



Algeria's Support For The Ottoman Empire Against Euro-Christian Threats During The 10th/16th Century: An Approach Based On Ottoman Documents

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Abstract:

Algeria played a pivotal role in the civilizational conflict within the Mediterranean during the 10th/16th century, marked by the struggle between the Ottoman State and Euro-Christian states. Algeria exemplified the highest forms of cooperation and unity within the Islamic bloc, supporting the Ottoman State in most of its Mediterranean naval wars against the Euro-Christian alliance. This included significant events such as the Battle of Preveza in 1538, aiding France against its rival Spain amidst the Bourbon-Habsburg conflict, contributing to the Siege of Malta in 1565, assisting the Ottoman fleet in the Battle of Lepanto in 1571, and playing an active role in the Battle of Tunis-La Goulette in 1574.

The research problem stems from the following question: How did Algeria support the Ottoman State amidst Euro-Christian threats, as reflected in Ottoman documents from the 10th/16th century?

The study concludes by highlighting Algeria's contributions in the domains of intelligence, logistical cooperation, and military solidarity, particularly in the wars waged by the Ottoman State against Euro-Christian powers.

Keywords: Ottoman State; Algeria; Euro-Christian states; Ottoman documents; 10th/16th century.

Introduction:

After coming under the rule of the Ottoman State, Algeria played a pivotal role in the Mediterranean civilizational struggle that took place between the Ottoman State and the Euro-Christian states during the 10th/16th century. Guided by the adage "sometimes a harm brings benefit," this conflict witnessed the highest forms of cooperation and unity within the Islamic bloc. Algeria supported the Ottoman State and stood in solidarity with it in most of its Mediterranean naval wars against the Euro-Christian alliance. This included significant events such as the Battle of Preveza in 1538, assisting France against

its traditional rival Spain, contributing to the Siege of Malta in 1565, and the conquest of Cyprus in 1570, followed by the Battle of Lepanto in 1571. The Algerian fleet was then called upon to restore security to the Ottoman lands after the defeat at Lepanto, providing both material and military support in the Battle of Tunis-La Goulette in 1574. Additionally, the Algerian fleet was requested to fend off any potential Spanish attacks after the expulsion of the Spanish from La Goulette, further supporting France and engaging in various other efforts. These actions reflected the solidarity of the Algerian eyalet with the Sublime Porte. The Ottoman documents provide invaluable insights into this essential act of solidarity, which later contributed to the expansion of the Ottoman State's territory and the consolidation of its influence over the Mediterranean region.

Thus, the research problem is formulated as follows: How did Algeria's military and intelligence support to the Ottoman State during the 10th/16th century manifest, as reflected in Ottoman documents?

1. Algeria: From Spanish Colony to Ottoman Eyalet - Providing Support to the Mother State in the First Half of the 10th/16th Century

1.1 Algeria: From Spanish Colony to Ottoman Eyalet:

While Spanish forces were launching attacks on the Maghreb coasts, the Ottoman State, on the other hand, was sending aid to local sailors in recognition of their efforts in protecting Muslims from European aggression. It was during this time that the brothers of Ya'qub al-Din emerged on the Mediterranean stage, presenting a significant obstacle to traditional colonialism. It is noted that after hearing of their victories in the Mediterranean basin, the people of the Algerian city of Béjaïa sent a request for assistance to them, seeking help against the Spanish threat. The brothers responded to their call. Upon their arrival in 918 AH / 1512 CE, the brothers began confronting the enemies. ¹United with other Maghrebi Muslim sailors, the brothers, alongside Ottoman sailors², attempted to counter the Spanish forces. However, their efforts ultimately failed. The Ottoman aid previously provided to the brothers, in the form of two large ships, each with 27 seats and 16 cannons³, along with their own fleet, enabled them to lay siege to the city of Béjaïa for the second time in 920 AH / 1514 CE for 29 days, although they were unable to achieve their goal. They managed, however, to liberate the city of Jijel and establish control there. The brothers' military acumen and collaborative efforts allowed them to defeat the enemies.

Following the death of `Arūj, Khayr al-Din continued the jihad under his leadership despite the significant challenges that threatened to overwhelm him. His actions were not tied to the orders of the Sublime Porte and did not represent the Ottoman State. The internal rebellions of the eyalet, the emergence of adversaries to Khayr al-Din on the scene, and the continued Spanish threat stationed on the Algerian coasts led Khayr al-Din to propose to the people of Algiers the idea of joining the Ottoman State as a protector of Muslims, to which they agreed. ⁴

¹ - Khayr al-Din Barbarossa: *Memoirs of Khayr al-Din Barbarossa*, trans. Muhammad Diraj, Dar Toledo for Publishing and Distribution, 3rd ed., Algeria, 1436 AH / 2015 CE, p. 67.

² - Fray Diego de Haedo: *Histoire des Rois d'Alger*, trans. H.D. Grammont, R.A, vol. 24, 1880, p. 47.

³ - Barbarossa, Khair al-Din: *op. cit.*, p. 70

⁴ - Rahima Bichhi: "Centers of the Maritime Jihad Movement in the Maghreb and Their Role in Repelling European Campaigns during the 10th-11th Hijri Centuries (16th-17th centuries); A Comparative Study through

The Ottoman Sultan Selim responded to their plea⁵, aiming to expand his state and increase its influence, and sent a banner and a letter to the people of Algiers along with Khayr al-Din. This resulted in Algiers being officially recognized as an Ottoman eyalet, and Khayr al-Din was appointed as its governor. The Ottomans also provided the necessary military assistance⁶. This official incorporation of Algiers under Ottoman rule occurred in 925 AH / 1519 CE.⁷

Following this integration, Khayr al-Din worked to repel the Spanish threat and unify the Algerian eyalet. He expanded Ottoman control over several cities, including La Calle in 927 AH / 1521 CE, Annaba in 928 AH / 1522 CE, and Constantine. This stabilization led to the end of Spanish presence in the Castle of Bougie, which had been a major obstacle to the movements of his fleet and a pressure point on the city. Thus, he began building a strong state and an enduring Islamic fortress facing the Euro-Christian powers in the western Mediterranean⁸, serving as a key ally to the Ottoman State in the western Mediterranean.

1.2. Algeria as the Caliph of the Ottoman State: Saving the Muslims of Andalusia

Since the primary objective of the Algerian fleet was to counter Christian forces and assist Muslims, the jihad operations expanded significantly across regions. The first step in this expansion was the support and aid provided to the oppressed Muslims of Andalusia. Due to its strategic location, the Algerian eyalet did not overlook the plight of the Andalusians. During his seven years of rule, Khayr al-Din successfully transported seventy thousand Andalusian refugees to safety.

In 948 AH / 1541 CE, the Muslims of Andalusia residing in Algeria sent a letter to Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent, informing him of the remaining Muslims in Andalusia, the persecution they faced from the enemies, and their need for assistance. They also acknowledged Khayr al-Din's efforts in protecting them and resettling them in coastal cities of the eyalet, such as Cherchell and Tlemcen⁹. The local inhabitants welcomed the refugees warmly, under the orders of the beylerbey Khayr al-Din, who encouraged their settlement and ensured their stability¹⁰.

Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent instructed Khayr al-Din Barbarossa to provide full assistance to them. Following in his footsteps, beylerbey Salih Reis recaptured the fort of Badis, making it a base for launching his campaigns¹¹.

Consequently, aid was sent, and despite the high-priority concerns facing the Sublime Porte, the Algerian fleet continued to provide unwavering support to the Andalusians. Even when the assistance was not explicitly ordered by the imperial court, such as in the

Archival Documents," Ph.D. thesis in Modern History, supervised by Ibrahim Sayoud, University of Ghardaïa, 1443-1444 AH / 2021-2022 CE, p. 180.

⁵ - Letter from the People of Algiers to Sultan Selim I in early Dhu al-Qi'dah, 925 AH / October 1519 CE. Topkapi Saravi Arsivi, 6456/ BOA.TSMA.E.757/63.

⁶ - Khair al-Din Barbarossa: op. cit., pp. 94-9

⁷ - Aïcha Djamil: Algeria and the Sublime Porte through Ottoman Archives (1520-1830), PhD Thesis in Modern and Contemporary History, supervised by Pr. Abdelkader Sahraoui, University of Djilali Liabes, Sidi Bel Abbes, 2017-2018, p. 49.

⁸ - Rahima Bichi: Ibid., p. 181.

⁹ - Ibid., p. 199.

¹⁰ - Hanifi Hlaili: Researches and Studies in Andalusian-Morisco History, Dar Al-Huda for Printing, Publishing, and Distribution, Algeria, (n.d.), 2010, pp. 22-23.

¹¹ - B.O.A, A.DVNS.MHM.d, (Mühimme Defteri), Kutu No.889, Gömlek No. 656; 961 / 1554, s 167.

case of Kılıç Ali, who was contacted by the Sublime Porte to commend his role in aiding the Andalusians, the fleet still provided supplies and personnel¹². Despite the many pressing issues, the plight of the Muslims of Andalusia remained at the forefront of the Sultan's mind, even in the most challenging circumstances his empire faced. It had been the Sultan's intention to send the Ottoman fleet to assist the Andalusians earlier, but the infidels of Cyprus had broken their treaty and committed transgressions against the pilgrims of the Holy Mosque and the merchant community. These issues delayed the Ottoman fleet's dispatch, but Kılıç Ali was ordered to send troops, supplies, and provisions whenever possible to support the Andalusians, while ensuring the Sublime Porte was kept informed of the ongoing situation¹³.

1.3. Algeria's Ottoman Influence in Tripoli to Rescue It from Christian Occupation

The Spanish forces were determined not to relinquish their hold on the Maghreb coasts and sought to expand their influence, aiming to extend their reach to the coast of Tripoli, as reflected in King Ferdinand's statement: "... for our stability in Africa, we must occupy Oran, Béjaïa, and Tripoli... and not allow the Moroccans to reside in coastal cities..."¹⁴ Indeed, the Spanish forces managed to occupy Tripoli on the 24th of Rabi' al-Thani, 916 AH / 30 July 1510 CE, led by Pedro Navarro, after fierce resistance, leaving behind 5,000 martyrs and 6,000 captives.¹⁵ Due to the oppressive policies imposed by the Spanish against the locals in Tripoli and the growing threat they posed, the people of Tajoura, along with those who had fled from Tripoli, formed a delegation and contacted Sultan Selim I in 926 AH / 1519 CE, to request assistance and seek a solution to the crisis¹⁶.

In response, the Ottoman authorities sent the Barbarossa brothers (Khayr al-Din) to confront the Spanish and their strongholds. The Spanish forces almost lost control of Tripoli due to the frequent attacks from the Ottoman corsairs¹⁷, prompting them to seek a loyal power to govern Tripoli on their behalf. On the 25th of Rajab, 936 AH / 24 March 1530 CE, a decree was issued to cede Tripoli to the Knights of St. John at Castel Franco Bolognese, granting them the island of Malta from Emperor Charles V and authorizing them to protect and defend Tripoli¹⁸.

Following the Ottoman aid led by Khayr al-Din to the people of Tripoli, he appointed one of his relatives, Khayr al-Din Karaman, as his deputy in Tajoura. Karaman worked diligently to make this base more significant and secure, constructing a watchtower near

¹² - B.O.A, A.DVNS.MHM.d,..., Kutu No.9, Gömlek No. 204; 23 Şevval 977 /30 Mart 1570, s 77.

¹³ - B.O.A, A.DVNS.MHM.d,..., Kutu No.9, Gömlek No. 204; 10 Zilkade 977 / 16 Nisan 1570, s 77.

¹⁴ - Charles Féraud: *Libyan Annals from the Arab Conquest to the Italian Invasion*, trans. and ed. by Mohammed Abdel Karim Al-Wafi, Qarinos University Publications, Benghazi-Libya, 3rd ed., 1994, pp. 73-74.

¹⁵ - Al-Hasan Al-Wazzan: *Description of Africa*, trans. by Mohammed Hajji et al., 2 vols., Dar Al-Gharb Al-Islami, Beirut, 2nd ed., 1983, vol. 2, p. 101. Ahmed bin Hussein Al-Naib Al-Ansari: *Nafahat Al-Nasrin wa Al-Rayhan fi Man Kan bi Tarabulus min Al-Ayan*, ed. by Mohammed Zainhom Mohammed Arab, Dar Al-Farjani for Publishing and Distribution, Egypt, 1994, p. 38. Abu Salim Abdullah bin Mohammed Al-Ayyashi: *Al-Rihla Al-Ayyashiya (1071-1073 AH/1661-1663 CE)*, ed. by Said Al-Fadhli and Suleiman Al-Qurashi, Dar Al-Suwaidi for Publishing and Distribution, Abu Dhabi, UAE, 1st ed., 2006, vol. 1, p. 143.

¹⁶ - Najm al-Din Ghalib al-Kib: *Madinat Tarabulus Abra al-Tarikh*, Al-Dar Al-Arabiya lil-Kitab, Libya-Tunisia, 2nd ed., 1978, p. 91.

¹⁷ - Mohammed Cherai Ben Maiza: *The Role of the Catholic Church and Its Organizations in Relations Between the Maghreb Eyalets and Southwestern European States (France, Spain, the Italian Principalities) During the 16th-17th Centuries*, Master's thesis in Modern History, supervised by Mokhtar Hassani, University of Ghardaia, academic year 2011-2012, p. 114.

¹⁸ - Ettore Rossi: *Libya from the Arab Conquest to 1911*, trans. Khalifa Mohammed Al-Tallisi, Arab Publishing House, Alexandria, 2nd ed., p. 192.

Tripoli for defense and expanding the Tajoura harbor to accommodate warships, making it a naval base for the Ottoman fleet.¹⁹ Khayr al-Din Karaman also engaged in battles against the Knights of St. John, tightening the siege and weakening their position. The residents of Janzur broke their alliance with the Knights of St. John, refused to pay taxes to them, and joined the resistance movement²⁰.

Karaman also besieged Tripoli, surrounding the city and preventing the enemy from opening its gates. He built a fort south of the city, known as the "Captain's Castle," located near the Dahra region, where cannons were installed to directly target the fortifications of the city. Karaman's forces were resolute, and after a series of intense clashes, the situation seemed to favor the Ottomans, but the Knights of St. John nearly defeated them when a false rumor about Khayr al-Din Karaman's death spread among the Ottoman soldiers, causing them to retreat. This allowed the knights to gain the upper hand and eventually win the battle²¹.

However, the struggle continued for the Knights, who later attacked the Abu Dabus tribe, five miles from Tripoli, plundering it, capturing its people, and burning the village. Following this setback, the Algerian-Ottoman support system became more visible with the appointment of Murad Agha as Khayr al-Din Karaman's successor in Tajoura in 945 AH / 1539 CE. Murad Agha continued the military campaigns against Tripoli, receiving ships, men, and supplies from Khayr al-Din²².

However, after Khayr al-Din's death in 953 AH / 1546 CE, Murad Agha struggled to maintain support due to the disruption of aid from Khayr al-Din. In this challenging situation, the Ottoman corsair Dragut emerged as a formidable force, working diligently to weaken the Spanish presence along the Tunisian coast and liberate Tripoli from the control of the Knights of St. John²³.

1.4. Algeria Responds to Khayr al-Din's Call and Supports the Ottoman Fleet in the Battle of Preveza (945 AH / 1538 CE)

The Algerian-Ottoman cooperation gained global prominence through several key battles, including the Battle of Preveza, which Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent referred to as the "Great Jihad." In this battle, all Ottoman forces united with Khayr al-Din Barbarossa's fleet. The strategic importance of the island of Preveza was one of the main reasons for Khayr al-Din's decision to attack it, leading an Ottoman fleet consisting of 130 ships and between 20,000 and 30,000 men²⁴. The fleet was commanded by famous Ottoman corsairs such as Dragut Pasha, Sinan Pasha, Murad Reis, Saleh Reis, Ali Reis, Hassan Agha, and Hassan, the son of Khayr al-Din. The Christian coalition, composed of forces from the Papacy, Venice, Spain, Florence, Genoa, and Malta, was led by Andrea Doria²⁵.

¹⁹ - Mohammed Saeed Al-Tawil: Political and Commercial Relations between Libya and the Mediterranean Western European Countries (1210-1248 AH / 1795-1832 AD), Ph.D. dissertation in Modern and Contemporary History, supervised by Ammar Bin Khrouf, unpublished, University of Algiers, 2007-2008, pp. 41-42.

²⁰ - Rahima Bishi: Marakiz Harakat al-Jihad..., op. cit., p. 352.

²¹ - Ibn Ghalbun: Al-Tadhkar fi man Malaka Tarabulus wa ma Kana biha min al-Akhbar, ed. and annotated by Al-Tahir Ahmad Al-Zawi, Dar Al-Madar Al-Islami, National Library of Benghazi, Libya, 1st ed., 2004, pp. 154-155.

²² - Rahima Bishi: Marakiz Harakat al-Jihad..., op. cit., p. 353.

²³ - Ibn Ghalbun: Op. cit., pp. 157-159.

²⁴ - Moulay Belhamissi: Histoire de la marine Algérienne (1516-1830), ENAL, Alger, 1986, p. 142.

²⁵ - Mohamed Draï: Le début de la présence ottomane en Algérie et le rôle des frères Barberousse (1512-1543), éd. Nacir Eddine Saïdouni, Ossala Publishing, Alger, 1ère éd., 2012, p. 327.

The Battle of Preveza took place on the 4th of Jumada al-Awwal, 945 AH / 28 September 1538 CE, in the Gulf of Actium near Preveza Harbor in western Greece. Despite the Christian coalition's superiority in several aspects, the Ottoman fleet emerged victorious, largely due to Khayr al-Din's control over all the units of his fleet, including the Algerian navy, and his strategic command of his generals and troops. This unity and cohesion contrasted with Andrea Doria's fleet, where there was a lack of coordination, as the various factions did not speak a common language²⁶.

This Ottoman victory, with the participation of experienced corsairs who had ruled Algeria—starting with Khayr al-Din, followed by Hassan Agha, Hassan ibn Khayr al-Din, and Saleh Reis—enabled the Ottoman Empire to maintain control over the Eastern Mediterranean for the next thirty years. As a result of their victory, the Ottomans forced Spain to launch an invasion of Algeria in 948 AH / 1541 CE, personally led by Charles V to avenge their defeat at Preveza. However, the Spanish forces suffered a crushing defeat at the walls of Algiers, which was even more humiliating than their earlier loss in Preveza.

1.5. Captain Doria Khayr al-Din Seeks Algerian Support for France Against Spain

This cooperation emerged due to the shared common enemy between France and the Ottoman Empire, with Khayr al-Din Barbarossa playing a central role. François I of France sought an ally against Charles V, and Khayr al-Din, after expelling the Spanish from the fortress of Binyon in 935 AH / 1529 CE, also sought a partner to oppose Charles V. François I viewed the Ottoman Empire as his only viable ally, given their mutual enemy. In 940 AH / 1534 CE, while on his way to Istanbul, Khayr al-Din stopped in France, where he met with François I and presented him with valuable gifts. They agreed to unite their efforts against Spain²⁷. Shortly afterward, François I signed a treaty of friendship with the Ottoman Empire in 942 AH / 1535 CE. Following this, Ottoman-Algerian efforts toward France began to manifest. France, through its ambassador "Polin" in Constantinople, requested the Ottoman caliph to send a fleet to recover the city of Nice. On 3 Rabi' al-Thani 950 AH / 5 July 1543 CE, Khayr al-Din arrived with the Ottoman fleet, joined by Hassan Agha, the Beylerbey of Algeria, and around 40 Algerian ships. They cooperated with the French fleet to reclaim the city, which they successfully retook on 22 August²⁸.

Khayr al-Din remained stationed at the Toulon port, where he spent the winter, and received adequate supplies from the French king, who also provided him with 800,000 reales and 400 Algerian and Ottoman prisoners²⁹.

When Hassan Pasha, the son of Khayr al-Din, took over the leadership of Algeria, he was asked by King François I to assist him against Spain. However, Hassan refused, considering it an insult to Algeria's military strength and disregarding the strong Ottoman-French relations. This refusal led to French resentment toward him, and they sought to remove him from power in Algeria³⁰.

²⁶ - Khayr al-Din: Op. cit., pp. 186-189

²⁷ - Haedo: Histoire des Rois..., op. cit., p. 57.

²⁸ - Sheikh Lakhal: The Activities of the Bastion Agency and Its Impact on Algerian-French Relations During the First Half of the 17th Century (1013-1070 AH/1604-1659 AD), Master's Thesis in Modern History, supervised by Ibrahim Saioud, University of Ghardaia, 2012-2013, p. 34.

²⁹ - Abdelkader Fekayer: The Spanish Invasion of the Algerian Coasts and Its Effects (910-1206 AH/1505-1792 AD): A Study of Political, Economic, Social, and Cultural Impacts, Doctoral Thesis in Modern History, supervised by Dr. Jamal Qanan, University of Algiers, 2000-2001, p. 182.

³⁰ - Rahima Bichi: Marakiz Harakat al-Jihad..., op. cit., p. 228.

Thus, the Franco-Ottoman-Maghreb cooperation was the result of a practical reality—the common threat posed by Spain under King Charles V. This situation led the Ottoman Empire to support France in its wars against Spain with both material and military assistance. In return, France kept the Ottoman Empire informed about Spanish movements and intentions in the Maghreb and the Mediterranean.

2. Algeria Supports the Ottoman State Against the European-Christian Threats During the Second Half of the 10th Hijri Century (16th Century CE):

This support manifested in several historical events, which can be clarified as follows:

2.1. Algeria Supports France in Response to the Orders of the Ottoman State:

In 959 AH (1552 CE), King Henry II of France sent d'Albisse to ask Saleh Rais to attack the Spanish coasts, offering promises to work together. Since Dragut Reis was at the time leading the Ottoman fleet to block the Spanish Duke D'Alva (the Spanish army commander) in coordination with de Lagarde (the French fleet commander), Saleh Rais responded to the French king's request. He raided the Spanish fleet in early June (960 AH/1553 CE) with forty warships and managed to besiege the Spanish vessels, which carried Duke Fernando Álvarez de Toledo³¹.

Additionally, in 965 AH (1558 CE), France sought the help of the Ottoman Empire and the Ottoman governors in Algeria against the Spaniards, who were blocking French ships. The Ottoman fleet attacked the Gulf of Salerno, Naples, and Corsica, then headed towards Marseille, where they joined the Algerian fleet. Together, they attacked Majorca³².

2.2 Algeria Responds to the Ottoman Orders to Support Tripoli in 966 AH (1559 CE):

The Ottoman State decided to intervene and liberate Tripoli from the control of the Knights of Malta by sending its special forces and offering assistance to Dragut Reis. The Ottoman fleet sent to Tripoli was estimated to consist of 140 ships of various sizes and types, under the command of Sinan Pasha, which merged with Dragut's fleet of about fifty ships, as well as Saleh Bey, the ruler of Rhodes³³.

On the 6th of Sha'ban 958 AH (9 August 1551 CE), the Ottoman army attacked the city with cannons, towers, and walls, and chaos spread among the knights' soldiers. Upon realizing the fall of the city to the Ottomans, the governor of the city of Valletta sent a request to Sinan Pasha for negotiations, which led to a surrender agreement and the withdrawal of the knights from the region³⁴. Thus, Tripoli became an Ottoman province (Eyalet) in 958 AH (1551 CE), and Murad Agha assumed its governance.

Fearing a second European occupation of Tripoli, the Ottoman Sultan sent a decree requesting the Algerian Beylerbey to monitor the enemy's movements, spy on them, and ensure the protection and defense of the province, as reports had reached the Sultan that the Christian fleet was gathering, potentially preparing to attack Tripoli before the arrival of the Ottoman fleet³⁵.

³¹ - Ernest ,Charrière : Négociations de la France dans le levant, Extrait de la correspondance de Rome et de Venise ,4t , Paris , (1848-1860), T2, p204.

³² - Abdelkader Fkaier: Op. cit., p. 183.

³³ - Rahima Bichi: Marakiz Harakat al-Jihad..., op. cit., p. 355.

³⁴ - Ibn Galboun: Op. cit., pp. 160-161.

³⁵ - B.O.A, A.DVNS.MHM.d,..., Kutu No.3, Gömlek No. 139; 16 Şevval 966 / 26 Temmuz 1559, Ss 59-58.

The Algerian Beylerbey also corresponded with the Sultan about Dragut's complaint regarding a shortage of military supplies and his request for money³⁶. The Sultan responded by instructing that he be supplied with weapons and equipment, along with the necessary funds. The Sultan also instructed all governors and commanders of the Maghreb coasts to send soldiers, weapons, and ammunition to Tripoli and to meet its needs, warning them against neglect or delay in this matter³⁷.

The Sultan maintained communication with the governor of Tripoli, Dragut, regarding the military assistance provided and instructed him to repair the military installations and supply them with the necessary equipment, ensuring that they would be ready when the fleets sent to the province arrived under the Sultan's orders³⁸.

2.3 The Dedication of Algerian Sailors in the Siege of Malta (971 AH / 1565 CE)

The Ottoman Empire decided to conquer the fortress of Malta after the island became a stronghold for the empire's enemies. These enemies had been disrupting the trade routes and harassing pilgrims and merchants traveling to Egypt by sea, in addition to posing a threat to several Maghreb regions, including Tripoli, Mahdia, Tunis, Béjaïa, and Algiers. The Ottoman authorities appointed Mustafa Pasha as the leader of the campaign and issued orders to the Beylerbey of the Mediterranean Islands, Piyale Pasha, to accompany the Ottoman fleet and join the campaign alongside the heads of the Ottoman provinces in the Mediterranean. Due to the valiant leadership and military acumen displayed by Khair al-Din's son, Hayreddin, in various situations with the Algerian fleet, the Sublime Porte sent him a letter urging the leaders of the Ottoman provinces to participate in the campaign. The letter promised honors and rewards based on individual merits and requested him to prepare the Algerian fleet, equipping the ships with necessary supplies and weapons, and appointing a trusted commander to lead these vessels, which were to join the Ottoman fleet at sea to begin the attack on Malta³⁹.

Additionally, the Sublime Porte issued a decree to the Beylerbey of Algiers, Hassan Pasha, to prepare the soldiers and fleet of his province and join the campaign once Mustafa Pasha's forces reached the region⁴⁰.

In another firman, the previous request by Hassan Pasha was reaffirmed, with the necessity of informing the Sublime Porte of all developments⁴¹.

Despite these orders and others regarding the campaign, the mission was not executed for reasons unknown. However, the Ottoman Empire was preparing for it. A short while later, a serious incident triggered the empire to expedite the campaign. The Maltese pirates seized a large Ottoman ship en route to Istanbul, laden with valuable goods. This incident could not go unpunished, leading the Ottoman authorities to organize a naval force of 250 ships under the command of the Grand Admiral Piyale Pasha, alongside a land force of 35,000 troops led by Mustafa Pasha. The campaign set sail in Sha'ban 971 AH (March 15, 1565 CE) from Istanbul, with the Beylerbey of Tripoli, Dragut Pasha, also participating. However, the campaign did not achieve its objectives after the Knights of Malta learned of the campaign's timing and fortified the castle. Despite the Ottoman

³⁶ - B.O.A, A.DVNS.MHM.d,..., Kutu No.3, Gömlek No. 248; 20 Zilkade 966 /24 Ağustos 1559, s 99.

³⁷ - B.O.A, A.DVNS.MHM.d,..., Kutu No.3, Gömlek No. 581; 4 Rebiyülevvel 967 /4 Aralık 1559, s 209

³⁸ - B.O.A, A.DVNS.MHM.d,..., Kutu No.3, Gömlek No.579 ; 6 Rebiyülevvel 967 /5 Aralık 1559, s 209.

³⁹ - B.O.A, A.DVNS.MHM.d,..., Kutu No.6, Gömlek No.565 ; 25 Cemaziyelevvel 972 /29 Aralık 1564, s 266.

⁴⁰ - B.O.A, A.DVNS.MHM.d,..., Kutu No.6, Gömlek No.561 ; 29 Cemaziyelevvel 972 /2 Ocak 1565, s 263.

⁴¹ - B.O.A, A.DVNS.MHM.d,..., Kutu No.6, Gömlek No.904 ; 20 Şaban 972 /23 Mart 1565, s 426.

forces' control over several castles in the region and their siege of Malta, the entry of Spanish forces into the region forced the Ottoman commander to lift the siege and withdraw from the island. Mahamud bin Hasan Pasha, Beylerbey of Algiers, also participated with his ships alongside his father, and the Sublime Porte issued a special firman for him to equip his fleet with provisions⁴².

As for the role of the Algerian navy in the siege of Malta, due to their experience and seniority, they were tasked with guarding the island and attacking Fort Saint Michel, where they inflicted significant losses on the defenders⁴³.

After the siege and the war, the Ottoman Sultan sent a letter to the Beylerbey of Algiers praising the efforts of the Algerian naval fighters and the gallantry and virtues they displayed in their battle against the Maltese. He congratulated them on their victory upon entering the operational theater⁴⁴.

Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent remained determined to capture Malta despite the significant losses the Ottoman forces suffered in terms of lives and equipment in the previous campaign. He decided to launch another campaign, but his need to prepare a new expedition towards Europe prevented its immediate execution. Nonetheless, he ordered the Ottoman fleet to set sail, as indicated in an order to the Beylerbey of Algiers, Hassan Pasha, dated 25 Rajab 975 AH (February 15, 1566 CE). The order instructed the fleet to set sail, and Hassan Pasha was requested to participate with the Algerian ships and meet with the ships of the Mediterranean provinces. The Sublime Porte had concerns about potential Spanish attacks on Ottoman ports and ships in the region, and thus asked Hassan Pasha to remain vigilant, protect his province, and even raid Spanish coasts and those of their allies⁴⁵.

It is well-known that during this campaign, the Ottoman forces succeeded in capturing the island of Sakız (Chios) in the Aegean Sea. Due to his competence and military expertise, Hayreddin's son, Hassan, was appointed to lead the Ottoman fleet after the death of Piyale Pasha in 975 AH (1567 CE)⁴⁶.

2.4. Despite the Distraction of Supporting the Buṣṣārāt Revolt and Liberating Tunis, the Support for the Conquest of Cyprus (978 AH / 1570 CE)

By 978 AH (1570 CE), the power of the Ottoman state had reached its peak, but it faced increasing threats from its enemies, particularly the Knights of Malta and the Venetians stationed in Cyprus⁴⁷ and along the Adriatic shores. These adversaries threatened Ottoman interests by raiding and attacking merchants and pilgrims. In response, the Ottoman state decided to launch a campaign against the island of Cyprus⁴⁸. Orders were

⁴² - B.O.A, A.DVNS.MHM.d,..., Kutu No.6, Gömlek No.1049 ; 18 Ramazan 972 /19 Nisan 1565, s 484.

⁴³ - Rahima Bichi: The Jihad Operations of the Ottoman Algerian Fleet During the Century (AH 10/AD 16) in Light of Muhimme Defteri Documents (Study Models), in Historical Studies Journal, vol. 1, Safar 1443 AH / September 2021 CE, p. 08.

⁴⁴ - The Algerian National Archives: Muhimme Defteri No. 5, Ruling No. 817, p. 313, dated 23 Jumada al-Thani 973 AH / 13 January 1566 CE.

⁴⁵ - B.O.A, A.DVNS.MHM.d,..., Kutu No.5, Gömlek No. 968; 25 Ramazan 973 / 15 Nisan 1566, s 367.

⁴⁶ - Rahima Bishi: The Jihad Operations of the Ottoman Algerian Fleet..., op. cit., p. 9.

⁴⁷ - Rahima Bishi: Marākiz Ḥarakat al-Jihād..., op. cit., p. 218.

⁴⁸ - Mohamed Si Youssef: Kılıç Ali Pasha and His Role in the Ottoman Navy, Master's Thesis in Modern and Contemporary History, supervised by Dr. Abou El Kacem Saadallah, University of Algiers, 1408/1988, p. 107.

sent to all forces in the Mediterranean to unite with the Ottoman fleet for the conquest of Cyprus⁴⁹.

Beylerbey of Algiers, Kılıç Ali Pasha, received a royal edict instructing him to join and participate in the mission, with orders to prepare the fleet. In another letter, it was stated: **"... Therefore, we order you to join the fleet and support it in this task, and to do so without delay, while also safeguarding and protecting Algeria and its fortresses..."**⁵⁰ Kılıç Ali obeyed the orders despite being occupied with supporting the Buşşārāt Revolt and watching over the borders of Tunis, fearing a second Spanish attack on the city, given their proximity.

The Algerian fleet set out to meet the Ottoman fleet in Safar 978 AH (July 1570 CE), and on their way, they captured four Maltese ships, striking fear into their enemies. The fortress of Lefke was captured on 10 Rabi' al-Awwal 978 AH (September 10, 1570 CE), and Cyprus was captured on 10 Rabi' al-Awwal 979 AH (August 2, 1571 CE)⁵¹.

2.5. Khayr ad-Din (Qalij Ali) Leads the Algerian Fleet and Avenge the Ottoman Defeat at the Battle of Lepanto (979 AH/1571 CE):

After the Ottomans' conquest of Cyprus on the 10th of Rabi' al-Awwal 979 AH (2nd August 1571 CE), Venice sought assistance from the Christian states. Pope Pius V responded to this request and organized a coalition to confront the Ottoman advance, with the news reaching the Sublime Porte⁵².

Because the eyalet of Algiers held a special position due to its solidarity with the Sublime State in facing the European-Christian threats, the Beylerbey of Algiers, Khayr ad-Din (Qalij Ali), received an order to equip his fleet with as many ships as possible to reinforce the Ottoman fleet⁵³. The Beylerbey of Algiers sent a message to the Sublime Porte informing the central administration that he had taken the Sultan's orders seriously, protected his rear lines, and was preparing to join the Ottoman fleet with full readiness in terms of personnel and equipment⁵⁴.

Following these orders, the Sultan sent another directive to Khayr ad-Din, asking him to join the Ottoman fleet. Therefore, Khayr ad-Din set sail in 979 AH (1571 CE)⁵⁵, departing Algiers with a fleet consisting of 6 Bachtarda ships, one Qadirgha ship, and 11 Qaliyat vessels⁵⁶.

On the 17th of Jumada al-Awwal 979 AH (7th October 1571 CE), the Battle of Lepanto occurred, ending in a significant defeat for the Ottoman fleet. Several factors contributed to this loss, including the exhaustion of the Ottoman sailors, who had spent nearly six months at sea and were returning for rest when the surprise attack by the Christian

⁴⁹ - B.O.A, A.DVNS.MHM.d,..., Kutu No.6, Gömlek No. 565; 25 Cemaziyelevvel 972 / 29 Aralık 1564, s 266.

⁵⁰ - B.O.A, A.DVNS.MHM.d,..., Kutu No.12, Gömlek No. 367; 02 Zilkade 978 / 28 Mart 1571, s 173.

⁵¹ - Rahima Bishi: Marākiz H̄arakat al-Jihād..., op. cit., p. 220.

⁵² - Algerian National Archives: Muhimme Defteri 12, no. 98, dated AH 978/AD 1571.

⁵³ - Algerian National Archives: Muhimme Defteri 12, Decision 15, p. 8, dated 17th of Jumada al-Awwal AH 978/16th October 1570.

⁵⁴ - Algerian National Archives: Muhimme Defteri 12, Decision 367, p. 173, dated 2nd of Dhu al-Qi'dah AH 978/27th March 1571.

⁵⁵ - Algerian National Archives: Muhimme Defteri 14, Decision 48, p. 41, dated 1st of Safar AH 979/24th June 1571.

⁵⁶ - Algerian National Archives: Muhimme Defteri 10, Decision 14, p. 12, dated 3rd of Safar AH 979/26th June 1571.

coalition forced them into battle. As for Khayr ad-Din, his maritime expertise allowed him to save his entire fleet, which had formed the left wing of the Ottoman fleet. He also received an inquiry from Sultan Selim II about the status of the remaining ships, the conditions of the enemy, their plans after Lepanto, and the need to spy on them⁵⁷. This trust bestowed upon him by the Sultan reflected his significant position. As a result, the central administration expressed great satisfaction with Khayr ad-Din's dedication to serving the Sublime Porte, which led to his appointment as Admiral of the Ottoman State, in addition to his governance of the eyalets of Algiers and Tunisia⁵⁸. He was tasked with safeguarding the Ottoman coasts, ordered to rebuild the destroyed Ottoman fleet, and instructed to recruit skilled professionals specializing in maritime sciences⁵⁹.

Indeed, Khayr ad-Din successfully revitalized the Ottoman fleet, benefiting from the expertise of Algerian sailors in rebuilding the fleet and improving the sailors' weapons and equipment. In 980 AH (June 1572 CE), he showcased his new fleet, which consisted of 200 ships and 8 naval fortresses, thereby restoring the honor of the previous defeat⁶⁰.

2. 6. Utilization of the Algerian Fleet to Ensure Security in the Ottoman State's Surroundings After the Defeat at the Battle of Lepanto:

6-1. Honoring the Commander of Tlemcen for Breaking the Siege Imposed by the Enemy on the Ayamura Fortress: Following the defeat of the Ottoman fleet at the Battle of Lepanto, the Ottoman State went on full alert, taking precautions in the Aegean and Mediterranean seas, mobilizing all its defenses. It also sought assistance from its Mediterranean provinces, especially Algeria, due to its expertise in safeguarding the region and confronting the European-Christian coalition, including Spain, Venice, Genoa, and the Pope. The Sublime Porte praised the role played by the commander of Tlemcen, Armaqas Mustafa, in breaking the siege imposed by the enemy on the Ayamura Fortress, located to the west of Greece in the Ionian Sea. As a result, the Sublime Porte honored him by requesting that he deposit his Qaliyat ship and the prisoners aboard with the Emir of Qarlili, before heading to Istanbul⁶¹.

6-2. Reporting the Enemy Fleet's Assembly in Messina, Sicily, and the Order to Raid Their Ships Upon Leaving Messina: In a similar context, the Beylerbey of Western Algeria informed the Sublime Porte that when the Algerian forces arrived in the city of Monastir, under the eyalet of Tunisia, two spies had been captured by the head of the forces, Qara Hassan, who reported to him about the assembly of the Christian-European fleet in Messina⁶². The Sublime Porte ordered that the Algerian fleet be equipped with the

⁵⁷ - B.O.A, A.DVNS.MHM.d,..., Kutu No.16, Gömlek No. 129; 04 Cemaziyelevvel 979 / 23 Ekim 1571, s 62.

⁵⁸ - Algerian National Archives: Muhimme Defteri 12, Decision 1088, p. 571, dated 7th of Dhu al-Qi'dah AH 979/21st March 1572.

⁵⁹ - Algerian National Archives: Muhimme Defteri 16, Decision 563, p. 320, dated 11th of Jumada al-Thani AH 979/30th October 1571.

-Algerian National Archives: Muhimme Defteri 16, Decision 150, p. 74, dated 4th of Jumada al-Thani AH 979/23rd October 1571.

⁶⁰ - Mohamed Sayyid Youssef: Op. cit., p. 119.

⁶¹ - B.O.A, A.DVNS.MHM.d,..., Kutu No.18, Gömlek No.292/293 ; 20 Şevval 979 /06 Mart 1572, s 137.

⁶² - Messina: A district in the northeastern part of the island of Sicily, Italy.

necessary supplies and instructed them to raid the enemy ships as they departed from Messina⁶³.

7. Algeria Provides Material and Military Support to the Ottoman Fleet in the Battle of Tunis – Halq al-Wadi (1574 AH):

Even Tunisia, which was adjacent to the eyalet of Algeria, received support for its liberation from Spanish dominance. After the Hafsids Sultan's failure to protect his lands, he sought assistance from the Spanish forces, who took control of the country and turned it into a near-colony. As a result, the Algerian fleet began its movements toward Tunisia, including an encounter led by Khair al-Din against the large Spanish campaign led by Charles V. However, Khair al-Din's forces were not sufficient to repel it⁶⁴.

Algeria's efforts toward Tunisia continued until 977 AH (1569 AD), when Qalij Ali took power in Algeria. He received messages from Tunisian notables requesting their rescue from the oppression of Moulai Ahmed and his Spanish allies. He responded in 977 AH (1569 AD) and succeeded in liberating the city of Tunis in Rajab 977 AH (December 1569). He appointed Ramadan as the city's leader, and with a firman from Istanbul dated 25 Shawwal 979 AH (11 March 1572), Algeria's military presence in Halq al-Wadi encouraged the people of Tunis to send urgent pleas to the Ottoman Sultan, asking for military support. These requests led the Sultan to send orders to Qalij Ali to dispatch reinforcements to Tunis⁶⁵.

The Spanish objectives were not just to retain what little they had left in the southern Mediterranean but also to plan an attack on both Tunisia and Algeria⁶⁶. When the Ottoman Sultan learned of these plans, he sent a letter to the western governors, urging them to prepare for any sudden Spanish attack on both Tunisia and Algeria. According to a message from the Sultan to the Beylerbey of Tripoli, he informed him that Don Juan de Austria, who had agreed with his fleet commanders to assemble the fleet at the island of Tabarka, intended to attack Tunisia⁶⁷.

When the Spanish fleet reached Halq al-Wadi, there was no opposition from the stationed Ottoman forces. The people of Tunis sent multiple pleas to the Ottoman Sultan requesting military aid. The Sultan, after hearing from the Algerian fleet's return from the Battle of Lepanto, ordered Qalij Ali to send reinforcements⁶⁸. However, Don Juan arrived before any defensive preparations could be made, attacked, and easily captured the city since the Ottoman garrison of Algeria, which had been left by Qalij Ali after his campaign in 976 AH (1569 AD), could not resist due to its small number of only two thousand soldiers led by

⁶³ - B.O.A, A.DVNS.MHM.d,..., Kutu No.19, Gömlek No. 255; 21 Rebiyülevvel 980 /01 Ağustos 1572, s 119.

⁶⁴ - Delenda Al-Arqash et al.: Modern Maghreb through Sources, Center for University Publishing, Media Com, D.T., D.M.N., 2003, pp. 53-54.

⁶⁵ - Algerian National Archives: Muhimme Defteri 19, Decision 264, p. 123, dated 4 Safar 980 AH/15 June 1572 CE.

⁶⁶ - Algerian National Archives: Muhimme Defteri 14, Decision 284, p. 200, dated 3 Safar 979 AH/26 June 1571 CE. /

- B.O.A, A.DVNS.MHM.d,..., Kutu No.10, Gömlek No. 10; 22 Muharrem 979 /15 Haziran 1571, s 08.

- B.O.A, A.DVNS.MHM.d,..., Kutu No.10, Gömlek No. 05 ; 02 Muharrem 979 /26 Mayıs 1571, s 04

- B.O.A, A.DVNS.MHM.d,..., Kutu No.10, Gömlek No. 22; 03 Safer 979 /26 Haziran 1571, s 19.

- B.O.A, A.DVNS.MHM.d,..., Kutu No.10, Gömlek No. 19; 03 Safer 979 /26 Haziran 1571, s 17.

⁶⁷ - B.O.A, A.DVNS.MHM.d,..., Kutu No.10, Gömlek No. 12; 03 Safer 979 /26 Haziran 1571, s 09.

B.O.A, A.DVNS.MHM.d,..., Kutu No.10, Gömlek No. 14; 03 Safer 976 / 27 Temmuz 1568, s 12.

⁶⁸ - Algerian National Archives: Muhimme Defteri 19, Decision 264, p. 123, dated 4 Safar 980 AH/15 June 1572 CE.

Ramadan Pasha. The garrison was forced to retreat to Hammamet, but the gates were closed. They then headed toward the city of Kairouan, where Haidar Pasha was stationed. The Spanish forces pursued them, and a fierce battle ensued, ending in victory for the Algerian forces⁶⁹.

Qalij Ali had already requested permission from Sultan Selim to retake Tunisia before the Spanish could properly fortify it.

The Ottoman Sultan sent orders to the Bey of Algeria to prepare and send soldiers to Tunisia, stressing caution and vigilance⁷⁰. He also ordered the supply of 5,000 sacks, 10,000 nets, and 100 tents to be carried by the Algerian fleet to the warfront⁷¹. Additional orders were sent to Algeria, Tripoli, and Kairouan to prepare for the recovery of Tunisia⁷².

The first letter was addressed to the governor of Tunis, in response to a message informing him of the fall of the province to the Spanish. It warned him of an Ottoman fleet preparing for an attack on Halq al-Wadi and requested his assistance with men, weapons, and supplies⁷³.

The second letter was sent to Ahmad Arab Pasha, Beylerbey of Western Algeria, asking him to join the fleet led by Qalij Ali Pasha and unite with the forces from Tunis and Tripoli, all under the command of Qalij Ali⁷⁴.

The third letter was directed to Ramadan Pasha, the newly appointed governor of the eyalet of Algeria, instructing him to prepare a fleet of 300 vessels and to send 1,095 Algerian cavalry, 1,000 janissaries with all their equipment. The date for the departure was set for 1 Muharram 982 AH (22 April 1574 AD), with the goal of "liberating and securing the fortress of Halq al-Wadi."⁷⁵ Qalij Ali was the fleet commander, and Sinan Pasha led the campaign. Thanks to the combined efforts, this campaign succeeded in ending the Spanish presence in all of Tunisia⁷⁶, despite the reinforcements sent by the Spanish to Halq al-Wadi and Tunis. Haidar Pasha was appointed as the governor of Tunis,

⁶⁹- Ibn Abi Dinar: *Al-Mu'nis fi Akhbar Ifriqiya wa Tunis*, Dar Al-Maseera, Beirut, 3rd ed., 1993, p. 199.

⁷⁰ - Algerian National Archives: Muhimme Defteri No. 21, Decision No. 526, p. 220, dated 21 Dhu al-Qi'dah 980 AH / 24 March 1573 CE.

⁷¹ - Algerian National Archives: Muhimme Defteri No. 24, Decision No. 13, p. 5, dated 16 Dhu al-Qi'dah 981 AH / 8 March 1574 CE.

- B.O.A, A.DVNS.MHM.d,..., Kutu No.24, Gömlek No. 293; 20 Zilhicce 981 / 11 Nisan 1574, s 107.

⁷² - Algerian National Archives: Muhimme Defteri No. 21, Decision No. 637, p. 266, dated 16 Dhu al-Hijjah 980 AH / 22 April 1573 CE.

⁷³ - Algerian National Archives: Muhimme Defteri No. 24, Decision No. 166, p. 59, dated 5 Dhu al-Hijjah 981 AH / 27 March 1574 CE.

⁷⁴ - Algerian National Archives: Muhimme Defteri No. 24, Decision No. 167, p. 59, dated 5 Dhu al-Hijjah 981 AH / 27 March 1574 CE.

⁷⁵ - National Algerian Archives: Muhimme Defteri No. 24, Decision No 168, p. 60, dated 5 Dhul-Hijjah 981 AH / 27 March 1574 CE.

Muhimme Defteri No. 24, Decision No, pp. 91-92, dated 14 Dhul-Hijjah 981 AH / 5 April 1574 CE.

The message specifies the recruitment locations as follows: "... 60 horsemen from the Ténès regiment, 100 horsemen from the Ma'lamah regiment (as written), 20 horsemen from the Silsila region (as written), 80 horsemen from the Médéa regiment, 100 horsemen from the companions of Shermi (as written) present in Algiers, 100 horsemen from the scattered aghas (Aghalri), and the commanders of the blocks (Block Bashtry), Algiers, 20 horsemen from the Algiers guards (Qabouji), 40 horsemen from the Jaouisha, 35 horsemen from the Omarun region (as written), 400 horsemen from Constantine, 80 horsemen from Biskra, 60 horsemen from the Bled Abbas (as written), and 1,000 elite Janissaries with their muskets...."

⁷⁶ - B.O.A, A.DVNS.MHM.d,..., Kutu No.26, Gömlek No. 832; 15 Recep 982 / 30 Ekim 1574, s 287.

- B.O.A, A.DVNS.MHM.d,..., Kutu No.26, Gömlek No. 834; 15 Recep 982 / 30 Ekim 1574, s 288.

which became part of the Algerian eyalet until 995 AH (1587 AD), when it became directly dependent on the Sublime Porte.

8. The Assistance of the Algerian Fleet to Counter Any Potential Spanish Attack After Their Eviction from Halq al-Wadi:

8-1. Reporting the Fleet's Departure to Sea and Issuing Orders to the Governors of the Region to Monitor It and Not Overlook Spanish Movements in the Mediterranean Sea:

The Spanish were enraged after losing one of their key strongholds in North Africa, namely the fortress of Halq al-Wadi. They could not accept the loss and continued to mobilize their forces to confront the Ottoman Empire in the Mediterranean. On the other hand, the Ottomans monitored the Spanish movements in the sea through their intelligence network in the region. According to correspondence, an Arab informant and one of the Janissaries reported to the central state that the Spanish king had ordered his fleet to set sail. This fleet consisted of 70 warships of the Qadriga type. The Sublime Porte took this report seriously and ordered the necessary precautions to be taken to counter any attack by this fleet. Orders were issued to the Beylerbeys of Western Algeria, Tunisia, Tripoli, and Rhodes to verify the information and investigate the Spanish fleet's movements. The Sublime Porte instructed them not to overlook the enemy's movements and to be ready to defend the country from any aggression. Despite the Spanish fleet not launching any military campaign to regain lost territories in Tunisia during this period, Spanish ships did not hesitate to target any vessel heading toward Ottoman shores, including merchant ships, and attack them⁷⁷.

8-2. The Algerian Fleet Providing Support to Hassan Beylerbey of Tunisia, Commander of Military Campaigns Against the Spanish:

Merchant ships heading to Istanbul had been subject to attacks by Spanish ships. These ships did not limit themselves to attacking merchant vessels but also engaged in hostile actions along Ottoman shores, particularly along the Maghreb coasts, to the extent that these activities could no longer be overlooked. Consequently, the Sublime Porte issued a royal decree appointing the Beylerbey of Tunisia as the commander of military campaigns against foreign hostile targets in the Maghreb. This decree granted him full authority over naval operations. Furthermore, orders were issued to Algeria, Tripoli, the governors of sanjaks, ship commanders, and other military leaders in the region to serve under the command of Hassan Pasha and provide the necessary support for any military campaign he led⁷⁸. Despite these preparations, no direct confrontations occurred between the Ottoman Empire and its enemies, particularly Spain, and Ottoman merchant ships did not report any incidents of collisions with Spanish vessels.

8-3. Orders for the Algerian Fleet to Join the Ottoman Fleet and Comply with the Orders of Admiral Sinan Pasha:

In 998 AH (1590 CE), Sinan Pasha was appointed commander of the naval forces, having governed Erzurum before this appointment. In 998 AH (1591 CE), he was assigned as the head of the Ottoman navy and soon set sail for the Mediterranean. The Ottoman Empire

⁷⁷ - B.O.A, A.DVNS.MHM.d,..., Kutu No.55, Gömlek No. 283; 02 Safer 993 / 03 Şubat 1585, s 158.

⁷⁸ - B.O.A, A.DVNS.MHM.d,..., Kutu No. 55, Gömlek No. 283; 02 Safer 993 / 03 Şubat 1585, s. 158.

- Fadil Beyat: Previous Reference, p. 228.

appeared to be preparing for a military campaign against its traditional enemy, Spain. Consequently, orders were issued to the Beylerbeys of Algeria, Tunisia, and Tripoli to participate in this campaign alongside their forces. The nature of their participation was left to the discretion of the naval commander. Despite the absence of significant naval engagements between the Ottoman fleet and enemy fleets during the years following Sinan Pasha's assumption of naval command, the Ottoman state remained vigilant and ensured that its naval forces and coastal provinces were fully prepared for any unforeseen developments. The Sublime Porte continued to issue orders to regional governors and commanders to maintain readiness for any eventuality⁷⁹.

8-4. The Request for Hassan Bey, Governor of the Constantine Sanjak, to Join the Ottoman Fleet:

Similarly, the governor of the Constantine Sanjak in the Algerian Eyalet was instructed to join the Ottoman fleet with his ship, alongside the Beylerbey of Western Algeria⁸⁰.

8-5. Further Orders for the Algerian Fleet to Join the Ottoman Fleet: Another communication was sent to the Beylerbey of Algeria, and the commanders of ships in the region, including Hamza Bey and Ilyas Bey, directing them to join the Ottoman fleet and serve under the command of Admiral Sinan Pasha. This was part of the fleet's deployment to the Mediterranean Sea in the spring of 1002 AH (1594 CE), with the promise of royal recognition and rewards for their services⁸¹.

Conclusion:

Based on the presented research paper titled "**Algeria Supports the Ottoman Empire Against the Euro-Christian Threats during the 10th Islamic Century / 16th Century CE: An Approach Through Ottoman Documents**," the following conclusions have been reached:

- ✓ Algeria's joining of the Ottoman Empire fulfilled many of the desires of the Ottomans, primarily the expansion of the Ottoman state's territory, extending their influence over the western Mediterranean basin, and confronting the Spanish Empire in its own homeland.
- ✓ The geostrategic position of the province of Algeria allowed it to play a crucial role in intelligence and gathering information about their adversaries. This strategic location significantly contributed to the success of Algerian-Ottoman cooperation against the Euro-Christian states. Additionally, it transformed Algeria into a base for jihad and an essential center for Ottoman presence in the western Mediterranean.
- ✓ Algeria served as a forward base against the enemies of the Ottoman Empire, successfully obstructing their Euro-Christian adversaries. This inclusion in the Empire instilled fear, especially among the Spanish. On the other hand, it became a front for establishing relations with European countries such as France and England.
- ✓ The Province of Algeria provided material and human support to the Muslims of Andalusia, assisting them in their uprisings against the Spanish, transporting them

⁷⁹ - B.O.A, A.DVNS.MHM.d, ..., Kutu No.68, Gömlek No.28 ; 24 Zilkade 999 / 13 Ekim 1591, s 15

⁸⁰ - B.O.A, A.DVNS.MHM.d, ..., Kutu No.72, Gömlek No. 169; 15 Şaban 1002 / 06 Mayıs 1594, s 86

⁸¹ - B.O.A, A.DVNS.MHM.d, ..., Kutu No.72, Gömlek No. 363; 19 Cemaziyelahir 1002 / 12 Mart 1594, s 190

aboard the Algerian fleet to the Maghreb region, and ensuring their security and stability.

- ✓ The solidarity between the Province of Algeria and the Ottoman Empire shifted the balance of power in favor of the Ottomans, as new regions, such as Tripolitania and Tunisia, joined the Empire, recognizing the material and moral support provided to Algeria.
- ✓ The victory achieved by the Ottoman navy at the Battle of Preveza (the Greater Jihad) in 1538, under the leadership of Hayreddin Barbarossa, against the Euro-Christian alliance enabled the Ottomans to control the eastern Mediterranean for thirty years. The Algerian navy played a pivotal role in this battle, and it also had its own share in the Battle of Charlekan against Algeria in retaliation for the defeat at Preveza.
- ✓ The Algerian fleet's support for Hayreddin Barbarossa in France against its traditional enemy, Spain, despite viewing this as an insult to Algeria's military power, was justified by the Ottoman Empire's strategic interests. This Ottoman-French cooperation resulted from the shared threat posed by Spain, led by "King Charles I."
- ✓ Despite the Spanish campaign aimed at the fortress of Badajoz, Hassan Pasha secured his province, led the Algerian fleet to support the Ottoman fleet during the Siege of Malta in 1565, and provided logistical support due to Algeria's proximity to Malta, demonstrating great valor alongside his fleet.
- ✓ Even though Kılıç Ali was occupied with supporting the "Basharat" uprising in Andalusia, liberating the city of Tunis from Spanish dominance, and confronting the Spanish at the Battle of Halaq al-Wadi, he did not hesitate to provide Algerian support for the conquest of Cyprus in 1570.
- ✓ Kılıç Ali's command of the Algerian and Tripolitanian fleets to support the Ottoman navy at the Battle of Lepanto in 1571 enabled him to save his entire fleet and avenge the Ottoman defeat. The Algerian fleet was also called upon to restore order within the Ottoman territories after the loss at Lepanto.
- ✓ Due to the proximity of Algeria to Tunisia, Algeria provided material and military support to the Ottoman fleet in the Battle of Tunisia – Halaq al-Wadi in 1574, and the Algerian fleet was used to prevent any potential Spanish attack following their expulsion from Halaq al-Wadi.
- ✓ Thanks to the combined efforts of Algeria's Beylerbeys, represented by Hayreddin, his son Hassan, Kılıç Ali, and Hassan Veneziano, who provided support to the Ottoman Empire, their competence and military acumen led to their appointment as admirals in the Ottoman fleet.
- ✓ Thanks to the consistent presence and cooperation between the Ottoman and Algerian fleets, the Maghreb's territorial integrity was preserved, and the Ottoman Empire was able to expand its territory further.

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