Exceptions to the principle of prohibiting the administrative judge from directing orders to the administration

Abstract

The principle of prohibition of directing orders to the administration and the prohibition of substituting them
dates back to the date of the French Council of State turning to the stage of the outright judiciary or the commissioner.
Before that date, the Council of State used to direct orders to the administration and replace them in practicing its
competence because it was only an advisory body to the administration. Therefore, the Council practiced the authority to
direct orders to the administration and to replace them based on the direct subordination to the head of state. But, after
the independence from the administration and possessing final judicial authority, the council voluntarily chose to restrict
its powers in the cancellation lawsuit with a number of restrictions, including its abstention from directing orders to the
administration and replacing it with practicing its administrative function without any explicit and clear provision that
obliges the Council to this type of restriction.