsin. According to Daryl Kimball, “in addition to requiring the destruction of delivery vehicles, START III negotiations were to address the destruction of strategic nuclear warheads...to promote the irreversibility of deep reductions including prevention of a rapid increase in the number of warheads” (Kimball, 2003). The pre-condition to START-III Framework was entry into force of START-II that in fact never happened. So, the fate of both the arrangement ended into vain.

#### **f. SORT**

As part of confidence building measures particularly to initiate the process of rapprochement in 2002 under the auspices of US-Russian Summit both United States and Russia signed another agreement with the purpose to reduce and limit the number of nuclear weapons. Parallel to several other agreements signed during the summit, Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) or Moscow Treaty was inked on May 24, 2002. It was signed by the Bush administration and Vladimir Putin. George W. Bush maintained that the US would only count the warheads which are optionally deployed. That specifically meant the reduction of warheads in active service. This stance of US excluded all those weapons which were not operational or placed in storage including the weapons carried by delivery vehicles going through repair or overhaul. Contrary to START-I and START-II, the agreement on SORT did not mandate the treaty to destroy the delivery vehicles. Neither treaty obligated each party to destroy weapons, which was earlier agreed in START-III Framework agreement. SORT only talked about limiting the number of warheads. The draft of the treaty described December 31, 2012 as the deadline to achieve the aggregate number not exceeding beyond 1700-2200 for both parties. Two other conditions were added in February 2003 by the US Senate Armed Services Committee, which included clause of annual report on bilateral cooperation and annual update on compliance mechanism. With all the above complications and amendments in the draft, the treaty finally entered into force with formal approval by Duma and Senate on June 01, 2003 (NTI, 2011). On February 5, 2011 prior to its described deadline of December 31, 2012; the New START agreement replaced the SORT on February 5, 2011.

#### **g. New START**

Continuing the pace of arrangement on arms control United States and Russia entered into another agreement on April 8, 2010 and inked the New START treaty. The treaty is still binding on both states that limited each party to retain 1550 warheads of strategic nature. Such weapons also limited the number of delivery means to 700. New START treaty included the provision of limiting the launchers to 800, whether deployed or non-deployed. If New START is compared with that of SORT's upper limit of weapons which was about 2200 then it has meaningfully reduced the warheads number to 30%, which was locked at 1550. The same very way New START lowered the limit of delivery vehicles by 50%, when it is compared to START-I treaty expired earlier on December 5, 2009, as is evident that the allowance to retain delivery

vehicles in New START is 700 with that of START-I, which mandated each party to keep 1600 vehicles. The verification regime of New START was a combination of START-I elements including onsite inspections and expositions. As pointed out by Daryl Kimball, that “measures under the treaty include on-site inspections and exhibitions, data exchanges and notifications related to strategic offensive arms and facilities covered by the treaty, and provisions to facilitate the use of national technical means for treaty monitoring. The treaty also provides for the continued exchange of telemetry (missile flight-test data on up to five tests per year) and does not meaningfully limit missile defenses or long-range conventional strike capabilities” (Kimball, 2003).

New START mandated each party to complete the limit implementation by seven years immediately after the entry into force. The agreement also gave 10 years lifetime to the treaty with provision to extend it further. The treaty was approved by the US Senate on December 22, 2010, while Russian Duma and Federation Council approved the treaty draft on January 26, 2011. Under the consensual arrangements the treaty binding status got entry into force on February 5, 2011 and has ended its legal mandate on February 05, 2021.

At the time of writing this paper, New START is the only treaty which currently exists as part of strategic nuclear arms control regime, whereas INF treaty being non-strategic arrangement on nuclear arms control has been going through intense political-cum-diplomatic maneuvers by the two rivals. ABM treaty though was an important part of longstanding non-strategic arms control arrangement that got approval back in 1972 under the SALT-I measures has been dead since 2002 when the then Bush administration decided to exist the treaty. The same limbo situation is now with INF and no one knows the future of New START. Specific to evolving situation, the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) of US states that:

“Russia possesses significant advantages in its nuclear weapons production capacity and in non-strategic nuclear forces over the U.S. and allies. It is also building a large, diverse, and modern set of non-strategic systems that are dual-capable (may be armed with nuclear or conventional weapons). These theater- and tactical-range systems are not accountable under the New START Treaty and Russia’s non-strategic nuclear weapons modernization is increasing the total number of such weapons in its arsenal, while significantly improving its delivery capabilities” (US Defense Department, 2021, p. 4).

#### IV. NON-STRATEGIC MEASURES:

The ‘non-strategic nuclear arms control measures included 1987 INF treaty and 1991 Presidential Nuclear Initiative by the US President George H. W. Bush, which was reciprocated by Mikhail Gorbachev the then Soviet leader. Both United States and Russia entered into 21<sup>st</sup> century with only two arms control arrangements, which included ABM treaty being the legacy of SALT-1 arrangement and INF treaty being the subsequent verification supplement for START-1 treaty. In 2003 SORT entered into force which was replaced by New Start in 2010. Therefore, the next section of the study would only entail details about 1987 INF treaty and Presidential Nuclear Initiative of 1991 as part of non-strategic measures on nuclear arms control between United States and Russia. Why these treaties were agreed earlier and what factors impacted on the consensus later on, is the overarching question that will drive the discussion.

- **INF Treaty**

On December 8, 1987 leadership of the both United States and former Soviet Union signed the ‘Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF). It was a time when in the middle of Afghan War Soviets were clutched into proxy war with Mujahedeen. The treaty allowed an agreement between both signatory parties to destroy land-based cruise and ballistic missiles, which comes between the ranges of 500 to 5500 kilometers. Keeping in view Soviet and American sphere of global influence this range comes under non-strategic weapons but for both Pakistan and India such a missile holds strategic significance in South Asia. The unequivocal commitment and robust verification regime of the INF treaty including onsite inspections paved the way for inspection regime of subsequent START-1 agreement of 1991.

The treaty draft of INF after formal approval entered into force on June 01, 1988. Both parties to the treaty efficiently completed their compliance by June 01, 1991 that in return destroyed about 2692 ballistic and cruise missiles. Due to Soviet disintegration, the agreement was extended to newly emerged states of Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan who possess Soviet missiles and were deemed necessary to return their weapons to Russian Federation. Therefore, the INF treaty entered into multilayered arrangement and included the three more states. Also, two other states joined the INF treaty which included Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan but they have never actively participated in the proceedings and onsite inspections.

The INF treaty enjoys an exceptional lifetime that is of an unlimited duration, which is why the recent US deviation from global nuclear order and withdrawal from the treaty has created anxiety in the global security system. After ending this treaty just like the AMB, the US is now in a better position to maneuver security environment around the globe particularly against its rivals.

Since many years both Washington and Moscow has blamed each other of violating the treaty. The issues of compliance were raised by United States back in 2014 that Russia has tested and developed a ground-launched cruise missile in negation to treaty compliance. The US claimed that the missile range comes within the ambit of 500 to 5500 kilometers bar of INF treaty (Majumdar, 2017). Furthermore, the US sources in March 2017 also claimed that the Russian military has already deployed the SSC-8 missile system on forward bases (Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty, 2017). Moreover the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review of the US has specifically commented on violation of the INF treaty. NPR draft mentions that:

“Russia is modernizing an active stockpile of up to 2,000 non-strategic nuclear weapons, including those employable by ships, planes, and ground forces. These include air-to-surface missiles, short range ballistic missiles, gravity bombs, and depth charges for medium-range bombers, tactical bombers, and naval aviation, as well as anti-ship, anti-submarine, and anti-aircraft missiles and torpedoes for surface ships and submarines, a nuclear ground-launched cruise missile in violation of the 1987 INF Treaty, and Moscow’s antiballistic missile system” (US Defense Department, 2021, p. 23).

As expected, Moscow not only denied the US claims rather charged Washington with non-compliance of the treaty. Russia maintained the point that the defense-launch-system, which the US is deploying in Europe is capable of launching the cruise missiles with that of “using targets for missile defense tests with similar characteristics to INF Treaty-prohibited intermediate-range missiles, and making armed drones that are equivalent to ground-launched cruise missiles” (BBC, 2018). The hotchpotch of counter claims has ensured only one thing, which is termination of the arrangements necessary to hold both rivals accountable.

- **Presidential Nuclear Initiative**

The 1991 Presidential Nuclear Initiative (PNI) was related to tactical nuclear forces, when on September 27, 1991, the then US President George H. W. Bush unilaterally pledged that United States will remove the forces from deployment and eliminate all of its tactical nuclear forces. This announcement came in the aftermath of Soviet dissolution, which expected a reciprocal response from the Soviet leadership. The pledge was in fact to reduce the likely hood of nuclear proliferation that Soviet leadership after disintegration may not be able to control. Under the initiative Bush announced that nuclear artillery shells along with short range ballistic missiles will be destroyed. He also indicated that the US nuclear forces operating in the domain of its navy such as surface ships, land based naval aircrafts, and attack submarines will no longer carry non-strategic nuclear weapons. Reciprocating the US Presidential Nuclear Initiative, the then Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev announced his pledge on October 5, 1991 to eliminate nuclear landmines, artillery munitions, and tactical nuclear weapons. Extending his commitment Gorbachev also pledged to take away and withdraw tactical nuclear warheads being operational with Soviet navy (Koch, 2012). With the passage of time skepticism has overtaken the so-called pledges under the 1991 PNI, which unfortunately after 17 years had re-invoked the debate of non-strategic nuclear weapons. The interesting facts around tactical nuclear weapons suggest the other way around as 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) of US has officially brought back the induction of battlefield nuclear weapons along with modernization of naval based delivery means. The plea of the NPR is again based on the Russian non-compliance. Washington believes that Russia has developed non-strategic nuclear



warheads and had lowered the nuclear threshold to take advantage in the conflict (US Defense Department, 2021).

## V. GETTING OUT FROM ABM TREATY:

Agreed on May 26, 1972 in Moscow, the Anti Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty was an arrangement between the former Soviet Union and United States to compliment the SALT-I negotiations that allowed both the states to install two defense systems, one to protect capital cities and the other missile sites. The treaty postulated the premise of not developing national ABM systems. Later on, both parties agreed to install only one defense system. Soviet restricted the installation to protect premises of Moscow, whereas United States deployed the ABM system at Grand Forks, North Dakota. According to official testimony of the draft, the intension of the treaty was “to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to take effective measures toward reductions in strategic arms, nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament” (US State Department, 2021c). The spirit behind the agreement was to bring confidence building measures into bilateral relations. Furthermore, it validated the doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) under the dictum of deterrence. It was considered that possibility of peace can be strengthened with the ultimate fear in mind that if one side attacks on the other, the reciprocal response would bring catastrophic destruction to the initiator too. Since then the treaty has been modified by a series of amendments. The US Senate approved the treaty draft on August 3, 1972 that ultimately entered the ABM into force on October 3, 1972. Over the period of time treaty had undergone through many modifications. The treaty had hosted many Five Year Review Meetings, which were held in Geneva on regular timeframe.

In 2001, President Bush while describing his dislike to the dictum of deterrence attached to MAD said that, “Security of both the United States and the Soviet Union was based on a grim premise that neither side would fire nuclear weapons at each other, because doing so would mean the end of both nations” (Norton-Taylor & Perrone, 2001). To create a room for withdrawal from the ABM treaty, on another occasion he said that “it [ABM] hampers our ability to keep the peace, to develop defensive weapons necessary to defend America against the true threats of the 21st century” (The Guardian, 2001). Finally, in 2002 George Bush distanced his administration from the treaty and withdrew from a 30 years old arms control arrangement. He in fact devalued the significance of treaty while calling it an outdated arrangement that has no relevance and strategic purpose in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Moreover, he denounced the threat spectrum of US associated with traditional rival Russia to a more generic classification of ‘rouge states’ that mostly included Iraq, Iran and North Korea. Bush being the sole proponent of exiting the treaty arrangement with Russia reconfigured the deterrence, when he said that “[deterrence] can no longer be based solely on the threat of nuclear retaliation ... We must move beyond the constraints of the 30-year-old ABM treaty. This treaty does not recognize the present, or point us to the future. It enshrines the past” (Norton-Taylor, 2001).

## VI. SLIPPING AWAY FROM INF TREATY: RISKS AND SCENARIOS

All the three treaties mentioned above limit the opportunities to develop new generation of strategic weapons.

- INF prohibits all types of warheads with ranges beyond 500 but less than 5,500 km.

The question is; Does US really needed weapons between 500 and 5,500 km? Keeping in view recent trends in Trump’s deviation from international commitments, this study assumes that the White House believes yes, they are needed. This somehow also identifies the potential targets as well which without any doubt will be Russia and China. So what now?

1. US withdrawal from INF will probably lead to deployment of intermediate range missiles with or without nuclear warheads on American military bases which are located in convenient vicinity to China.

It's not a secret that US enjoy vast number of military bases on the territory of her allies. Nukes can be brought back to South Korea and most probably to Japan.

2. South Asian allies are also not excluded. The question is how to convince the leadership of a country to allow deployment. It's easy for US. They have brilliant experience of creating instability in the region escalating simmering conflicts. All you have to do is to create image of a dangerous neighbor and provide credible assurances that the missiles will prevent bad things from happening. Taking into account complicated relations of India with China and strengthening of US-Indian ties this study forecast that in future American missiles will be deployed in India.

3. China as by now is free from any international obligations in the sphere of strategic weapons development and due to strong economy is able to produce new generations of sophisticated delivery means with different range scope. Beijing claims its right to defend national interest with modern correspondent systems against external threats such as possible aggression from US and India or application of proxy means to destabilize its grip over Tibet, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Xinjiang, etc.

## VII. CONCLUSION:

Washington believes that Russia and China pose direct threat to its national interest and security of its allies and therefore should be neutralized. In this study an attempt has been made to underscore the US security anxiety which revolves around the pretext of Russian and Chinese evolving missile modernization. Washington believes that to ensure her national security it has to neutralize both the Chinese and Russian factor in an adequate manner. This aspires and requires US missile deployments in Asia Pacific with that of additional air and sea delivery means. In fact, the INF treaty was putting bar on the US options to mitigate the evolving security theatre. Somehow, Washington's viewpoint to walk away from the INF treaty is the same as of ABM treaty. This study makes the point that as a result US would accelerate development and deployment elements of its Global ABM system in South Korea, Japan and number of European countries. That is why Washington's decision to abandon INF treaty can be openly considered as a multistep strategy for denial of global security system. At the same time the final goal of this strategy is clearly visible, which is to weaken the reciprocal abilities of presumed rogue and revisionist enemy-countries.

Washington's decision to abandon INF treaty can be openly considered as a multistep strategy towards the denial of global security system. On December 04, 2018 during a NATO meeting at Brussels, the U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said that they have given 60 days ultimatum to Russian counter parts to comply with the INF treaty or otherwise United States would follow its own discourse of withdrawing from the treaty (Ward, 2018). Issuing the warning from NATO platform altogether had significance for a collective counter response against Russian perceived violations. The United States at the same time wanted to benefit from withdrawing strategy to weaken its main 'enemy-countries'. Additionally, the White House has been interested in strengthening ties with allies such as India to contain Chinese rise.

It is important to mention that India will definitely put efforts to enforce missile program if missile race in South Asia receives more gain from American input. India's recent membership in MTCR will also push New Delhi to acquire new technologies from new partners in frames of legal cooperation inside MTCR (Mishra, 2018). In this scenario it would be difficult for Islamabad to compete because of economic, political and technical issues.

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